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EU and its Neighbours: Resilience and Multicultural Harmony

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Editorial / Preface

L'histoire est une discipline savante qui se consacre à l'étude des événements du passé. Il s'agit d'établir la connaissance la plus objective possible de ce qui relève du passé. Produite par les historiens à partir d'un travail approfondi fondé sur différentes archives, l'historien se doit de croiser ces sources avec une distanciation nécessaire avec ses documents qui peuvent être partielles et subjectives c'est le cas des travaux présentés. La mémoire est le vécu d'événement par des individus ou des groupes, accompagnée d'une charge émotionnelle, elle est sélective et par conséquent subjective. Ces dernières années, l'activité de l'historien s'est considérablement élargie, une demande sociale et judiciaire se fait de plus en plus pressante. L'historien est de plus en plus sollicité dans l'espace public pour apporter son expertise sur le passé et de témoigner devant les tribunaux. Les scènes d'intervention de l'historien se sont multipliées: témoin, expert aux tribunaux, médias, commissions mettant l'histoire ans une position ambivalente, confrontée à une demande sociale contradictoire mais surtout pressante. L'historien devient ainsi tributaire de son objet et d'une écriture prescriptive plutôt que descriptive. C'est que qu'ont démontré ici d'une manière convaincante, nos brillants chercheurs.

L'interculturalité et multiculturalité, concepts aujourd'hui au cœur des débats contemporains, est bien plus qu'une simple rencontre entre des cultures. C'est un espace de dialogue, de partage et parfois de confrontation, mais aussi un terrain d'enrichissement mutuel. Dans un monde où les frontières géographiques, politiques et sociales sont de plus en plus perméables, la capacité à comprendre et à échanger avec l'Autre devient essentielle, non seulement pour la paix et la cohésion sociale, mais aussi pour le développement individuel et collectif.

Ce travail collectif dirigée par Mihaela Natea et Simion Costea¹, se veut un témoignage de la richesse de l'interculturalité et de ses défis multiples. Il regroupe une diversité de voix, de perspectives et d'approches qui mettent en lumière les multiples facettes de ce phénomène complexe. Chaque contribution, qu'elle soit théorique, pratique ou réflexive, enrichit notre compréhension des mécanismes d'interaction entre les cultures, tout en mettant en évidence les obstacles et les opportunités qui en découlent.

Dans les pages qui suivent, vous découvrirez des analyses sur les dynamiques sociales, économiques et politiques européennes qui façonnent nos sociétés de plus en plus globalisées, ainsi que des témoignages vécus par des individus et des communautés au cœur de ces échanges interculturels. Les auteurs ont choisi de ne pas seulement parler des différences, mais de souligner ce qui nous unit, malgré nos diverses origines et trajectoires académiques.

À une époque où les discours sur l'Europe sont souvent marqués par la peur de l'inconnu et la méfiance envers ce qui est perçu comme "Autre", il nous semble crucial de rappeler que

¹Natea, Mihaela Daciana, Costea, Maria, Costea, Simion, *European Security and Multicultural Societies, Dealing with a Russian Empire Revival*, L'Harmattan, Paris France, 2024. Costea, Maria, Costea, Simion (ISI) "Ukraine between EU and Eurasian Regional Project in 2013", p.113-131, in *Transylvanian Review* (Center for Transylvanian Studies and the Romanian Academy), Vol. XXIV, Supplement No. 1, 2015. Costea, Maria, Costea Simion (ISI), „The Management of the EU's Eastern Partnership Project: A New Stage in the European Neighbourhood Policy”, p.409-433, in *Transylvanian Review* (Center for Transylvanian Studies and the Romanian Academy), Vol. XX, Supplement No. 4, 2011. Costea, Simion (ISI), „The Culture of the European Accession Negotiations”, p.50-56, in vol. *Globalization and intercultural dialogue: multidisciplinary perspectives* Tîrgu-Mureş, Arhipelag XXI, 2014, 2014. Costea, Simion, “EU-Ukraine Relations and the Eastern Partnership: Challenges, Progress and Potential”, p.259-276, in *European Foreign Affairs Review* (College of Europe BRUGGE and University of Montreal), volume 16, issue 2, 2011. Dolidze, M, Chemutai, V. Georgia Monthly Economic Update, November 2024, World Bank Group. Natea, Mihaela Daciana, „Fabricating truth: from a hybrid war to political fake news. Study case on Romanian illiberal parties' discourse in the context of the Ukrainian war”, in *Civil Szemle*, Special Issues V/2023, pp. 155.

l'interculturalité n'est pas un phénomène passif, mais un processus actif, un apprentissage constant qui nécessite ouverture, empathie et réciprocité.

Dans un monde où les frontières, qu'elles soient géographiques, culturelles, sociales ou idéologiques, semblent se redéfinir sans cesse, l'«Autre» reste une figure à la fois familière et énigmatique.

Qui est l'Autre ? Celui que l'on perçoit comme différent, que l'on comprend à travers un prisme souvent teinté de préjugés, de stéréotypes, mais aussi de curiosité et d'empathie ?

Ce livre s'engage à explorer cette notion sous différents angles, en croisant les regards de diverses disciplines, et pratiques.

À travers ces pages, nous plongeons dans une réflexion où l'Autre est aussi bien une réalité extérieure qu'une construction intérieure, parfois perçue avec crainte, parfois avec fascination. Qu'il soit un individu d'une culture différente, un être rejeté en raison de sa différence ou encore une version de soi-même projetée et idéalisée, l'«Autre» nous invite à repenser notre propre place dans le monde.

Les sujets qui s'y déploient sont multiples: de la rencontre interculturelle à la relations, la globalisation, des dynamiques sociales et politiques aux questionnements sur la désinformation, l'intelligence artificielle, la différence et l'altérité. Chaque chapitre, chaque réflexion s'inscrit dans une démarche visant à comprendre ce qui nous sépare, mais aussi ce qui nous unit, à travers le prisme de l'Autre.

Les contributions réunies ici nous invitent à repenser nos certitudes, à déconstruire les stéréotypes et à célébrer la diversité comme une richesse. Elles nous montrent que l'interculturalité au sein de l'Europe n'est pas une fin en soi, mais un moyen de renforcer les liens entre les individus, les universitaires, et les pays, de redéfinir la notion de citoyenneté européenne et de construire un avenir commun basé sur le respect et la compréhension mutuels.

Ainsi, cet ouvrage est un appel à la réflexion et à l'action, un «guide» pour celles et ceux qui œuvrent, au quotidien, à tisser des ponts entre les cultures, les peuples, les pays mais aussi un miroir dans lequel chacun peut se reconnaître et, peut-être, se réinventer.

Les auteurs de ce collectif nous rappellent que l'Europe est avant tout un espace de partage humain et de transformation personnelle.

Nous vous invitons à découvrir ces pages avec curiosité et ouverture d'esprit, et à participer vous-même à ce grand voyage interculturel extra européen.

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SECTION 1

History, Religion, and Multicultural Societies: Bridging Europe and Its Neighbours

Victimisation, violences et souffrances. Comment se construit le discours victimaire?

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Abstract: *Victimization, violence, and suffering. Victimization and violence multiply wounded and confronted memories. Therefore it is not a question here of privileging the victims, of moving from victim to victim, from women to colonized natives, from impoverished Fellahs to exploited workers, nor of to make models or to identify with them. What is important, is to restore historical dignity to those who were colonized and to question what the elites did with the cultural goods "put" at their disposal. It is also about evoking the different forms of violence and proposing a reflection on a new humanism.*

Keywords: *violence, memories, victims, history, humanity, wars.*

Résumé: *La victimisation et les violences multiplient les mémoires blessées et affrontées. Par conséquent il ne s'agit pas ici de privilégier les victimes, de cheminer de victimes en victimes, des femmes aux indigènes colonisés, des fellahs appauvris aux ouvriers exploités, ni d'en faire des modèles, ni de s'y identifier. Mais il est important de redonner la dignité historique à celles et ceux qui furent colonisés et de s'interroger sur ce qu'ont fait les élites des biens culturels « mis » à leur disposition. Il s'agit également d'évoquer les différentes formes de violence et de proposer une réflexion sur un nouvel humanisme.*

Mots clefs: *violences, mémoires, victimes, histoire, humanité, guerres.*

Relire le passé. Eternel travail de l'historien qui rend l'histoire vivante et de plus en plus intéressante. Mais la relecture n'est pas un long fleuve tranquille et ne suit pas les rythmes des saisons. Ces relectures s'accroissent quand les souffrances et les heurts du présent font appel au passé, quand le passé rattrape le présent. La domination, le déclassement social, la violence ne peuvent produire qu'une histoire traversée par l'oubli, les conflits et la victimisation.

« Ce monde est celui des pires violences la barbarie « généralisée » écrivait Hannah Arendt.³ Dans le monde, les femmes sont les premières victimes de violences, violences physiques, sexuelles, psychologiques, verbales, économiques. Elles sont aussi soumises au quotidien à des violences moins visibles, plus insidieuses telles que l'accès inégal au marché du travail, l'inégalité des salaires, la répartition inégale des tâches domestiques etc.⁴. ("Chapitre 21. Les violences faites aux femmes dans le monde: regards ...")

La figure de la victime remonte à très loin dans l'histoire, sa place et sa perception varient en fonction des contextes socio- historiques, des valeurs collectives et surtout des émotions provoquées par celle-ci. "G. Erner (2006) considère que la notion de victime sert à désigner toute condition perçue comme insupportable par notre époque: douleur physique, souffrance sociale, ou psychologique liée ou non à un traumatisme."

La victime apparaît dans cette perspective, comme une construction sociale élaborée par l'ensemble des discours, des représentations, des croyances et des références d'une époque donnée.

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³ Hannah Arendt, *Conditions de l'homme moderne*, Poeket, Paris, 2002, 4^{ème} de couverture. Dans cet ouvrage, elle livre sa pensée sur l'originalité radicale de notre époque et pose les bases d'une réflexion qui permettra peut-être, de se donner les moyens d'éviter les dérapages vers la violence aveugle en comprenant en profondeur la dimension de « l'homme moderne ».

⁴ Anne-Françoise DEQUIRE, *Les violences faites aux femmes. Un combat séculaire* ; édition du Cygne, Paris, 2015.p.7.

Il s'agit d'une position perçue de manière positive dans le système des valeurs de la société: être victime renvoie aux sacrifices, aux saints aux martyrs (objet d'admiration et de vénération).

Toutefois, ce mot (victimisation) a toujours été appliqué à diverses réalités ; avec des sens différents, cela montre la difficulté d'en retracer l'histoire complète, même si telle n'est pas notre ambition.

L'héritage culturel a laissé la conviction qu'il faut toujours être du côté du faible, de la victime censée susciter la compassion, l'empathie et à qui on doit réparation des souffrances. Victime réelle (non construite) et/ou construite par les moyens discursifs et audio visuels trouvent sa traduction et son prolongement dans l'intentionnalité (M. Gauchet, 2005).

Les victimes qui revendiquent ce statut ou les médiateurs qui le font au nom de ceux-ci, cherchent et veulent se montrer souffrants en discours, en larmes et en images.

La démonstration de la souffrance est supposée provoquer la commisération, la sympathie, l'indignation, l'état victimaire crée une rupture dans l'ordre du monde car ces victimes se trouvent dans une position inférieure à la normale. Pendant des siècles ces victimes n'ont pas été à l'ordre du jour, le tournant fut lors de la Révolution française de 1789 pendant laquelle les chefs révolutionnaires se sont penchés sur les doléances du peuple victime de tyrannie monarchique et d'une société inégalitaire (les Ordres). L'effort de s'occuper des victimes, de leur misère et de leur marginalisation se poursuit tout au long du XIX^{ème} siècle.

Dans les années 1960, les révolutionnaires manifestaient leur solidarité avec les opprimés et cherchaient à les faire apparaître dans l'espace public (banderoles, manifestations de soutien, solidarité militante...). Ensuite vient le temps d'évoquer les victimes de la Shoah et depuis une décennie on assiste à un paysage troublant et inquiétant, celui de la concurrence des victimes (J.M Chaument).

Le souci de la reconnaissance de la souffrance des opprimés, les damnés de la terre (F. Fanon, 1961) constituait un thème dominant plein d'analogie avec le thème de la victimisation et du manque de reconnaissance dont souffraient les victimes, (Rimé, 2015). La victime se transforme alors en catégorie sociale à part entière, elle se construit dans le regard et le discours de l'autre qui joue un rôle important dans son usage/mésusage social et culturel.

Les victimes écrivent leur histoire. La figure de la victime connaît depuis plusieurs années une consécration historique importante, une forme d'innovation historique indéniable et incontestable.

Partout dans le monde dans le sillage de la mort de George Floyd, cet afro-américain étouffé par un policier blanc, des statues de grands personnages sont renversées, graffitées et jetées à l'eau.⁵ Les monuments dressés à la gloire de Christophe Colomb, du général Robert Lee aux USA, du négrier Edouard Colston à Bristol, de Churchill en Angleterre, ou en France de Colbert, l'instigateur du Code noir (en 1685), régissant l'esclavage outre-mer, sont ciblés comme autant de symboles de la domination occidentale et de l'asservissement d'une partie de l'humanité.

Ce retour du refoulé explique le désir des muets de l'histoire de prendre revanche sur les aberrations du monde des puissants et dominants⁶.

⁵ Pierre BOURDIEU: « En France, la décennie 80 aura été marquée non seulement par la montée des inégalités urbaines, de la xénophobie et des mouvements de protestation des jeunes des « banlieues » populaires, mais aussi par la prolifération d'un discours d'un type nouveau autour du thème de la « ghettoïsation » qui suggère une convergence subite entre les quartiers déshérités des villes françaises et des villes américaines. La thématique du ghetto, nourrie des clichés importés d'Outre-Atlantique (Chicago-Le Bronx, Harlem...) s'est imposée comme l'un des lieux communs du débat public sur la ville », *La misère du monde*, p.263.

⁶ -Faut-il interpréter leurs écrits passés à la lumière des jours actuels? ou à l'inverse accepterait-on de croiser le buste de Victor Hugo jugé colonialiste « Dieu offre l'Afrique à L'Europe » en faveur de la colonisation, condescend vis-à-vis des peuples africains.

Notre époque est grandement marquée par la violence des régimes totalitaires⁷ ont vu le jour en Europe réputée démocratique, deux conflits mondiaux avec l'étendu, la violence au second et une dégradation de la violence sur tous les théâtres des opérations.

Les violences de masses sont nombreuses aussi bien contre les soldats que contre les civils. Cette guerre a ouvert la voie à des violences de masse et au génocide des Juifs et des Tsiganes: déportation, exécution par balles. Le bilan de l'extermination des Juifs d'Europe est tout à fait effroyable et le bilan du génocide tzigane est tout aussi terrifiant. A la suite des capitulations des puissances de l'Axe, les procès de Nuremberg⁸ et de Tokyo⁹ doivent permettre de juger les principaux responsables des crimes de guerre et crimes contre l'humanité. Une première expérience de mise en place d'une justice pénale internationale.

Il ne s'agit pas ici de privilégier les victimes, de cheminer de victimes en victimes, des esclaves au monde ouvrier, du monde ouvrier aux femmes, des femmes aux indigènes colonisés, de ces derniers aux immigrés. La notion de victime est aujourd'hui valorisée (A. Rabatel) et nous avons même tendance à faire des victimes des modèles. S'identifier aux victimes devient valorisant.

Nous savons bien que le dispositif victimaire s'appuie sur les émotions mises en récit et en scène afin de la rendre visible au maximum (M. Gauchet). Ce processus psychologique ou l'individu se place dans une situation de victime de tout, est contraignante dans le positionnement qu'elle donne et dise. Nous nous appuyons sur les travaux de S. Branca sur l'auto-victimisation et la construction du dispositif victimaire autour de la dichotomie Blancs/Noirs. Elle montre bien que les leaders noirs ont fait appel à la mobilisation des émotions, aux résonances culturelles et ont à l'identité collective pour mobiliser.

Quant à P-A. Taguieff, il explicite que la construction victimaire des hâisseurs des Juifs a permis de justifier et de légitimer les mesures d'expulsion et d'extermination des Juifs depuis le XII^e siècle. A travers des récits criminalisant un autre groupe (ex: musulmans, juifs, femmes) qui lui est innocent, transforment et disqualifient (P. Charaudeau), ce dernier en responsable des malheurs réels ou potentiels de la société voire de l'humanité en lui attribuant des intentions criminelles. Une fois la figure du bourreau imaginaire créée et incrustée, il devient légitime de se venger de lui en l'éliminant.

Cette démarche victimaire risque de retarder ou même d'empêcher toute véritable intégration au corps social, elle multiplie en outre les mémoires affrontées et blessées

Que peut signifier l'émergence des « mémoires brisées » et de particularismes identitaires dans une société qui croyait aux vertus supérieures du tout similaire, de l'indivisibilité et de l'homogénéité? Cette question se pose avec acuité en France, et les réponses passionnées qu'elle suscite permettent d'envisager toute la complexité d'un débat reposant sur des conceptions différentes du « Vivre Ensemble ». Depuis les années 2000, c'est en effet autour des polémiques mémorielles que semble se reposer la question des « minorités visibles » dans la société française. Derrière les usages publics de la victimisation, se dissimule ainsi le vaste questionnement concernant la prise en compte de la diversité et les risques d'une mise en cause du modèle français républicain ainsi que l'effritement du « grand récit national ».

P. Ricoeur ne croyait pas si bien dire¹⁰, il énonçait son mobile civique: « *je reste troublé par l'inquiétant spectacle que donne le top de mémoire ici, le trop d'oubli ailleurs, pour ne rien dire de l'influence des commémorations et des abus de mémoire et d'oubli* ». Son objectif est d'éviter toute crispation, toute victimisation, toute souffrance, toute confusion, tout repli.

⁷ -Il s'agit du fascisme en Italie, du nazisme en Allemagne et du Communisme en URSS.

⁸ Du 20 novembre 1945 au 1^{er} octobre 1946.

⁹ -Du 19 janvier 1946 au 12 novembre 1948.

¹⁰ Paul Ricoeur, *La Mémoire, l'Histoire, l'Oubli*, Paris, Le Seuil, 2002.

Depuis quelques années, la mémoire (et ses lots de victimes) se trouve mobiliser à différentes échelles de la société. Anthropologues, sociologues, historiens mais aussi des acteurs de la société civile et des hommes politiques s'emploient aujourd'hui à cicatiser les souffrances, à revisiter le passé avant que celui s'éloigne et que les témoins disparaissent. Les racines historiques et familiales se trouvent mobilisées comme pour « sanctuariser » la vie sociale et naturaliser un ensemble de pratiques culturelles et sociales.¹¹

Appeler au « devoir de mémoire » par plusieurs catégories de victimes, revient à solliciter le retour du refoulé, le refus de l'oubli pour celles et ceux qui ont pris le parti d'oublier les aspects les plus traumatisants de leur passé dans le but de surmonter leurs anciennes périodes douloureuses.¹²

Nous voudrions insister particulièrement sur le fait qu'il s'agit dans la victimisation de constructions sous-tendues par des représentations sociales qui mobilisent des moyens discursifs et argumentatifs divers (S. Branca, 2015).

Dans cette perspective, plusieurs pistes de réflexion se dégagent sur ce sujet.

— Le dispositif argumentatif est-il le même lorsqu'un groupe s'auto-victime ou lorsqu'il est construit par un tiers qui lui, ne fait pas partie du groupe?

— Comment se construit le dispositif victimaire dans des types et des genres de discours différents?

— Quels sont les procédés argumentatifs utilisés pour sa mise en circulation et comment s'articulent les arguments de type rationnel et émotionnel dans ces dispositifs?¹³

— Comment un contre discours arrive-t-il à se construire et à se justifier en disqualifiant le discours victimaire sans déroger aux valeurs admises par tous. ("Introduction. De la victime à la victimisation: la construction d'...")

Dans ce monde défiguré dans lequel nous sommes sans repères, nous avançons à vue, au jour le jour. Cependant de nouveaux horizons nous attendent avec certainement des défis à relever et des belles opportunités à saisir.

Les questions qui sont formulées sont à la fois brûlantes et passionnantes. Elles nécessitent un traitement distant et critique et un discours différent.¹⁴

Traitons les sous un nouveau regard avec sérénité, responsabilité et rationalité!

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¹¹ François DOSS, *Intervention prononcée à l'INRP lors de la journée sur le thème « Histoire et mémoire, défis et enjeux d'un débat »*, le 25 octobre 2006. *Diversité*, n°149, Juin 2007, p27.

¹² *Le Débat*, septembre-octobre 2006.

¹³ L'attention accordée par les médias à l'explosion de rage qui a embrasé Los Angeles en mai 1992, à la suite de l'acquittement des policiers blancs incriminés dans l'affaire Rodney King, ne doit pas occulter les émeutes silencieuses de la vie de tous les jours qui font du ghetto noir un champ de bataille perpétuelle pour la sécurité et la survie.

¹⁴ Hedi SAIDI, *Mémoire forcée et Histoire difficile*, Université de Sfax, 2020.

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La laïcité - valeur occidentale ou portée universelle?

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Abstract:: *Secularism, Western value, or universal scope? Republican France is today ahead of the rest of the world, in the area of the secularization of morals, political life and the functioning of social life in general. These advances have enabled significant secularization and given France the system most conducive to promote the secular principle. Currently, we are witnessing a return of religion in society, calling into question secularism and the separation between Church and State. Can this secularism claim to be universal? We propose some avenues for reflection in order to bring about the triumph of an "Islam of Enlightenment" in France and in the EU. We must recognize that holy war is outdated and useless and we must refuse any form of fundamentalism. In the Quran, there are as many verses which advocate peace as war. Muftis must favor the former, the peaceful ones. Imams must be confined to the mosque. We need to promote an Islam of Enlightenment.*

Keywords: EU, Secularism, Church, Islam, Religion, State, Integration.

Résumé: *Il est indéniable que la France républicaine est aujourd'hui en avance par rapport au reste du monde, dans le domaine de la sécularisation des mœurs, de la vie politique et du fonctionnement de la vie sociale en générale. Ces avancées ont permis une sécularisation importante et donné à la France le système le plus propice à la prise en compte du principe laïque. Actuellement, nous assistons à un retour du fait religieux dans la société mettant en cause la laïcité et la séparation entre l'Église et l'État. Est-ce que cette laïcité peut prétendre à l'universalité? Nous proposons quelques pistes de réflexion afin de faire triompher un « islam des Lumières » en France et dans l'UE. Il faut reconnaître que la guerre sainte est dépassée et inutile et il faut refuser toute forme d'intégrisme. Dans le Coran, il y a autant de versets qui prônent la paix que la guerre. Les muftis doivent privilégier les premières, la paix. Il faut cantonner les imams à la mosquée. Il faut faire valoir un islam des Lumières.*

Mots clés: UE, Laïcité, Église, Islam, Religion, État, Intégration.

INTRODUCTION

Le mot « laïc » est d'abord apparu dans le langage de l'Église catholique. Le laïc est celui qui n'est pas prêtre ou moine mais simplement un membre du « peuple » qu'aucune fonction religieuse particulière ne distingue. Le mot laïc vient en effet d'un terme grec, *laos*, qui signifie « le peuple tout entier ». C'est directement à cette origine grecque que se rattachent l'adjectif « laïque » et le nom « laïcité » qui ne sont apparus dans le vocabulaire français qu'au XIX^e siècle.

La laïcité,¹ c'est la pratique du libre examen, de la pensée libre, dégagée de l'argument d'autorité². C'est la rationalité critique opposée aux dogmes, la pluralité opposée au monopole de la vérité, la constitution et la défense d'un espace public du pluralisme, de discussion d'idées. Elle est la problématisation généralisée de Dieu, du monde, de la nature, de l'homme, de la cité, de la vérité (Edgar Morin).

En tant que telle, c'est bien l'institutionnalisation de la Tolérance. Une **société laïque** n'est pas donc une société antireligieuse, agnostique ou athée, mais simplement **une société dans laquelle aucune forme particulière de pensée ou de croyance n'est privilégiée dans l'espace public**.

La faillite actuelle de l'idéologie marxiste³ athée et ses variantes a autorisé la réapparition du fait religieux dans des États où il était officiellement interdit. Ainsi, depuis 1989 renaissent au grand

¹ -Sans doute les historiens et les philosophes nous diraient-ils que dès l'antiquité et tout au long du Moyen Age, des philosophes de toutes origines ont promu l'autonomie de la pensée et du jugement. Platon, Aristote comme les philosophes musulmans que sont Avicenne (Ibn Sinâ) et Averroès (Ibn Rushd) appellent à étudier rationnellement le monde.

² -Dire la vérité et l'imposer à tous

³ Francis Fukuyama annonçait dans sa formule la « fin de l'histoire »: la victoire du « monde libre » dans la guerre froide devait assurer le monopole de la démocratie du marché, horizon désormais unique et indépassable. Costea, Simion, Labori,

jour l'Église orthodoxe en Russie, Ukraine, Roumanie, le luthérianisme en Estonie et Lettonie, l'Islam dans les Républiques ex-soviétiques du Kazakhstan, de l'Ouzbékistan, de Kirghizie, de Turkménistan, du Tadjikistan de l'Azerbaïdjan, le bouddhisme au Cambodge. Seule la Corée du Nord, la Chine et Cuba communistes affichent un athéisme contredit par bien des réalités (venue du pape à Cuba). Mais cette résurrection s'accompagne, à l'échelle mondiale, d'un regain de conflictualité. Non pas que les religions, dans leur essence, sont porteuses d'intolérance, toutefois, force est de constater l'accumulation d'affrontements qui culminent médiatiquement avec les attentats du 11 septembre 2001.

Ainsi depuis 1989, plusieurs pays ont connu diverses guerres civiles ou conflits régionaux comportant un élément religieux ou idéologique: la Tchétchénie, l'Arménie et Azerbaïdjan, l'ex-Yougoslavie, l'Irak, la Syrie, la Lybie, l'Algérie, Israël, la Birmanie, le Sri Lanka, le Timor-Oriental, le Tibet, les Philippines. Ces conflits régionaux mettent aux prises des acteurs marqués religieusement, que cette connotation soit consciente et affichée ou qu'elle leur soit attachée inconsciemment.⁴

L'après-Seconde Guerre mondiale et la volonté affirmée de mettre à l'index la guerre, suivie de la guerre froide⁵ ont donné l'illusion d'un monde sans guerre. Or depuis 1945 à 1989, 160 conflits ont éclaté à la surface de la planète causant la mort de 40 millions de personnes (Boniface, 2001), conflits localisés où l'élément religieux n'est en rien négligeable occultés par l'affrontement des deux superpuissances.

LES RELIGIONS, SOURCE D'HOSTILITE?

Partout le fanatisme religieux ruine le « Vivre Ensemble », mine la vie des pays et sabote la laïcité. Ce raz de marée de nostalgie religieuse, qui brouille les cartes et bouscule les démocraties, n'est pas si surprenant que cela.

Les énormes mutations technologiques économiques et géopolitiques que nous vivons depuis plusieurs années portent en elles autant de menaces que de promesses. Mais malheureusement, elles nous précipitent collectivement dans une incertitude, une instabilité, un avenir difficile à maîtriser (Roy, 2008). Dans ces périodes, la tentation est grande de tenter de recréer rêveusement un monde auréolé de toutes les vertus, une nostalgie de l'islam pur et conquérant, son « âge d'or ».

DE NOUS JOURS

Le contexte religieux national s'est transformé. Aux trois religions traditionnellement implantées en France, s'est ajouté l'Islam qui est désormais la deuxième religion en France. L'islam n'a pas été partie prenante de l'élaboration des lois laïques des années 1880 et 1905. En outre, nous remarquons que l'Église catholique, dominante en France, a mis plus d'un siècle et demi à accepter la laïcité sans arrière-pensée. L'Islam, lui, s'y trouve confronté brutalement. Or la jurisprudence islamique dominante établit un lien étroit entre la politique et le religieux. Elle ne fait pas spontanément de la religion « une affaire privée » et la laïcité de l'État ne fait pas traditionnellement partie de ses schémas de pensée. La République Française n'a pas, à l'époque de la colonisation, favorisé l'émergence d'une éducation à la laïcité ou d'une réflexion sur la laïcité dans les pays

Michel, *Le Management des Politiques de l'Union Européenne* PARIS, Prodifmultimedia, 2011. Costea, Simion (coord.), *Culture, Elites and European Integration, Volume IV – International Relations and European Union Interdisciplinary Studies*, PARIS, Editions Prodifmultimedia, 2011. Costea, Simion (coord.), *For a Stronger and Wider European Union*, Cluj-Napoca, Napoca Star, 2005. Costea, Maria, Costea, Simion, (ISI), „Challenges of the EU in the Migrant/Refugee Crisis in 2015”, p.166-175, in vol. *Discourse as a form of multiculturalism in literature and communication. History and cultural mentalities* Tirgu-Mures, Arhipelag XXI Press, 2015.

⁴ -Ainsi au Kosovo, les Kosovars musulmans ont été aux prises avec les troupes de la République fédérale de Yougoslavie alors que les forces d'interposition de l'ONU (la KFOR) étaient avant tout composées de Chrétiens.

⁵ -Où la paix impossible rendait malgré toute la guerre improbable.

musulmans sous sa tutelle, en particulier en Algérie, du fait du maintien d'une identité personnelle confessionnelle (« Français musulmans ») liée au code de l'indigénat. Après deux siècles de reflux, la mer du spirituel remonte. (Bidar, 2016). Mais le spirituel revient parfois même du côté de la religion, lorsqu'elle en s'érige pas en maître de vérité. De plus en plus des héritiers de l'islam, du christianisme, du judaïsme, vont puiser à ces sources des perles d'inspiration. On ne va plus vers les textes pour obéir mais pour méditer, trouver son chemin de vie personnel. On relit la Bible, le Coran, la Bhagavad-Gita, pour y sentir le mystère de l'univers et de notre condition humaine (Bidar, 2016).

Chacun tente de s'ouvrir aussi aux grands textes des autres et la nouvelle quête de sens fait exploser tous les cadres. Elle déborde les murs et les frontières du religieux qui n'a plus le monopole de rien. Le chercheur de sagesse est aujourd'hui **un nomade spirituel, un explorateur**, un omnivore qui cherche partout de la nourriture pour son âme, partout une expérience initiatique, y compris dans les domaines les plus profanes de sa vie: ses amours, ses réseaux, ses engagements, son travail, de la simplicité, de la beauté, de l'intensité, de la qualité plutôt que la quantité. Cette soif est spirituelle, car elle vient s'étancher aux mille et une sources de l'existence où jaillit quelque chose qui peut nous faire grandir en humanité. La vie spirituelle qui émerge ne tend plus vers un au-delà, elle veut se nourrir ici et maintenant, dans tout geste, tout acte, tout engagement, la vie spirituelle cherche à devenir la vie toute courte, tel est l'événement de ce début du XXI^{ème} siècle (A. Bidar, 2016).

Le contexte social n'est plus le même. Jean Jaurès affirmait au début du XX^{ème} siècle que la laïcité ne s'imposerait que si elle s'accompagnait de la justice sociale. La crise de l'emploi qui frappe la société française et en particulier les populations d'origine immigrée, confronte ces dernières à l'exclusion économique et sociale. La tentation du repli communautaire et la crispation sur des valeurs qui ne sont pas celles de la République répondent, dans une partie de la population, à ce sentiment d'exclusion. *« Pour éviter une telle dérive il faut que chaque individu soit rendu effectivement maître de tous les droits que la république laïque lui confère, et qu'il en éprouve l'authenticité au cœur même de la vie économique et sociale. Sans quoi il sera évidemment tenté par ce qui lui apparaîtra comme une sphère plus humaine, plus accueillante quelque soient les allégeances qu'elle requiert. »*⁶

Le contexte international lui aussi a évolué.⁷ Le développement de l'intégrisme dans toutes les religions, l'aggravation du conflit israélo-palestinien (2023), les guerres au Proche Orient, toutes ces tensions internationales ont rejailli, sous la forme de l'intolérance, du racisme, de l'antisémitisme, sur l'espace national et jusqu'au cœur des établissements scolaires dont la paix et la sérénité se trouvent menacées. Plus que jamais la démarche laïque s'impose pour nous préserver de tels déchirements.

Deuxième religion de France, et des autres pays de l'Union Européenne, l'islam reste la religion des autres par excellence. Elle est l'une des plus méconnues des religions de ce pays. Elle rime souvent avec **intégrisme, terrorisme, exploitation de la femme et fanatisme**. D'abord l'adhésion à cette religion a naturellement des effets sur le comportement des musulmans en société: elle est de nature à modifier leur attitude, à infléchir leur vote à peser sur leurs opinions politiques ou sociales.

⁶ Pena-Ruiz, H. *Qu'est-ce que la laïcité?* Paris, Gallimard, p.170.

⁷ Natea, Mihaela Daciana, Fabricating truth: from a hybrid war to political fake news. Study case on Romanian illiberal parties' discourse in the context of the Ukrainian war, *Civil Szemle*, Special Issues V/2023, pp. 155, Natea, Mihaela Daciana, Mihai Daniel Aniței, Reshaping European and national security in a post COVID – 19 context, *Acta Marisiensis, Seria Oeconomica*, 2020, vol II, Natea, Mihaela Daciana, A New European Philosophy on Recovery and Resilience. The Recovery and Resilience Facility and the Impact over Member States. *Acta Marisiensis, Seria Oeconomica*, 2021, vol II, Natea, Mihaela Daciana, *Reshaping European Security in a Post COVID-19 World*, L'Harmattan, Paris France, 2023, Natea, Mihaela Daciana, "Is the EU strategic communication good enough? Why does the war in Ukraine prove the need for a more complex approach towards Disinformation?", in coord. Mihaela Daciana Natea, *Disinformation crossing borders. The Multilayered Disinformation Concerning the War in Ukraine*, L'Harmattan, Paris France, 2022.

De plus, le fait religieux comporte ordinairement une dimension sociale puisqu'il se vit dans une communauté. La foi est enseignée, reçue, vécue dans une mosquée, église, synagogue, elle s'exprime dans un culte célébré publiquement le vendredi. La religion suscite ainsi l'existence d'une communauté musulmane (confessionnelle par nature) à l'intérieur de la société française globale et cette dernière ne peut plus ignorer la présence musulmane et se désintéresser de la présence musulmane dans le pays et dans l'Union Européenne. Il faut donc aller aux explications théoriques pour mieux cerner ce retour du religieux particulièrement chez les jeunes et non pas les explications journalistiques. Mais cet aspect des rapports Religion/ État qui est généralement le plus visible et le plus connu, s'il retient l'attention en priorité, est loin d'être le seul et l'unique ou s'articulent les deux institutions. Il n'est que sommet d'une pyramide de relations multiples et qui intéressent bien d'autres secteurs de la réalité telle que la culture, les mentalités, l'immigration, les classes sociales, le djihadisme. Ce n'est donc pas seulement la présence des étrangers sur le sol français qui évoque le fait religieux, c'est toute l'histoire de la France. D'autre part, les rapports avec l'islam ont subi d'importantes évolutions avec l'installation durable et définitive des immigrés.

Mais qui dans ce pays et dans l'UE a intérêt à traduire en termes exclusivement religieux, des problèmes qui sont politiques, sociaux économiques et identitaires et qui prennent éventuellement des formes religieuses parce qu'ils ne peuvent plus prendre des formes politiques.

Si le fait religieux a cessé en beaucoup de société, (tel n'est pas le cas dans les sociétés musulmanes où la référence à l'islam est l'expression du sentiment national) d'être l'expression commune, si le pluralisme des croyances est devenu le droit et le fait, si les liens entre religion et politique se sont distendus, le fait religieux n'a pas disparu. Loin de là, il montre même une étonnante persistance dans les pays qui ont tenté de l'étouffer (Union soviétique et les pays socialistes), il montre une capacité de durer et de résister qui n'autorise pas à le traiter comme une simple survivance voué à s'étioler à bref délai.

L'ISLAM EN FRANCE⁸ ET LE PRINCIPE DE LA LAÏCITE?

Quelques pistes de réflexion afin de faire triompher un « islam des Lumières »⁹ en France et dans L'UE:

-Les instances religieuses musulmanes ne peuvent plus ignorer que leurs fidèles appartiennent aussi à une Nation et sont par conséquent les citoyens de cet État et de l'UE.

- Décréter la guerre sainte dépassée et inutile et refuser toute forme d'intégrisme¹⁰. Dans le Coran, il y a autant de versets qui prônent la paix que la guerre. Les muftis doivent privilégier les premières: l'ascèse intérieure. Substituer au Jihad, la bataille contre soi, l'approfondissement de la foi, l'amour de l'Autre. En l'absence de clergé en islam il revient par conséquent aux intellectuels musulmans de le faire.

-Réévaluer le statut de la femme. Polygamie, répudiation... aspects les plus visibles de l'infériorité juridique de la femme. Comme toujours les fondamentalistes s'appuient sur les textes. Ils les extrapolent exemple: *frappez-la de 100 coups* (Sourate de la Lumière), ce statut est caduc.

-Affirmer la prééminence de l'individu sur la communauté. Pour interpréter les textes, les musulmans doivent se libérer de l'idéologie de la communauté très forte dans cette religion. Puisque

⁸ -Un Islam en France est un islam qui doit respecter le statut de la femme, les valeurs de la République, la laïcité, l'égalité Homme/femme, in fine il doit séparer le ciel et la terre. Un islam en France est un islam importé d'autres pays (Arabie Saoudite, Afghanistan, Algérie...) qui veulent l'appliquer intégralement sans tenir compte de l'histoire et des spécificités de la société française.

⁹ -L'expression est de l'anthropologue Malek Chebel.

¹⁰ - Le terme même d'*intégrisme* a historiquement une origine chrétienne¹⁰. En 1890, c'est le nom du parti politique espagnol créé par ses promoteurs en vue de la mise en pratique du syllabus, publié par les autorités pontificales, en 1864. Ce texte s'oppose de la façon la plus totale à tout modernisme et préconise une conception fixiste des pensées et des comportements aux différents plans politiques, idéologiques et religieux. Il s'agit en fait, de faire en sorte que rien ne change en quelque domaine que ce soit, toute modernité risquant de remettre en cause l'intégrité des principes éternels de l'Église.

l'islam prétend transcender des identités nationales. La *Oumma* n'est pas au-dessus de la critique humaine. Existence des États avec des histoires et des cultures différentes et de l'autre côté, l'Homme croyant ou pas, libre de s'exprimer.

-Rappeler le primat de la politique sur le religieux. L'islam régit la sphère céleste et les affaires terrestres, le domaine privé et l'espace public. Il faut cantonner les imams à la mosquée. C'est à cette condition que l'Islam pourra se séculariser. Un islam rénové n'est nullement une menace pour la laïcité. Il faut faire valoir un islam des Lumières (Chebel, 2009).

-Favoriser une nouvelle interprétation des textes: Après le questionnement de l'innovation depuis près de mille ans, l'interprétation s'est figée sur des percepts qui datent du Moyen Age. Or le Coran doit être replacé dans son contexte historique nouveau, il ne nous parle plus de la même manière.

Nombreux musulmans sont en quête d'une spiritualité enfin partageable entre tous, athées, agnostiques et croyants de toutes confessions. Les générations qui arrivent sont mues par cette immense espérance d'une « re-spiritualisation » du monde. Leurs aînées sécularisées se battaient pour une société qui soit la plus juste. A ce combat pour le progrès politique, ces nouvelles générations veulent ajouter le progrès d'être et conscience. Elles perçoivent que les deux sont inséparables, que la transformation personnelle sera demain la condition - l'énergie- de la transformation sociale. Elle refuse le monde d'hier, qui ne donnait plus gère de droit de cité au spirituel. Qui mesurait la valeur d'une vie en termes de réussite matérielle, de plaisirs sensibles. En rupture avec ce modèle, cette jeunesse veut éprouver la joie bien exaltante de se sentir vivante, animée par cette sublime source lumineuse décrite par toutes les traditions de sagesse d'Orient et d'Occident (Bidar, 2016).

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Les jeunes Algériens et leur rapport à la religion: entre adhésion fondamentale et contradictions. Young Algerians and Their Relationship with Religion: Between Fundamental Adherence and Contradictions

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Abstract: *Young Algerians and Their Relationship with Religion: Between Fundamental Adherence and Contradictions. This study arises from a fundamental question regarding the apparent contradiction between the resurgence of religion in Algeria, the religious behaviors adopted by young people, and their attitudes, which often conflict with the values and norms of Islam. Therefore, the research aims to examine the role and manifestations of religion in young people's lives, the significance of religious values to them, and whether these values genuinely shape their spiritual and communal lives. In other words, the study seeks to determine whether young people's religious identity is constructed collectively or individually.*

A field survey, conducted using a questionnaire and an associative method across Algeria, revealed a strong and widespread attachment to religion among young people, which influences their values and behaviors in all aspects of life. However, their limited religious knowledge, low degree of spirituality, and strong material aspirations lead them to develop their own normative framework, which they apply selectively. As a result, they construct their identity based both on a communal model derived from the enduring values of Islam and on a personal framework shaped by their experiences and aspirations.

Keywords: Algeria, EU, attachment, contradiction, young people, Islam

Résumé: *Cette étude est née d'une interrogation fondamentale concernant la contradiction entre le retour du religieux et les comportements religieux adoptés par les jeunes en Algérie, et leurs attitudes souvent totalement opposées aux valeurs et normes de l'Islam. L'objectif de la recherche était donc de comprendre quelle place et quelles formes prend la religion dans la vie des jeunes, quelle est l'importance des valeurs religieuses pour eux et si ces valeurs structurent réellement leur vie spirituelle et leur vie communautaire, autrement dit, si l'identité religieuse des jeunes se construit sur un mode collectif ou sur un mode individuel. Une enquête de terrain menée à l'aide d'un questionnaire et d'une méthode associative, à travers toute l'Algérie, a permis de montrer un attachement fort et massif des jeunes à la religion qui structure leurs valeurs et leurs comportements dans toutes les sphères de leur vie. Cependant, l'insuffisance de leurs connaissances religieuses, un faible degré de spiritualité et la force de leurs aspirations matérielles les amènent à se forger leur propre référentiel de normes et de valeurs, qu'ils appliquent à leur convenance, construisant ainsi leur identité à la fois sur un modèle communautaire tiré des valeurs fortes de l'Islam, mais aussi sur un registre personnel provenant de leurs expériences et de leurs aspirations.*

Mots clés: Attachement, Algérie, UE, contradictions, jeunes, Islam

INTRODUCTION

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L'Algérie serait classée parmi les pays les plus religieux du monde et cette religiosité touche beaucoup les jeunes, vecteurs actifs de la propension du phénomène religieux. Pourtant, peu d'études ont été réalisées en Sciences Humaines sur la religiosité et particulièrement celle des jeunes, statistiquement majoritaires en Algérie. Cependant, le phénomène religieux chez les jeunes et leur rapport à l'Islam, nous interroge fondamentalement sur cette religiosité, sur ses formes, son sens, ses objectifs réels et cachés et au bout du compte sur le projet de société qu'ont les jeunes à travers le retour au religieux, si nous voulons comprendre et participer à la résolution de leurs difficultés existentielles.

1 - POSITION DU PROBLEME:

La jeunesse algérienne est confrontée à de nombreuses difficultés de différents ordres où le travail, la culture, les loisirs, et même l'avenir et les possibilités de vivre sont des champs de plus en plus fermés aux jeunes. Il est difficile pour les jeunes en Algérie de faire des projets d'avenir et de les réaliser: travailler, se loger, se marier, voyager... dans une ambiance de paupérisation générale, avec cependant de nouveaux modèles de consommation et une grande précarité du marché du travail. Souvent écartés de la légitimité, les jeunes mettent en place des stratégies, parfois extrêmes, qui leur permettent de se poser comme acteurs de leurs vies et ont toutes pour objet de se donner une visibilité en tant que jeune. Toutes ces stratégies expriment le malaise vécu par une immense majorité de jeunes en Algérie, chez des jeunes vivant une situation caractérisée par la perte de repères sociaux traditionnels et la difficulté d'identification à des référents identitaires multiples, parfois contradictoires, couronnés par les valeurs religieuses, et qui renvoient à des attitudes individuelles et collectives souvent éclatées. Le durcissement de l'affirmation identitaire ne suffit pas pour sortir de l'impasse et ne constitue très souvent qu'une quête existentielle destinée à donner une signification personnelle à des parcours de vie.²

Parallèlement à ce vécu difficile, nous assistons à un retour du religieux, ce phénomène prenant une importance de plus en plus grande en Algérie, comme dans nombreux autres pays. « Aujourd'hui, nous assistons à des formes de retour du religieux qui donnent le phénomène du « born again », autrement dit celui qui renaît à la religion. C'est peut-être le phénomène le plus marquant de la religiosité contemporaine dans toutes les religions ». Tozy³ parle, dans ce sens, de renouveau du religieux. Retour du religieux, born again, « tawba » rapprochent l'individu d'une religion, de ses dogmes, de ses pratiques, de ses valeurs. La religiosité serait ce rapport du croyant à sa religion. Mais le born again suppose aussi une transformation de la personne.⁴

Les jeunes aujourd'hui semblent respecter une observance plus stricte de toutes les pratiques religieuses y compris du « hadj »⁵ qui attire des croyants de plus en plus jeunes alors qu'il était jadis réservé de manière exclusive aux plus âgés. La religion semble prendre une place de plus en plus dominante dans leur vie, et leurs décisions, leurs relations sociales, leurs activités paraissent subordonnées aux normes religieuses. La religion dépasse ainsi la sphère privée, pour prendre une place importante dans la sphère publique. Les journées même du jeune deviennent gérées par les horaires de prière, et non plus par les heures de ses activités éducatives ou professionnelles.

L'observation de la prière qui constitue le pilier normatif par excellence, fait apparaître que celle-ci est maintenant beaucoup plus pratiquée par les jeunes, et de manière collective, souvent à la mosquée, alors qu'elle se faisait chez les aînés plutôt de façon individuelle, chez soi.

² Avenel Cyprien, *Sociologie des quartiers sensibles*, Ed Armand Colin, Paris 2009

³ Tozy Mohamed « L'évolution du champ religieux marocain au défi de la mondialisation » Dans Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée, Vol. 16, n° 1, Casablanca, 2009

⁴ Ianni Jérémie, « Soumission à l'autorité et réflexivité dans la narration de la conversion religieuse évangélique », Dans Revue algérienne des lettres Volume 6, N°2, |2022

⁵ Pèlerinage à la Mecque

Pour comprendre ces changements, ce retour du religieux, et la nouvelle religiosité chez les jeunes, il nous faut d'abord comprendre en quoi consiste le rapport des jeunes à la religion. Quelle place et quelles formes prend la religion dans leurs vies? Quelle est l'importance des valeurs religieuses pour eux? Les valeurs religieuses constituent-elles des repères pour les jeunes? Ces valeurs guident-elles uniquement leur vie spirituelle ou également leur vie communautaire? Peuvent-elles être érigées en règles politiques ou en d'autres termes, les jeunes sont-ils pour une politisation de la religion? Quel sens prennent pour eux les pratiques religieuses, et dans quelle mesure les jeunes les observent-ils? Quelles sont les pratiques les plus importantes pour eux? Quelle place accordent-ils à l'aspect extérieur du croyant? Quelles sont les véritables connaissances qu'ils ont en matière de religion? La religiosité chez les jeunes correspond-elle à une quête de spiritualité? A une quête identitaire? Le malaise vécu par les jeunes peut-il justifier le recours aux repères religieux dans une quête identitaire? La religiosité exprime-t-elle une recherche de changement social et/ou politique?

Les réponses à ces questions peuvent nous permettre de décrypter l'un des phénomènes sociaux les plus complexes à travers le monde. Elles peuvent également nous permettre de comprendre les réelles valeurs des jeunes, et le monde qu'ils veulent construire, la société dans laquelle ils veulent vivre, et les changements qu'ils souhaitent apporter autour d'eux.

2 – METHODOLOGIE

Pour tenter de répondre à ces interrogations, nous nous sommes appuyés sur une approche mixte, quantitative et qualitative utilisant un questionnaire et une méthode associative.

2.1 – Les méthodes:

Le questionnaire est constitué de 62 questions, certaines fermées, d'autres en éventail et d'autres encore sous forme de check-lists, abordant les questions du sens de la religion, du niveau de religiosité, des qualités, valeurs et comportements religieux, des connaissances religieuses, de l'expression de la religion, des pratiques religieuses, de la tolérance, de la spiritualité, de la politique et du rôle de la famille.

Les données recueillies par le biais des questionnaires ont été soumises à des traitements statistiques: tris à plat pour examiner les grandes tendances des réponses, et tris croisés pour définir l'influence de certaines variables. Nous avons utilisé le logiciel SPSS version 26.

Les données recueillies par le biais des méthodes associatives ont fait l'objet d'analyses mixtes (qualitatives et quantitatives) en vue de déterminer les structures des représentations.

2.2 – L'échantillon d'enquête:

Il s'agit d'un échantillon non probabiliste, réalisé de façon raisonnée, pour qu'un certain nombre de critères y soient représentés.

La taille de l'échantillon d'enquête global est N=984, choisi sur l'ensemble du territoire. Les 4 grandes régions d'Algérie ont été représentées dans l'échantillon: l'Est, l'Ouest, le Centre, et le Sud.

Les critères d'échantillonnage sont:

L'âge: des jeunes, soit des individus de 14 à 30 ans.

Le sexe: les deux sexes sont représentés

Le milieu géographique: aussi bien le milieu urbain que le milieu rural apparaissent dans l'échantillon

L'activité: travailleurs, chômeurs et jeunes scolarisés ont été représentés dans l'échantillon.

Le niveau d'instruction: tous les niveaux d'instruction sont représentés.

Pour ce qui est de l'échantillon auquel ont été passées les grilles associatives, il s'agit de 38 jeunes, issus de l'échantillon initial, et qui ont été choisis de façon raisonnée.

3 – LES RESULTATS

3.1- Les résultats au questionnaire

L'enquête par questionnaire a fait apparaître un certain nombre de résultats, des idées fortes, certaines étant modulées et influencées par les variables socio-familiales, d'autres s'imposant, en dehors de toute distinction selon les variables. Les variables qui semblent avoir le plus grand effet sont les variables sexe et âge, secondairement la variable niveau scolaire, fortement corrélée avec la variable âge.

Les résultats auxquels nous avons abouti manifestent, de prime abord, une forte religiosité chez les jeunes algériens, les garçons et les plus jeunes marquant un investissement un peu plus excessif que les filles, l'engagement religieux semblant donc décroître légèrement avec l'âge.

En effet, en ce qui concerne le rapport à la religion, nous remarquons qu'une grande majorité de jeunes se définit comme musulman, comme religieux, « moutadayene⁶ » et comme pratiquant, les comportements fondamentaux pour eux étant résolument la prière et le jeûne, et ce, de façon plus prononcée pour les filles. Certaines valeurs morales sont aussi présentées comme hautement importantes, telles que l'honnêteté et le respect des parents, lequel était par ailleurs une valeur traditionnellement sacrée, avant même le regain de religiosité actuel dans la société algérienne. Ainsi, la croyance religieuse des jeunes et les pratiques qui lui sont associées apparaissent comme un élément essentiel de leur vie quotidienne. L'existence de Dieu et le Tawhid⁷ en sont les principes fondamentaux et indiscutables. Pour eux, la religion interfère avec toutes les sphères de la vie, et ils déclarent appliquer les préceptes religieux dans tous les domaines de leur vie quotidienne, aussi bien dans leurs relations familiales, amicales, que dans leur travail. Ceci manifeste bien qu'ils soient favorables à la présence de la religion dans tous les domaines de la vie. La religion contribue de cette façon à l'affirmation de leur identité individuelle.

Les valeurs religieuses, la morale, la foi sont des éléments primordiaux pour eux et l'adhésion à une morale religieuse a pour but principal d'obtenir l'approbation de Dieu mais aussi de ne pas faire de mal aux autres, et par peur du châtime, menace souvent brandie par les prédicateurs religieux, sous le couvert des textes sacrés. Cependant, des concepts tels que la solidarité, le respect des autres et l'aide aux autres, le sérieux au travail sont moins valorisés, montrant par-là que, s'ils sont favorables à l'introduction de la religion dans toutes les sphères de la vie, la religion n'arrive pas à structurer concrètement le système de valeurs des jeunes. Ainsi, ces concepts qui appellent une application concrète de la foi et de la morale ne sont pas perçus par les jeunes de notre échantillon comme expression de leur engagement religieux et donc l'engagement religieux des jeunes n'exerce pas d'effet sur leurs pratiques sociales. De même, il y a un rejet important des signes ostentatoires de religiosité, tels que le vêtement, la barbe..., ou faire la prière à la mosquée et le pèlerinage à la Mecque. Ceci interroge sur la religion comme question personnelle ou de l'ordre du privé. Il apparaît clairement que toutes les pratiques communautaires n'ont pas l'aval des jeunes de notre échantillon qui préfèrent faire la prière à la maison plutôt qu'à la mosquée par exemple. L'affirmation religieuse des jeunes interrogés rejeterait ainsi toute posture ostensible, pour se fixer dans des attitudes individuelles, pas toujours visibles, mais affichées clairement, restant toutefois souvent dans le registre de l'abstrait. La religion et la foi sont plutôt vécues dans le registre individuel, en dehors des institutions religieuses, et des pratiques sociales et communautaires de la religion. Ce qui le confirme, c'est le rejet massif de l'idée selon laquelle les musulmans à l'étranger devraient afficher des signes extérieurs de religiosité, et également le fait que l'aspect extérieur du musulman est la dernière chose qui exprime sa religiosité. Ceci indiquerait que ces signes extérieurs seraient plutôt perçus comme l'expression d'une conformité sociale que d'une réelle conformité religieuse. Ainsi donc, la dimension sociale de la religion semble s'estomper légèrement, au détriment de la dimension individuelle, et la dimension publique au détriment de la dimension privée.

⁶ Religieux, pratiquant, croyant

⁷ Profession de foi: il n'y a de Dieu qu'Allah

Concernant leurs propres pratiques religieuses, les jeunes interrogés manifestent une constance et une assiduité dans les pratiques religieuses « essentielles » telles que la prière, le jeûne et la lecture du Coran, et une plus grande modération vis-à-vis de celles qui leur paraissent secondaires comme les pratiques surérogatoires (naouafel). Les piliers essentiels et apparents de la religion sont respectés et appliqués. En effet, le critère empirique le plus communément adopté est celui de la pratique de la prière, et il est devenu l'indicateur par excellence de la religiosité,⁸ nous pouvons dès lors affirmer sans crainte de nous tromper, que dans cette perspective, les jeunes de notre échantillon sont profondément religieux. Etre musulman signifie pour eux prier, jeûner et lire le Coran. « Leur croyance religieuse et la pratique qui lui est associée sont présentées par tous comme un élément essentiel de l'identité, orientant la vie courante à travers les prières quotidiennes et/ou la fréquentation de la mosquée »⁹

L'observance des pratiques religieuses procure aux jeunes de notre échantillon la proximité de Dieu et le bien-être, alors que la non-observance crée chez eux de la culpabilité et du malaise, sentiments particulièrement cohérents avec la crainte du châtement divin que nous avons observée.

Les jeunes interrogés déclarent avoir des connaissances religieuses assez insuffisantes, surtout pour les garçons, et ils les tiennent de leurs parents et de l'école, ce qui montre d'une part, la transmission transgénérationnelle des savoirs religieux, et d'autre part le rôle de l'Etat, par l'intermédiaire de l'école, dans cette transmission des savoirs religieux: l'islam fait partie de l'éducation de base des jeunes d'aujourd'hui. « Accompagnant leur scolarité à tous les cycles de l'enseignement, l'instruction religieuse les porte à interpréter la réalité sur la base d'un modèle unique et déjà construit: l'islam. C'est dire que durant tout leur cursus scolaire, les jeunes de la nouvelle génération sont façonnés de manière telle que la religion se trouve incorporée à leur habitus comme système prédominant de représentation du monde. Socialisés sous le signe du religieux, ils sont voués à ne concevoir leurs repères que dans l'Islam. »¹⁰. C'est pourquoi ils sont pour ainsi dire, fondamentalement religieux. Les femmes, plus que les hommes, sont favorables à l'éducation religieuse dans les programmes scolaires, ce qui peut être interprété comme un signe de leur engagement envers la transmission des valeurs religieuses à travers l'éducation, soulignant peut-être une préoccupation plus marquée pour l'influence de la religion sur le développement intellectuel et moral. Néanmoins, cette éducation religieuse, si elle parvient à donner aux jeunes des repères stables et permet une identification forte à l'Islam, n'a pas réussi à leur offrir le savoir religieux dont ils ont besoin. Ainsi, la dimension intellectuelle regroupant les connaissances et l'intérêt pour la religion est significativement réduite comparativement à la dimension éthique (importance de la religion dans la vie quotidienne) à l'idéologie et à la croyance elle-même. Cependant ce manque de connaissances religieuses est un élément très important de la religiosité des jeunes, en ce sens qu'il ouvre la porte à l'interprétation et à la négociation individuelles des valeurs à respecter. En effet, chacun ici peut choisir ses valeurs personnelles et en faire les références religieuses, s'accordant ainsi une morale souple, au gré de ses désirs personnels, ce qui fait parler les sociologues de personnalisation de la foi. En adaptant à leur convenance les préceptes et les valeurs religieuses, ils offrent aux yeux de l'observateur extérieur des comportements paraissant souvent inadéquats ou contraires à la norme comportementale, dans une société se disant musulmane. Les jeunes, entre leur savoir religieux restreint et les traditions qu'ils considèrent comme pratiques religieuses, trouvent des compromis, des arrangements, pour se convaincre que leurs actes sont licites et ne transgressent pas les normes religieuses et offrent comme caution de leur foi, leurs prières et leur jeûne. Ils sont donc protégés du châtement divin, et accordent à leurs actions une légitimité en

⁸ Merzouk Mohamed, Les nouvelles formes de religiosité juvénile: enquête en milieu étudiant, Dans *Insaniyat*, Oran n° 55-56, janvier - juin 2012, p121-131

⁹ Villechaise Agnès et Bucaille Lætitia, « L'affirmation religieuse des jeunes musulmans » Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 56-2, Genève, 2018, pp. 107-131

¹⁰ Merzouk Mohamed, Les nouvelles formes de religiosité juvénile: enquête en milieu étudiant, Dans *Insaniyat*, Alger n° 55-56, janvier - juin 2012, p121-131

fonction de leurs expériences personnelles. « Les jeunes musulmans pratiquants rencontrés doivent être définis comme multiples et mouvants. Leurs références sont diverses, leurs propos parfois assez contradictoires, leurs comportements souvent éloignés des normes revendiquées. Un fort engagement religieux en pensée et en actes... »¹¹

En ce qui concerne la transmission par la famille des valeurs morales, c'est essentiellement la notion de licite et de péché (halal et haram¹²) qui structure les apprentissages et cet apprentissage de la morale est respecté justement pour ne pas tomber dans le péché. Ces notions de halal et haram apparaissent donc comme structurantes de la morale des jeunes et démontre d'un désir puissant d'éviter les sanctions, comme le manifestent les réponses à la question concernant leur relation à Dieu, où il apparaît que c'est l'amour de Dieu qui est mis en avant (surtout pour les femmes), ainsi que la crainte de Dieu (surtout pour les hommes). La morale religieuse aurait donc pour objectif de montrer les chemins de l'excellence et par conséquent, les chemins du Paradis.

Pour ce qui est de la tolérance vis-à-vis des autres religions, les résultats sont assez paradoxaux: d'un côté, les jeunes interrogés affirment une grande tolérance vis-à-vis des non musulmans, mais de l'autre côté, ils estiment que le choix d'une autre religion que l'Islam ne devrait pas être permis et la majorité préfère la fréquentation de jeunes croyants et pratiquants. Ainsi, leur tolérance ne s'exerce pas vis-à-vis de la liberté des autres et de leurs choix personnels et elle reste très théorique et très abstraite.

La relation des jeunes à la spiritualité est assez complexe, parfois ambiguë. En effet, et bien qu'ils soient majoritaires à exprimer que leur vie et leurs actes sont en accord avec leurs croyances, et que leur bonheur est dépendant de leur relation avec Dieu, les jeunes pensent que ce n'est pas la foi qui leur permet d'atteindre la sérénité et le réconfort, pas plus qu'elle ne leur permet d'apprécier la vie, marquant ainsi une distinction entre vie spirituelle et vie matérielle et terrestre. Sachant que le bien être spirituel est la conséquence de la foi, ceci peut signifier qu'il ne s'agit pas pour eux (pour une partie du moins) d'une foi véritable, ou bien que les jeunes ont d'autres aspirations liées à leur vie quotidienne et la religion n'est pas tout pour eux et ne répond pas à tous leurs besoins, même si elle est partout dans leur vie. Au regard de leurs aspirations, la religion est rejetée au second plan, et les choses de la vie, comme l'argent, le travail... peuvent passer au premier plan, et ce notamment chez les jeunes de la catégorie d'âge supérieure, ceux de niveau universitaire et ceux qui travaillent. Les plus jeunes, en revanche paraissent accorder une plus grande importance à des aspects non matériels du bonheur, tels que les relations interpersonnelles, la réalisation personnelle ou la quête de sens.

Par ailleurs, la religion est jugée essentielle dans les situations difficiles du quotidien ou lorsque se pose la question du sens de la vie: elle permet à la majorité des personnes interrogées d'accepter les malheurs, la notion de kada oua kadr¹³ permet d'accepter avec fatalité les événements douloureux de la vie qui sont des épreuves que Dieu leur envoie pour tester leur foi, et ne sont absolument pas une punition de Dieu, idée que les jeunes de notre échantillon semblent refuser.

Concernant l'adoption de la religion dans la politique, les jeunes interrogés ont manifesté massivement le rejet de l'idée d'une société laïque, préférant vivre dans une société qui applique les enseignements de la chariaa¹⁴, et ce, pour les filles plus que pour les garçons. Les jeunes interrogés semblent conscients de certains dangers que pourrait véhiculer un état strictement islamique, tels que l'extrémisme ou le non-respect des libertés individuelles, mais préfèrent ces dangers à la prolifération des fléaux sociaux, lesquels, selon eux, pourraient résulter de la séparation de l'Etat et de la religion. Ainsi le projet de société des jeunes algériens interrogés serait résolument une société islamique, ils sont plutôt favorables aux partis islamistes et font confiance aux associations à

¹¹ Villechaise Agnès et Bucaille Lætitia 2018, « L'affirmation religieuse des jeunes musulmans » Revue européenne des sciences sociales, 56-2 p118

¹² Halal: licite, haram: illicite, péché

¹³ Destinée

¹⁴ Loi canonique islamique

vocation religieuse. Une politique islamiste représenterait peut-être pour eux une réponse aux difficultés sociales et économiques qu'ils vivent en tant que jeunes et leur permettrait de trouver un nouveau rôle social. Cette attitude des jeunes et leur vision sont très importantes, vue la part déterminante que peut avoir la population, particulièrement la population jeune, dans la définition du rôle de la religion dans la politique et doit nécessairement être prise en considération, quel que soit le poids de l'objectif démocratique souhaité par les dirigeants. « Le degré de religiosité d'une société influencera le rôle que la religion joue dans une transition mais un rôle important de la religion n'entrave pas nécessairement la consolidation d'un ordre démocratique »¹⁵ une stricte séparation de l'état et de la religion n'étant pas une condition sine qua non à l'établissement d'un système politique démocratique et renforcer le rôle de la religion dans la vie publique et politique peut être bénéfique dans la mesure où la religion peut agir comme une puissante force de cohésion nationale.

Pour ce qui est de la cohérence entre tradition et religion, ce sont les garçons, plus que les filles et les plus jeunes, plus que les plus âgés, qui pensent que la tradition est compatible avec la religion, et qu'elle provient en grande partie de la religion. Ceci est le signe manifeste que la religiosité chez les jeunes algériens ne s'est pas encore libérée des traditions et des coutumes et que, pour eux, persistent fortement des croyances qu'ils rattachent à la religion, ce qui montre encore une fois, la faiblesse de leurs savoirs religieux, et par ailleurs, que la vision d'un Islam épuré n'est pas encore concrétisée.

« S'inscrivant dans la tradition hanbalite, son grand dessein est plutôt de rendre à l'islam sa pureté originelle. Dès lors, menant campagne contre les formes de dévotion jugées hérétiques, il n'a cessé de stigmatiser le culte des saints et les rites confrériques, toutes pratiques dont le malékisme, traditionnellement dominant en Algérie, a fini par s'accommoder »¹⁶

3.2 - Analyse des résultats de la grille associative:

L'observation du champ représentationnel de la religion chez les jeunes interrogés a mis en évidence des éléments liés aux deux aspects fondamentaux de la pratique religieuse: Les cinq piliers de l'islam (El Chahadatane¹⁷, El Salat¹⁸, el Zakat¹⁹, el Siem²⁰, et el Hadj²¹) et les six piliers de la foi (La foi en Dieu, les anges, Les Livres Sacrés dont le Coran, les Prophètes dont Mohamed, le Jour du Jugement et enfin le Destin Divin). Ces deux aspects sont étroitement liés car une compréhension approfondie des croyances peut renforcer la pratique et vice versa.

Cette importance accordée à ces éléments peut s'expliquer par le fait que les cinq piliers de l'Islam représentent les pratiques concrètes et rituelles essentielles pour tout musulman. Cependant, il est intéressant de noter que dans la représentation sociale des jeunes interrogés, ces pratiques peuvent différer en termes de mise en avant ou de fréquence. Par exemple, la prière apparaît comme un pilier central qui résonne fortement dans leur vie quotidienne, tandis que d'autres éléments ont été moins mentionnés ou pris en considération dans leurs représentations comme c'est le cas du Hadj qui n'est pas apparu dans le champ représentationnel de nos enquêtés. Ceci rejoint tout à fait les résultats obtenus lors de l'enquête par questionnaire, où le pèlerinage avait aussi une importance secondaire.

D'autre part, les six piliers de la foi qui incarnent les croyances fondamentales dans l'Islam ont été abordés de manière différente, car certains étant peut-être plus facilement accessibles ou concrets

¹⁵ Barah Mikail, Religion et politique dans les transitions que connaissent les pays arabes, ASPJ Afrique & Francophonie - 3e trimestre 2013

¹⁶ Merzouk Mohamed, Les nouvelles formes de religiosité juvénile: enquête en milieu étudiant, Dans *Insaniyat*, Alger, n° 55-56, janvier - juin 2012, p124.

¹⁷ Double profession de foi: il n'y a de Dieu qu'Allah et Mahomet est son prophète

¹⁸ La prière

¹⁹ Aumône légale

²⁰ Le jeûne

²¹ Pèlerinage à la Mecque

dans leur vie quotidienne comme le Coran, et donc plus souvent évoqués, tandis que d'autres, plus abstraits ou moins perceptibles dans leur réalité quotidienne (ex: les anges, le jour du jugement...), n'ont pas été mentionnés ou mis en avant par les jeunes questionnés. Là également, l'importance du Coran rejoint les résultats de l'enquête par questionnaire.

Cette importance accordée à ces éléments semble être liée au fait que ces piliers sont souvent enseignés ensemble, que ce soit au sein de la famille, à l'école, ou transmis dans le discours communautaire, les médias..., et par conséquent elles peuvent influencer la manière dont les jeunes les perçoivent et les intègrent dans leur représentation personnelle de la religion.

Il se peut aussi que les jeunes se concentrent beaucoup plus sur les éléments les plus observables, les plus directement perçus et pratiques dans leur vie quotidienne, comme c'est le cas de la prière, du Jeûne, du Coran, etc.

En effet, l'analyse prototypique de l'inducteur "religion" par consigne normale et par consigne de substitution, nous montre que les connaissances communes qu'ont les jeunes interrogés sur le sujet de la "religion" concernent surtout sa forme la plus répandue et la plus visible ou concrète à savoir "La prière" qui semble à première vue l'élément le plus stable ou "l'élément prioritaire" et central de cette représentation, car il paraît être indispensable pour donner un sens à la Représentation Sociale que ce soit lors de la consigne normale ou de substitution où nous retrouvons tous les critères répertoriés par les auteurs réunis.²² Ce résultat rejoint ainsi les résultats de l'enquête quantitative, et comme le fait observer Merzouk²³ la prière est l'indicateur par excellence de la religiosité.

La prière semble être pour ces jeunes une pratique primordiale pour le musulman, un rituel effectué à des moments spécifiques tout au long de la journée, régulièrement, assurant un lien direct avec le Créateur. Souvent perçue comme un signe extérieur de la foi, bien qu'elle ne la reflète pas nécessairement dans sa totalité, la prière demeure un symbole visible et concret de la religion par rapport aux autres piliers de l'islam. Elle est également enseignée dès le plus jeune âge avant même le jeûne, renforçant ainsi son importance dans la vie des jeunes désireux de se conformer et de s'aligner sur les valeurs de leur religion et de leur société.

Pour le reste des autres éléments: Ibada²⁴, Akhlak²⁵... comme l'a décrit Abric²⁶, ils peuvent donner une certaine souplesse à la représentation, en intégrant de nouvelles informations, tout en prenant en considération l'expérience individuelle et le contexte dans lequel se structure cette représentation qui demeure compatible avec son système central. En d'autres termes, elles peuvent refléter en partie l'expérience personnelle vécue par chaque enquêté. Ce qui suppose que l'importance de ces valeurs ou de ces pratiques est particulière à chacun, qui la perçoit selon son propre système normatif.

Cependant, nous avons observé un changement dans la place attribuée aux items « Coran, Islam et Allah » au sein du noyau central, où leur fréquence d'évocation a diminué. Ce constat peut s'expliquer par une moindre contrainte due à la consigne de substitution, permettant ainsi aux enquêtés une plus grande liberté pour exprimer leurs idées. Il est possible qu'ils estiment que leurs pairs accordent plus d'importance à la prière, ou que ces éléments - le Coran, l'Islam et Allah - ne soient pas facilement observables ou concrets, expliquant ainsi pourquoi ils les citent moins fréquemment.

²² Rateau Patrick. Le noyau central des représentations sociales comme système hiérarchisé. Une étude sur la représentation du groupe. Les Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale, 26, (1995a) pp 29-52.

²³ Merzouk Mohamed, Les nouvelles formes de religiosité juvénile: enquête en milieu étudiant, Dans *Insaniyat*, Alger n° 55-56, janvier - juin 2012, p121-131

²⁴ La pratique rituelle

²⁵ La morale

²⁶ Abric Jean Claude, Les représentations sociales: aspects théoriques. Dans J.-C. Abric (Ed.), *Pratiques sociales et représentations*, Paris: Presses universitaires de France. 1994, pp. 11-35.

En somme, les représentations sociales des jeunes semblent être le résultat d'une interaction complexe entre leurs expériences personnelles, leur contexte familial, leur éducation, et les influences extérieures telles que les médias et le contexte socioculturel. Ces représentations sont dynamiques et peuvent évoluer à mesure que les jeunes continuent de se développer et de vivre de nouvelles expériences. Elles se recoupent tout à fait avec les informations livrées par les jeunes interrogés lors de l'enquête par questionnaire et viennent ainsi confirmer ces résultats, en apportant une valeur ajoutée, relative au conformisme social qui transparait dans l'utilisation des termes « Akhlak, Ibada, mais aussi Siem et Zakat ». En effet, ceux-ci apparaissent clairement comme des pratiques évoquées par conformisme ou par désirabilité sociale, et non pas comme des valeurs fortes de leur religion. Ainsi donc, les grilles associatives ont permis, elles aussi de rendre compte que le rapport des jeunes à la religion se caractérise par des croyances communes dures selon lesquelles leur religion est l'Islam, dont Dieu est le Maître, le livre en est le Coran et la pratique principale est la prière. Le reste, plus labile, plus changeant, plus individualisé, se structure au gré des personnes, autour d'une croyance centrale permanente et forte, et provient, soit de connaissances et de savoirs religieux avérés, soit de leurs expériences personnelles.

CONCLUSION:

Ainsi, les résultats de nos enquêtes de terrain, quantitative et qualitative, nous ont amenés à conclure sur un attachement fort et massif des jeunes à la religion laquelle structure leurs valeurs et leurs comportements dans toutes les sphères de leur vie et dans l'ensemble de la vie quotidienne. La religion occupe une place très importante pour eux. Nous pouvons dire sans crainte de nous tromper, que les jeunes algériens se sentent profondément musulmans. Ils respectent et accomplissent les piliers de l'Islam, ils croient fortement en Dieu et en ses enseignements, ils aspirent intensément au Paradis, et offrent leur foi pour y parvenir. L'expression la plus forte de cette foi est indubitablement la prière, noyau central de toutes les représentations de l'Islam. L'observance et l'assiduité par rapport à d'autres pratiques sont plus souples, et témoignent souvent plus d'une forme de conformisme que d'une réelle adhésion. Par ailleurs les pratiques et les comportements qui impliquent la solidarité et l'importance des relations humaines ne sont pas hautement valorisés, ni hautement appliqués, de même, celles qui présentent des aspects ostentatoires. Cependant, les savoirs religieux insuffisants des jeunes, d'une part, et d'autre part leur faible degré de spiritualité et leurs aspirations matérielles les amènent à considérer les valeurs spirituelles comme secondaires, et ils se forgent leur propre référentiel de normes, qu'ils appliquent à leur convenance sans les remettre en question, s'octroyant ainsi une identité religieuse personnelle. Les comportements des jeunes présentent ainsi un tableau parfois ambivalent, souvent contradictoire, certaines attitudes des jeunes paraissant à l'observateur extérieur totalement contraires à la morale religieuse, alors qu'elles n'entraînent aucune culpabilité chez leurs auteurs. C'est pourquoi « l'adhésion à la foi des étudiants n'emprunte pas à un modèle unique, mais se décline selon des modalités diverses »²⁷. Les jeunes en arrivent donc à faire un usage particulier des préceptes religieux, pour construire leur identité religieuse.

Ainsi donc, les jeunes d'aujourd'hui, ayant été bercés par un contexte religieux très prononcé, où la religion est fortement présente dans l'espace public, et où l'Islam fait partie de l'éducation de base des enfants, aussi bien en milieu scolaire qu'en milieu familial, n'ont pas d'autres repères éthiques et moraux que ceux de l'Islam. Le halal et le haram structurent leur éducation, ainsi que la crainte du châtime divin. Ce contexte commun et la présence de normes et de comportements communs, constituent donc l'identité religieuse collective à laquelle s'identifient les jeunes, plus ou moins poussés par la pression sociale, et plus ou moins conformistes. Ces deux identités se rejoignent parfois, se dissocient souvent, mais font partie de la socialisation des jeunes en leur

²⁷ Merzouk Mohamed, Les nouvelles formes de religiosité juvénile: enquête en milieu étudiant, Dans *Insaniyat*, Alger n° 55-56, janvier - juin 2012, p121-131

permettant de se construire à la fois sur le mode individuel et sur le mode collectif et communautaire. La place de la religion reste très forte dans la construction des identités et en est le repère principal. Nous pouvons donc, sans crainte de nous tromper décrire la personnalité des jeunes algériens comme une personnalité musulmane.

Ces jeunes, se sentant profondément religieux, même si leur foi et leurs pratiques s'appuient souvent sur leurs propres interprétations ou sur leurs lacunes, rejettent une société laïque dont ils ne veulent pas, mais souhaitent que la politique s'appuie sur la chariaa, car pour eux, c'est le meilleur moyen de lutter contre les fléaux sociaux et de préserver l'identité de l'Etat et certainement de restaurer une justice sociale qu'ils perçoivent comme perdue. Ainsi le projet de société des jeunes algériens est donc une société islamique, ne séparant pas le pouvoir politique de la religion. Cette attitude des jeunes et leur vision sont à prendre en considération, sans se voiler la face, mais surtout doivent être comprises sans ambiguïté. Les jeunes ne veulent pas d'une société plus musulmane qu'elle ne l'est maintenant, ou forcément plus ancrée sur la chariaa, qu'ils ne connaissent pas vraiment, pour la grande majorité ; ils ne veulent pas de mains coupées pour les voleurs par exemple, mais simplement se reconnaître dans une communauté avec laquelle ils partagent les mêmes valeurs. Ces valeurs doivent donc être reconnues et formalisées. Elles consistent certainement en les valeurs essentielles de l'Islam, celles qu'ils connaissent et qu'ils appliquent. Refuser la laïcité, signifie manifestement pour eux une demande de changement qu'ils ne peuvent envisager que dans le contexte de l'Islam dans lequel ils ont baigné depuis leur plus jeune âge et qui constitue leur système de valeurs fondamental.

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L'Etat d'esprit des communautés européennes en Tunisie durant la Seconde Guerre Mondiale

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Abstract: *The European Communities' State of Mind during the WWII. Our paper will focus on the state of mind of the European communities in Tunisia which oscillated between enthusiasm, fear and pragmatism. How did these communities experience the atmosphere of the first moments of the War? And how did the different phases of the war impact their situation in Tunisia? In this context, we will not study the Second World War as a historical event, but rather we will look at its impact on the European communities settled in Tunis.*

Keywords: *the Second World War, European communities, state of mind, enthusiasm, fear, pragmatism*

Résumé: *Notre article s'attardera sur l'état d'esprit des communautés européennes en Tunisie qui oscillait entre enthousiasme, peur et pragmatisme. Comment ces éléments ont-ils interagi avec la Seconde Guerre mondiale? Comment ces communautés ont-elles vécu l'atmosphère des premiers instants de la Guerre? Et comment les différentes phases de la guerre ont-elles affecté leurs conditions en Tunisie? Dans ce contexte, nous n'étudierons pas la Seconde Guerre mondiale en tant que événement historique, mais plutôt nous nous pencherons sur ses répercussions sur les communautés européennes installées en Tunisie.*

Mots-clés: *la Seconde Guerre mondiale, communautés européennes, l'état d'esprit, enthousiasme, peur, pragmatisme*

INTRODUCTION

Nul ne peut nier que la deuxième guerre mondiale est l'évènement qui a le plus marqué l'histoire du XXème. Nombreux historiens se sont penchés sur ses diverses répercussions. Cette présente recherche s'attardera sur l'état d'esprit des communautés européennes en Tunisie sous le protectorat durant cette épreuve entre l'enthousiasme, la peur et le pragmatisme.

Notre point de départ pour étudier cette question était le nombre d'interrogations qui pouvaient venir à l'esprit du chercheur sur l'histoire de ces communautés, c'est-à-dire comment ces éléments ont-ils interagi avec la Seconde Guerre mondiale? Comment ces communautés ont-elles vécu l'atmosphère des premiers instants de la Guerre? Et comment les différentes phases de la guerre ont-elles affecté leurs conditions en Tunisie?

De prime abord, nous affirmons d'emblée que nous n'étudierons pas la Seconde Guerre mondiale en tant que événement historique, mais plutôt nous nous pencherons sur ses répercussions sur les communautés européennes installées en Tunisie. De même nous tenons à souligner l'importance des documents que nous avons obtenus des Archives Nationales Tunisiennes, ainsi que des rapports émis par les contrôleurs civils dans les archives du Ministère français des Affaires étrangères (Courneuve).

I- LA COMMUNAUTÉ FRANÇAISE ET LA DIALECTIQUE DE L'ENTHOUSIASME ET DE LA PEUR

Il semble que les minorités françaises aient connu une évolution importante dans leur position concernant la Seconde Guerre mondiale. A la veille du déclenchement de ce conflit, les Français étaient enthousiastes à l'idée de gagner la guerre, emportés par la propagande officielle de l'Etat, ce que nous révèle une correspondance confidentielle de la région de Kairouan datée le 1er novembre

1939. Il s'agit d'un rapport du commandant de la sécurité de la région de la Steppe centrale, soulignant l'ampleur de l'enthousiasme de la communauté française et de sa pleine confiance dans la disponibilité des forces militaires françaises à mener cette guerre¹.

Au début des opérations militaires, en juin 1939, **la situation militaire n'a cessé de tourner aux dépens des Français**. Le contrôleur civil de la ville de Grombalia a confirmé que la situation est toujours ambiguë aux yeux des Français, tant qu'il y a une menace pour les intérêts de la France et son empire colonial, et cela en référence aux rapides et puissantes attaques allemandes. D'autre part, les Français ont exprimé leur mécontentement à l'égard de l'Angleterre, car les éléments français estimaient qu'elle n'avait pas fait ce qu'il fallait pour défendre les intérêts communs des deux pays².

Ces rapports indiquent également qu'il y avait un consensus complet sur la personne du "Maréchal Pétain", **héros de Verdun**, et la nomination d'Etienne Flandin, Ministre des Affaires étrangères ont rassuré les français de Tunisie. Ces derniers ne cachaient pas leur soutien au pouvoir de la droite française qui a toujours opprimé les Tunisiens. Il existe chez la communauté française de Tunisie une sorte de résiliation et un certain pragmatisme en ce qui concerne ses intérêts économiques et sociaux. Les mêmes sources ajoutent qu'à la fin de l'année (dès août 1940), un état de frustration régnait au sein de cette communauté française à cause de l'évolution des conditions sur le champ de bataille.

Cela est confirmé par Galia Lacour qui indique dans ses Mémoires que l'état de panique – à la suite des bombardements successifs - de la ville de Sousse a poussé sa famille à quitter son domicile et à chercher un lieu plus sûr. En effet ils ont loué une maison à Kaala Sghira³. L'auteur parlait aussi de leurs conditions de vie durant cette période, les qualifiant de très difficiles, surtout en ce qui concerne l'approvisionnement en eau, qui était amenée d'une distance relativement éloignée⁴.

Le maréchal Pétain et son gouvernement sont devenus le seul espoir pour la plupart de ces éléments, ce que confirment les différents rapports émis depuis le début des années quarante. Un rapport daté du 8 mars 1941 révèle que la communauté française déclare sa confiance au gouvernement de Vichy en général et au maréchal Pétain en particulier⁵ comme défenseur des intérêts français au sein des colonies surtout dans ces circonstances critiques.

Dans ce contexte, on comprend la joie de ces éléments français suite aux victoires anglaises lors de la première phase de la Seconde Guerre mondiale⁶. Cette communauté suivait les nouvelles venant des fronts de bataille notamment à travers la radio de la BBC, qui transmettait les succès des

¹ A.N.T série: M.N, C 43, D₁, titre: Etat d'esprit de la population indigène pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, ...op.cit. ,f 20.

² A.N.T série: M.N, C 43, D₁, titre: Etat d'esprit de la population indigène pendant la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, ...op.cit. ,f 20.. « Mais ce sentiment est voilé par l'impression que ce pays ne nous a pas apporté en temps voulu l'effort qu'il était capable de fournir ».

³ Galea (Joyce La cour) ; *En fermant les yeux, je vais là –Bas*, Ed, Le champ des cadets. 1996. p231 « J'avais encore plus peur à l'idée de pouvoir être enfouie sous terre. Je restai donc dans la bâtisse et me réfugiai auprès de mon oncle Yann et ma tante Arlette ... Je priais de toutes mes forces: « petit Jésus, protégez-nous!! » on comprit alors enfin que nous ne pouvions être nulle part à l'abri dans la ville et que les Américains ne se contenteraient même plus d'arroser le pourtour du port ou de la gare. Louis enfourcha sa bicyclette décidée à nous trouver un refuge hors de Sousse. Il revient dans la matinée et nous annonça qu'il avait loué un logement pour toute la famille, dans le village de Kalaa Sghira, c'est-à-dire sept kilomètres de là ».

⁴ Galea (Joyce La cour) ; *En fermant les yeux, je vais là –Bas* , Ed, Le champ des cadets . 1996. p231 « ...Mais il fallait chercher l'eau potable aux robinets du village, dans les jerricans allemands que les Arabes nous avaient vendues. Pour ce transport on utilisait forcément la calèche ».

⁵ M.A.E ; série: renseignements généraux; archives de Quai d'Orsay ; C: 76, D: direction de la sûreté publique f: 109 « la note dominante réside dans la confiance absolue faite au gouvernement du maréchal Patin et à l'action de son représentant en Tunisie ».

⁶ Galea (Joyce La cour) ; *En fermant les yeux...* op.cit. « A ce titre les victoires anglaises provoquent une vive satisfaction ».

armées anglaises. Ce qui donnait de l'espoir aux éléments français en Tunisie⁷, surtout avec l'entrée des États-Unis dans la guerre et le renversement du rapport de force en faveur des alliés⁸

Dans l'ensemble, il semble que la communauté française de Tunisie vivait dans l'attente des événements et les suivait sur les fronts⁹, si bien que leur état d'esprit oscillait entre optimisme et frustration. Dans un rapport rendu par le contrôleur civil de Grombalia le 6 janvier 1942, il était indiqué que le danger de «démembrement» de la France et de son empire commençait à se dissiper aux yeux des éléments français surtout à la lumière des victoires des forces alliées.

Néanmoins, il ne faut pas croire à un bloc soudé de cette communauté française. Nous tenons à rappeler que certains membres de la communauté française ont soutenu les forces de l'Axe en Tunisie. En effet, certaines études ont révélé qu'environ 150 volontaires sont entrés aux côtés des forces allemandes. Au 1er janvier 1943, 80 d'entre eux étaient français, majoritairement issus de l'extrême droite. Dans le même contexte, le rapport publié par Cristofini, le commandant des forces européennes de la division militaire française à l'ambassade de France au Vatican, a confirmé que le 1er février, environ 130 militaires français (de divers grades) ont rejoint les forces nazies¹⁰. Cela révèle probablement le rôle de certains partis et leur capacité à encadrer et médiatiser cette "coopération" avec les forces de l'Axe. Citons, à titre d'exemple, le Parti Populaire Français dont la branche à Tunis a organisé une campagne de propagande au cœur de la capitale, plus précisément rue de Paris, où le responsable de ce parti véhiculait ce que leur chef, Jacques Doriot, a proclamé dans le cadre de la motivation de l'adhésion de nouveaux éléments pour soutenir les forces de l'Axe¹¹. Dans le même contexte, s'insère la réaction de l'Amiral Estiva¹² annonçant la possibilité d'enlever la nationalité française aux anti-nationalistes. En effet les décrets-lois du 12 novembre 1938 et 9 septembre 1939 et les lois du 16 et 12 juillet 1940 permettent de procéder à la révision des acquisitions de la nationalité française par la voie de naturalisation. Ces dispositions ont comme conséquence le retrait de la nationalité française aux personnes qui ont une attitude anti-nationale, c'est-à-dire ceux qui ont rejoint l'armée de l'axe.

II- LA COMMUNAUTÉ ITALIENNE: DÉMORALISÉE MAIS PRAGMATIQUE

Il semble que les événements de la guerre aient eu un impact significatif sur les positions des Italiens en Tunisie¹³. Des rapports publiés par des contrôleurs civils indiquaient que les défaites continues de l'armée italienne sur les fronts affectaient profondément l'état psychologique des

⁷ Ibidem.... « L'attitude de la colonie française est restée expectante avec une note de pessimisme ayant tendance à se dissiper progressivement ... la poste radiophonique le plus écouté et la B.B.C ... les espoirs se tournent à nouveau vers l'Angleterre. Dont on souhaite la victoire ».

⁸ Ibidem.... p. 215

⁹ Ibidem.... « Il faut noter cependant que la colonie française se vit dans l'attente anxieuse des événements qui peuvent soit fortifier sa confiance soit l'amoindrir... »

¹⁰ A.S.D.M.I.A.E, série Aff, Pol, fonds Francia, carton 66 dossier 1, Rapport du 1^{er} février 1943 lieutenant – colonel Cristofini. Cité par ¹⁰ Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la tourmente de la seconde guerre mondiale*, centre de Publication Universitaire. La Manouba.p369.

¹¹ Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la tourmente de la seconde guerre mondiale*. Centre de Publication Universitaire. La Manouba.p369 « Nous avons, dès notre création déclarée que nous étions les adversaires résolus de la ploutocratie anglo-saxonne de la démocratie maçonnique et juive, du bolchevisme. Par contre, nous avons la volonté d'établir en France un régime autoritaire solidement appuyé sur un grand parti et capable d'instaurer un véritable socialisme, pour l'Empire nous dénonçons les méthodes primées d'une administration réactionnaire et nous voulions que les rapports France-musulmans fussent examinés dans un esprit nouveau entièrement débarrassé de tout préjugé colonialiste ... la politique de la France par rapport à l'Axe ne doit plus, ne peut plus être une simple politique de collaboration, la quelle implique un effort limité c'est une participation totale ; intégrale de toutes nos forces, de tous nos hommes à la guerre totale décrétée le mois dernier par le Führer et par le Duce que nous voulons réaliser »

¹² R.G, 85 Protectorat Tunisie, Direction de la sûreté publique, Naturalisation: Tunis le 27 novembre

¹³ Bessis (Juliette), *La Méditerranée fasciste L'Italie Mussolinienne et la Tunisie...*op.cit. 283

Italiens¹⁴ qui vivaient dans un état de frustration¹⁵. Ils étaient accablés par les nouveaux décrets qui interdisaient toutes sortes de propagande tel celui du 3 août 1939 de Ahmed Pecha Bey qui tend à réprimer les propagandes étrangères: « Quiconque reçoit de provenance étrangère directement ou indirectement des fonds de propagande et se livre à une propagande politique est frappé d'une peine de six mois à cinq ans et d'une amende de 1000 à 10000 francs.

D'autre part les services de police ont dressé un certain nombre de procès –verbaux à des ressortissants italiens pour audition des émissions radiophonique étrangères. En effet le 8 juillet, le chef du poste de police de Ben Arous a dressé un procès – verbal au ressortissant italiens Anselmo Pasquolina, pour audition d'une émission radiophonique étrangère¹⁶. L'intéressé traduit devant le tribunal militaire a été acquitté le 15 septembre 1941. D'autres procès –verbaux ont été dressés récemment à des ressortissants italiens pour des infractions analogues.

Toutes ces restrictions ont poussé certains éléments à chercher un rapprochement avec la communauté française et à tisser de nouvelles relations avec la puissance coloniale¹⁷.

En revanche, une correspondance entre le Contrôleur civil de Grombalia et le Résident général de France datée du 6 avril 1940 révèle la position des Italiens naturalisés sur la guerre, souhaitant que l'Italie n'entre pas en guerre contre la France. En effet, l'accession de leur pays au côté des pays de l'Axe¹⁸ a changé toutes les données. Ce qui a provoqué l'attrait des éléments Italiens pour la France et leur désir de maintenir des relations sans l'intervention du consul général italien qui a donné l'ordre de ne soutenir aucune initiative française¹⁹. Cependant, il ressort de cette correspondance qu'un nombre important d'éléments italiens de la région de Nabeul étaient du côté des Français. En effet, certains des grands propriétaires italiens de Nabeul ont versé 1000 francs français au contrôleur civil au profit des familles rappelées lors de la mobilisation²⁰.

En général, les différents rapports émis par les contrôleurs civils et les différentes correspondances nous ont révélé la tendance pragmatique des éléments italiens. Le seul souci de cette communauté est de préserver ses acquis et ses intérêts comme le prouve le rapport du Résident général de France daté du 6 août 1940, dans lequel on a confirmé que le nombre des Italiens au Cap bon est d'environ 4 000 personnes, neutres dont le seul souci est de préserver leurs intérêts, ce qui révèle la tendance pragmatique de ces éléments

Dans le même contexte, ce rapport souligne les efforts de la communauté italienne pour éviter toute situation qui pourrait menacer son avenir en Tunisie. L'alignement semble effrayant et la neutralité peut être la meilleure attitude face à la situation en Tunisie et à l'étranger²¹. En effet, certains éléments qui avaient précédemment déposé des demandes d'obtention de la nationalité française ont cherché à l'annuler²².

Il semble que ces éléments italiens vivaient dans l'anticipation et craignaient que cette neutralité ne leur coûte cher. D'une part, ils craignaient d'être accusés d'être antipatriotiques et de ne

¹⁴ A.N.T série: M.N,C 43 , D₁, titre: Etat d'esprit de la population indigènes pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale, ...op.cit.- c:76 « ... Le discours de Roosevelt qui écarte tout espoir même lointain, va accentuer encore cette démoralisation »

¹⁵ -R.G,85 protectorat Tunisie , Direction de la sureté publique ,Réglementation (décret du 3 août 1939)

¹⁶ Ibidem

¹⁷ Ibidem... « Déjà apparaissent de timides essais de rapprochement avec la colonie française et des attitudes plus déférentes à l'égard des autorités... »

¹⁸ M.A.E, fonds: protectorat Tunisie ; Type :Direction de la sureté publique ...op.cit.f122« ... au contraire une action de l'Italie aux cotés des Allies susciterait son enthousiasme ».

¹⁹ Ibidem... « En outre, des consignes ont été données interdisant toute souscription au profit d'œuvre de guerre françaises »

²⁰ Ibidem « ... un gros propriétaire italien, Bonfiglio, Stéfano ... est venu verser ostensiblement 1000 frs au contrôle civil au profit de l'Assistance aux familles de mobilisés, sans demande de couvert de l'anonymat »

²¹ Ibidem... « Son plus grand souci est de prendre une attitude peu la rendre pas indésirable au gouvernement futur de la Tunisie ... ».

²² Ibidem...« par contre le besogneux vient demander l'annulation de leurs instances de naturalisation »

pas soutenir la voie italienne pendant la guerre. D'autre part, ils craignaient de perdre leurs intérêts²³. Cependant, avec l'avancée de la guerre, ces éléments italiens en Tunisie se sont retrouvés dans un état de désespoir complet, et du coup, beaucoup d'entre eux n'ont eu d'autre choix que de songer à obtenir la nationalité française, devenue l'unique issue. Cela a été confirmé par l'un des fascistes appelés Solinas²⁴, mais aussi par certains "nouveaux" comportements italiens qui ont commencé à fréquenter des cafés et des restaurants français²⁵. On remarque aussi que le mouvement de boycott des produits français diminuait.

Il semble que cette communauté suivait avec beaucoup d'intérêt l'évolution des conditions générales de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, qui affectaient directement leur vie quotidienne. L'invasion de la Libye par les forces allemandes et leur occupation de la Bulgarie ont redonné espoir aux éléments italiens en Tunisie²⁶. Dans ce contexte, "Galia Lacour" a affirmé dans l'un de ses témoignages que la déclaration de guerre de l'Allemagne a été suivie de la propagation d'un état de peur et de terreur parmi tous²⁷.

On doit noter que les relations entre les éléments italiens et français en Tunisie se caractérisent par beaucoup de prudence, de méfiance, en plus des attaques récurrentes de part et d'autre²⁸. En effet, ces attentats touchèrent même des Tunisiens ayant acquis la nationalité française ou qu'on appelle les «nouveaux Français» dont le cas du procès de Valenza Jean, le 3 mars 1941.

D'autre part, la même source a indiqué que des mesures de sécurité ont été prises comme base pour surveiller tous les mouvements des Italiens en prévision de toute nouvelle attaque à la lumière de tout succès que les puissances de l'Axe pourraient obtenir²⁹. Un document publié le 29 mai 1942 confirme que les Tunisiens, ou du moins une partie importante d'entre eux, croient en la capacité de l'Italie à occuper la Tunisie. Cependant, un document daté du 18 juin 1942 parle de la visite de quelques Allemands dans la vieille ville, et cette visite fut très bien accueillie par les marchands qui pensaient que cette visite serait de bon augure pour eux³⁰.

La position des éléments italiens concernant la guerre n'était pas une position de principe, mais elle changeait plutôt en fonction des rebondissements de la guerre. A ce propos, le professeur Faysal Cherif a confirmé qu'avec la succession des victoires des alliés menées par "Montgomery" en Egypte, la Tunisie est devenue le dernier espoir pour les forces de l'Axe, surtout la Coalition italo-allemande.³¹

La Tunisie était l'endroit le plus important dans la mesure où une réunion germano-italienne s'est tenue le 2 janvier 1943 pour discuter à propos des moyens efficaces pour gagner leur bataille contre les Alliés et contrôler la Tunisie. Dans ce contexte, les études ont confirmé que les dirigeants italiens étaient conscients de l'importance de la communauté italienne présente en Tunisie, car elle peut apporter un grand soutien, notamment avec la présence d'environ 60 000 membres qui

²³ Ibidem... « Cette attitude équivoque peut être grosse de conséquence dans le cas où le gouvernement italien affirmerait son attention d'occuper la Tunisie. Les indécis et les tièdes auraient à cœur d'extérioriser leur loyalisme et des excès seraient à craindre ».

²⁴ ²⁴ Ibidem... f. 48 « Je crois maintenant qu'il vaut mieux avoir du sang français dans les vernes. La France est tirée d'affaire et elle va se reconstituer tandis que nous italiens nous ne savons pas où nous allons ».

²⁵ Ibidem... « Déjà quelques italiens commencent à enfreindre l'ordre de boycottage des cafés et restaurant français ».

²⁶ M.A.E, fonds: protectorat Tunisie ; Type :Direction de la sûreté publique ...op.cit. f76« l'intervention des Allemandes en Lybie et l'occupation de la Bulgarie ont ranimé les espoirs de la colonie italienne ».

²⁷ Galea (Joyce La Cour) ; *En fermant les yeux, je vais là-Bas* ...op.cit. p 170 « La guerre déclarée à l'Allemagne par la France et l'Angleterre et par voie de conséquence, la mobilisation générale, Papa et mami comme tous ceux qui s'arrêtaient lisaient en silence, ...et je me sentais envahie par la peur de ce que j'ignorais »

²⁸ Ibidem... p 170

²⁹ Ibidem... « Il est à craindre d'autres incidents à l'occasion d'un succès quelconque de l'axe ».

³⁰ M.A.E, fonds: protectorat Tunisie, op.cit. f 85

³¹ Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la tourmente de la seconde guerre mondiale*, Centre de Publication Universitaire. La Manouba.p340

représentent une force démographique assez importante. Cela s'ajoute au nombre de bénévoles qui augmentait de jour en jour³². L'hôpital d'Italie en Tunisie a reçu de nombreux blessés italiens et allemands, et de nombreuses institutions italiennes ont été mises au service des forces de l'Axe.

En outre, de nombreuses familles italiennes ont ouvert leurs maisons à certains réfugiés italiens fuyant les zones touchées par les bombardements, notamment Bizerte³³. Certaines sources ont également confirmé que l'entrée des forces italiennes s'était accompagnée d'une grande démonstration de force, et que les éléments italiens en Tunisie avaient annoncé leur soutien absolu aux armées italiennes en Tunisie, à la demande de l'amiral "Astiva", afin d'apaiser l'atmosphère et de maintenir le calme³⁴.

III- LE BILAN: FISSION DE LA COMMUNAUTÉ EUROPÉENNE EN TUNISIE

L'une des répercussions les plus importantes de la Seconde Guerre mondiale sur la réalité des communautés européennes est peut-être la consolidation de la défection au sein de ces éléments étrangers. Nous allons mettre l'accent sur la divergence des visions de ces communautés européennes (française, italienne, allemande) et donc la réfutation de la notion de "solidarité européenne".

Ces communautés suivaient le rythme des conditions internes et externes. Les aspirations de la communauté française n'étaient pas les mêmes que celles de la communauté italienne ou allemande. Tout comme la guerre a divisé les Européens entre les Alliés et l'Axe, les communautés européennes sont divisées en Tunisie, contrairement aux périodes précédentes, notamment les années vingt et le début des années trente, période marquée par une relative sérénité entre les différentes communautés.

Depuis le déclenchement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les signes de désunion et de disparité entre les éléments européens installés en Tunisie se sont manifestés selon le nouveau positionnement issu de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Cette situation perdurera jusqu'à la déclaration de l'indépendance de la Tunisie, début d'une nouvelle phase marquée par un nouveau repositionnement de ces communautés, notamment à la lumière de l'influence grandissante du modèle français comme « modèle-exemple » pour la plupart des minorités européennes, qui vont bientôt se confondre avec lui au sein du cadre du "projet de naturalisation".

Sur le plan économique, la situation en Tunisie est devenue très difficile, car les bombardements ont provoqué d'une part la perturbation de diverses activités dans de nombreuses régions du pays, ce qui a posé le problème de l'approvisionnement, notamment pour les forces de

³² Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la tourmente de la seconde guerre mondiale*, op.cit. p 347.

³³ A.S.D.M.I.A.E série Aff. Pol, fonds Tun, carton 14, dossier 1, de Silimbani au chef du cabinet du M.A.E du 10 décembre 1942 citer par Cherif (Fayçal) la Tunisie dans... op.cit., p 347 « Notre activité de propagande et de contrôle peut nous échapper étant donnée la situation une partie de la colonie italienne (60 à 70 mille pourra venir à l'aide des troupes d'occupation. Il y a à peu près 500 de nos compatriotes qui sont effectivement au service du commandement comme chauffeurs, mécaniciens guides etc... chaque four au cours de notre organisation des centaines de travailleurs se présentent sur tout pour dans les aérodromes et ports. Pour les demandes d'enrôlements volontaires un office spéciale s'est installé et qui sur une période de 5 jours a reçu plus de 1300 volontaires... alors que 1300 autres partiront au courant de ce mois pour servir en Lybie avec les troupes combattantes. Des enseignants d'écoles se sont déjà engagés comme officiers. L'hôpital italien reçoit de nombreux blessés italiens et allemands. Diverses écoles et établissements sont mis à la disposition des troupes, le comité d'assistance unifie avait organisé l'opération de se court et d'asile aux centaines de réfugiés italiens, surtout des enfants provenant des régions exposées aux offensives ennemies comme Bizerte au des localités qui sont en cours d'opération de guerre. Un appel est lancé auprès de nos compatriotes pour accueillir des familles et des réfugiés. »

³⁴ A.Q.O, série: Vichy-Tunisie, dossier 32, d'Esteva à Vichy, télégramme n° 1719 – 1720 du 10 novembre 1942 à 23 dossiers n° 1719 – 1720 « 20 avions italiens sont arrivés ce matin à EL Aouina. L'amiral Salza est à Tunis depuis le 31 octobre ... les Italiens de la ville ont voulu se porter vers la base d'aviation pour acclamer a Mr Petimremt de faire inviter toute la population italienne au calme et l'ordre n'a pas été troublé ».

l'Axe. D'autre part, les prix ont connu une augmentation sans précédent, où le prix de 12 œufs a atteint 120 francs, et la plupart des magasins ont été fermés³⁵.

De nombreuses villes ont été endommagées, notamment Bizerte, Beja, Mater, Mejez El Bab, Sousse, Kairouan, Sfax et Gafsa. Le mode de vie a également changé, car tout le monde - même les classes bourgeoises - s'est empressé d'aller chercher un peu de pain et pétrole. Que dire alors pour la catégorie moyenne et des prolétaires!

Pendant cette période, le marché noir a prospéré, car les prix des matières premières ont doublé, comme le montre le tableau suivant:

Tableau de la hausse des prix des matières premières au marché noir (hiver 1943)³⁶

Les produits	Les prix sur le marché noir	La valeur de la différence	Le pourcentage
Pain	4.40 fr	20 à 60 fr	454% à 1360
1kg Huile d'olive	30.15fr	30 à 52 fr	172%
Œufs (12 œufs)	40 fr	100 à 120 fr	250% à 300
La viande	29.90fr	100 à 120 fr	335% à 400
Poulet	37.40fr	200fr	534%
Pomme de terre	14.40 fr	-	-
Farine (1 kg)	4.90 fr	50-85 fr	1734 – 1002%

Cette hausse importante des prix a eu un impact significatif sur les conditions de la société tunisienne en général, y compris les communautés européennes, qui ont vécu des moments très difficiles, notamment à cause du manque de sécurité et de stabilité³⁷.

D'autre part, il convient de noter que cette évolution au niveau des rapports au sein de la "communauté européenne" en Tunisie s'est accompagnée d'une évolution au niveau des relations entre ces communautés et les tunisiens. Malgré l'existence de quelques transgressions dans les périodes précédentes, qui ont été recensées par le professeur Kamal Jerfel dans son article sur les relations euro-tunisiennes, basé principalement sur les archives des tribunaux français. Ce document a réussi en grande partie à tracer une chronologie de l'évolution de ces relations, notamment en ce qui concerne les relations franco-tunisiennes.

Des sources d'archives, plus précisément un document daté du 19 octobre 1942³⁸, montraient l'idée diffuse d'un rejet tunisien de la présence française. Cela est illustré par des cas géographiquement éloignés. D'abord lors du déroulement d'une fête à Bizerte en présence du contrôleur civil, avec l'annonce de l'hymne officiel français les Tunisiens se sont montrés indifférents en gardant leur place, mais dès le début de l'hymne tunisien, ils se sont tous levés en signe de respect. Ensuite, presque le même incident s'est produit dans la ville de Sousse le 12 octobre. Lors d'une cérémonie honorifique au casino municipal et dès que l'orchestre a commencé à chanter l'hymne français des sifflements ont retenti dans la salle. Quelques personnes se sont levées portant le drapeau

³⁵ GIDE (A), Journal ...op.cit., (Journal du 5 Janvier 1943)

³⁶ *Annuaire statistique de la Tunisie...*, op.cit., p 136. Citer par Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la...* op.cit., p 449

³⁷ Cherif (Fayçal), *La Tunisie dans la...* op.cit., p 451 « Le pays marchait au rythme de guerre. Cette situation avait généré un climat sociale tendu, le comportement des autorités militaires et le sol dates présents sur le terrain aussi bien ceux de l'Axe que des Allies en étaient en grande partie responsable. »

³⁸ A.N.T, série M.N.C 43, D1, titre: Etat d'Esprit de la population indigène pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale f 135.

tunisien et chantant la chanson dédiée au Bey "Inchdou Baburino". En plus l'un des soldats musulmans a crié à haute voix, "Vive le Bey", "Vive l'indépendance."³⁹

Citons un autre exemple. C'est le cas de la rencontre de football, qui se manifestent à travers un certain nombre d'événements qui, bien qu'en apparence anodins, reflètent finalement la nature des relations entre la communauté française et les Tunisiens. Tel est le cas de la rencontre de football entre le club sportif musulman de l'Espérance et l'Association sportive française organisée à la Goulette en 1942 au milieu d'une intense présence sécuritaire. Durant ce match l'Association sportive française marque deux buts contre l'Espérance, le public a contesté la décision de l'arbitre, alors le responsable de la sécurité a demandé à l'un des supporters de s'abstenir, ce dernier a protesté en disant: « Vous demandez le silence car l'arbitre est comme vous, français »⁴⁰.

Ce ressentiment apparaît également dans le même rapport à propos d'un autre incident survenu dans la ville d'Ain Drahim qui illustre à travers le manque de discipline parmi les travailleurs et une sorte d'indifférence envers leurs employeurs. L'affaire a plutôt atteint son apogée dans la ville de Tabarka, lorsqu'un des ouvriers a agressé son employeur au travail parce que ce dernier lui a demandé de travailler le soir.

Le rapport de sécurité émis le 28 octobre 1942⁴¹ par l'Unité de Sûreté Générale de Tunisie confirme un changement significatif dans le comportement des ouvriers: "Les colons se plaignant de leur indiscipline dans le secteur agricole et de leur indifférence. Idée confirmée par les propriétaires français de la région de Ghar al-Dima, qui se sont installés dans cette région il y a des décennies et ont vécu en harmonie avec les Tunisiens comme le confirme un document daté du 15 octobre 1942, le changement de cette relation, surtout après les perturbations en Tunisie dès le début des années quarante."⁴²

Tous ces exemples reflètent l'évolution des relations entre les Européens - notamment les Français- d'une part et les Tunisiens d'autre part, surtout pendant la première phase de la Seconde Guerre mondiale qui a été marquée par la victoire des pays de l'Axe et qui a engendré l'occupation de la capitale Paris... Ces nouvelles conditions accordaient aux Tunisiens une sorte de libération en termes de rapport colonisé – colonisateur. Les Tunisiens ont profité de tout événement pour critiquer les Français et leurs pratiques. De tels événements montrent le changement dans les relations dû au déclenchement de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, ainsi que le changement dans la conjoncture intérieure.

CONCLUSION:

- La seconde guerre mondiale est considérée comme une guerre dévastatrice qui a engendré de nombreux dégâts, beaucoup d'historiens se sont penchés sur les décomptes des pertes, mais l'originalité de cette présente recherche est le fait d'allée au-delà de ce côté matériel pour s'attarder sur les répercussions mentales des communautés européennes.

- Dans cette perspective, j'ai eu recours à une approche psychologique qui présente une occasion primordiale pour comprendre l'autre face de la guerre. Il s'agit des répercussions des rebondissements de la guerre sur l'état d'esprit de ces minorités européennes qui ne sont pas toujours en harmonie avec leurs gouvernements.

- Le but de ces communautés européennes notamment française et italienne reste toujours de préserver leurs intérêts personnels. D'ailleurs un article paru dans le journal *Le Petit Matin* intitulé

³⁹ Ibidem.

⁴⁰ A.N.T, série M.N.C 43, D1, titre: Etat d'Esprit de la population indigène pendant la deuxième guerre mondiale f 139.

⁴¹ Ibidem, f 144

⁴² Ibidem, f 134 « il est très inquiet pour la sécurité des Européens de la région ».

« *Intérêts Français et intérêts de la France* » évoque l'esprit pragmatique de ces minorités en Tunisie.

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Apostolic Anglo-Orthodox Unity Efforts in Multicultural Societies: The 1930 Lambeth Negotiations and Moscow's Opposition

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Abstract: *Inter-religious and inter-confessional dialogues are fundamental for fostering harmonious multicultural societies on an international scale. The Lambeth dialogues facilitated significant mutual recognition of baptism and priestly ordination between the Anglican Church and Orthodox Churches. However, the influence of the Moscow totalitarian regime on the Russian Orthodox Church, alongside other geopolitical factors, posed significant obstacles to efforts toward apostolic unity.*

Keywords: *Inter-religious dialogue, Apostolic unity, Lambeth Conference, Multicultural societies, Moscow regime influence*

THE ANGLICAN CHURCH'S ATTITUDE TOWARD UNITY WITH THE ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Anglican Church's approach to unity with the Orthodox Church was complex and multifaceted, deeply rooted in their apostolic traditions and longstanding desire to restore Christian unity. Throughout the 20th century, Anglicans made significant efforts to establish full communion with the Orthodox Church, motivated by a blend of apostolic, theological, historical, and ecclesiological factors.³ However, these efforts did not lead to full union due to Soviet regime geopolitical and ideologic hostility towards the West and few doctrinal differences between the two apostolic traditions.

MOTIVATIONS OF THE ANGLICAN CHURCH FOR UNITY

The Anglican Church, particularly influenced by the Anglo-Catholic movement, demonstrated a profound interest in uniting with the Orthodox Church. Several key motivations fueled this desire:

1. **Restoration of Christian Unity:** For many Anglicans, unity with the Orthodox Church was seen as a crucial step toward restoring Christian unity, understood as a return to **shared apostolic**

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roots. Leaders such as Bishop Charles Gore strongly promoted this vision, recognizing Orthodoxy as an unbroken continuity of apostolic tradition.

2. **Reaffirmation of Catholic Identity:** Faced with Protestant influences within the Anglican Church, some clergy viewed union with Orthodoxy as a way to strengthen Anglicanism's Catholic apostolic character. They believed such a union would clarify and reinforce Anglican doctrinal identity, particularly regarding apostolic succession and the sacraments.

3. **Mutual Recognition of Ordinations:** An essential aspect of Anglo-Orthodox dialogue was the mutual recognition of ordinations. Thousands of Anglican clergy saw this as a confirmation of the legitimacy of their apostolic succession. In 1923, a document titled *The Declaration of Intercommunion* was signed by 3,715 Anglican clergy, highlighting the widespread desire within the Anglican Church to establish full communion with Orthodoxy.

PROMINENT ADVOCATES OF UNITY

Notable supporters of unity included:

- **Bishop Charles Gore:** Known for his sustained efforts to foster closer relations between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches, Gore was an influential theologian who firmly believed in the necessity of unity between the two apostolic traditions.

- **Sir Arthur Headlam,** Bishop of Gloucester: Played a central role in many theological discussions between Anglicans and Orthodox leaders.

- **A. E. J. Rawlinson,** Bishop of Derby: Actively participated in ecumenical dialogues between the two traditions.

These leaders maintained that unity with the Orthodox Church would bring spiritual revitalization and strengthen the Anglican Church, contributing to broader Christian communion.⁴

OPPOSITION TO UNITY

Despite significant support for unity, opposition emerged from both Anglican and Orthodox circles, citing theological and practical obstacles:

1. **Doctrinal Differences:** One of the main challenges was the inability to reach a consensus on fundamental dogmas.

2. **Fear of Losing Identity:** Some Anglican leaders feared that union with Orthodoxy might undermine Anglican traditions and dilute the distinct identity of the Anglican Church, positioned between Roman Catholicism and Reformed Protestantism.

Reasons Unity Was Not Achieved

Efforts toward unity ultimately failed for several reasons:

1. **Persistent Theological Differences:** Despite prolonged discussions, divergences in the understanding of sacraments, apostolic succession, and other doctrinal matters could not be rapidly reconciled.

2. **Internal Opposition:** Within both the Anglican and Orthodox Churches, dogmatic factions opposed union, viewing it as either doctrinally risky or practically unfeasible.

3. **Political Context:** Geopolitical tensions, particularly Soviet Moscow's hostility towards the West and Soviet regime's influence over the Russian Orthodox Church, further complicated relations between the two Churches, hindering ecumenical dialogue.

⁴ Davidson, Randall Thomas. *Allocution on the Relations of the Anglican and Eastern-Orthodox Churches, Delivered to the Bishops and Clergy of the Convocation of Canterbury, Feb. 23, 1923*. Faith Press, 1923.

THE POSITIONS OF ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATES AT THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

The Lambeth Conference of 1930 and the broader ecumenical dialogue in the first half of the 20th century marked pivotal moments in attempts at rapprochement between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches. Each Orthodox Church approached this dialogue with a unique perspective shaped by its specific political, theological, and cultural circumstances. Analyzing these positions reveals the complexity of interdenominational relations and the decisive impact of the individuals involved in these negotiations.

This analysis examines the roles played by the Orthodox Churches of Russia, the Russian diaspora, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, Jerusalem, Serbia, Greece, Bulgaria, and Romania. It focuses on how each contributed to the dialogue process and subsequent developments.

THE ECUMENICAL PATRIARCHATE OF CONSTANTINOPLE

The Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople was one of the most active proponents of interdenominational dialogue with the Anglican Church throughout the 20th century. Under the leadership of Patriarch Meletios IV (Metaxakis) and his successors, Constantinople initiated and supported several ecumenical conferences, including those at Lambeth.

- **Patriarch Meletios IV (Metaxakis):** Known for his reformist vision and openness to modernity, Meletios IV played a key role in fostering closer relations with the Anglican Church. He strongly advocated adopting the Gregorian calendar and other reforms aimed at better synchronization with the Western Christian world.

- **Patriarch Athenagoras I (1948–1972):** Continuing this tradition, Patriarch Athenagoras was a fervent supporter of Christian unity. His initiatives included the historic 1964 meeting with Pope Paul VI, marking the mutual lifting of the 1054 excommunications between the Orthodox and Catholic Churches. Athenagoras promoted dialogue with the Anglican Church based on mutual respect and the exploration of shared beliefs, aiming for deeper understanding and eventual unity.⁵

THE PATRIARCHATE OF ALEXANDRIA

The Patriarchate of Alexandria, represented by Patriarch Meletios II Metaxakis at the 1930 Lambeth Conference, aligned with the ecumenical approach promoted by Constantinople. The recognition of Anglican ordinations by this Patriarchate in 1930 marked a significant moment in Anglican-Orthodox relations. Patriarch Meletios emphasized that, while doctrinal differences existed, these should not prevent closer collaboration and unification. His recognition was seen as a bold and necessary step toward Christian unity, especially in the face of modern challenges such as secularization and global political shifts.

THE PATRIARCHATE OF ANTIOCH

The Patriarchate of Antioch, under the leadership of Metropolitan Ignatius of Epiphany, adopted a moderate stance in its dialogue with the Anglican Church. Representatives from Antioch emphasized the importance of preserving Orthodox traditions and apostolic succession as essential to the validity of ordinations. At the Lambeth Conference, Ignatius highlighted the need to clarify

⁵ Davey, Colin. *Anglican-Orthodox Relations during the Patriarchate of ... Athenagoras I, 1948-1972*. 1975.

these aspects before moving toward unity. Antioch's position was also influenced by the geopolitical challenges of its region, where Christians faced interreligious tensions.

THE PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM

The Patriarchate of Jerusalem, represented by Archbishop Timotheos Temelis of Jordan at the Lambeth Conference, adopted a similar cautious approach to that of Antioch. Jerusalem, due to its central role in Christian history, held a unique status among Orthodox Churches. Archbishop Timotheos argued that any form of unity must be grounded in a shared understanding of doctrine and sacraments, reflecting a position that was very open to dialogue.

THE SERBIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Serbian Orthodox Church, represented by Metropolitan Irinej of Novi Sad at the Lambeth Conference, took a conservative position. Irinej emphasized the necessity of safeguarding doctrinal integrity and apostolic succession, expressing concerns about the potential impact of union on Orthodox identity. This position was shaped by the political context of the Balkans, where nationalism and Orthodoxy were closely intertwined.

At the Moscow Conference of 1948, the Serbian delegation participated in discussions aimed at establishing clear guidelines for relations between Orthodox and Anglican Churches. The Serbian Church maintained that any potential union must be founded on full unity in faith and doctrine, emphasizing the need for Anglican conformity to Orthodox dogma.

THE GREEK ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Greek Orthodox Church took a conservative approach to dialogue with the Anglican Church. Represented by Metropolitan Athenagoras of Corinth at the Lambeth Conference, the Greek delegation insisted on clarifying Anglican doctrines and strictly adhering to Orthodox traditions. Athenagoras highlighted the importance of doctrinal transparency concerning sacraments and apostolic succession as prerequisites for any discussions on unity. This stance reflected broader concerns about protecting Greek Orthodoxy from external influences in a politically and socially tumultuous context.

THE BULGARIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Bulgarian Orthodox Church approached its dialogue with the Anglican Church cautiously due to its schism with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Represented by Bishop Paisios of Zrievitsa at the Lambeth Conference, the Bulgarian Church stressed the importance of broad consensus among all Orthodox Churches before making decisions on union with the Anglican Church. While willing to evaluate the possibility of intercommunion, the Bulgarian Church emphasized preserving its canonical and doctrinal integrity.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Russian Orthodox Church, profoundly affected by the Bolshevik Revolution and the subsequent Communist regime, adopted a reserved and conservative stance in its external relations, including with the Anglican Church. By the time of the 1930 Lambeth Conference, the Russian Church faced severe persecution in the Soviet Union. Under Patriarch Sergius (Stragorodsky), the

Church sought limited autonomy within the Soviet state, but this came at the cost of significant compromises, such as the controversial 1927 Declaration of Loyalty to the regime.

While the Russian Orthodox Church did not send representatives to the Lambeth Conference, it maintained indirect communication, emphasizing the importance of doctrinal clarity. During World War II, Stalin permitted the Russian Orthodox Church to resume limited external relations, including with the Anglican Church, as part of an alliance against Nazi Germany. However, during the Cold War, these relations were curtailed by the Soviet regime.

THE RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OUTSIDE RUSSIA (ROCORA)

In contrast to the state-controlled Russian Orthodox Church, ROCORA adopted a firm stance against the Soviet regime and participated actively in theological dialogues with the Anglican Church. Under leaders like Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky), ROCORA engaged in discussions at the Lambeth Conferences of 1920 and 1930, emphasizing the importance of preserving Orthodox traditions while exploring avenues for collaboration.

ROCORA leaders insisted on maintaining doctrinal integrity and viewed interdenominational dialogue as an opportunity to assert Orthodox values in the face of secularism and atheism. Despite their openness to dialogue, ROCORA firmly upheld the necessity of conversion to Orthodoxy for true union.

THE ROMANIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

The Romanian Orthodox Church played a central role in ecumenical dialogues at both the Lambeth and Bucharest Conferences. Patriarch Miron Cristea, a prominent figure in Romanian Orthodoxy, supported closer relations with the Anglican Church as an opportunity to strengthen Romania's ties with the West. However, Cristea emphasized the importance of preserving Orthodox doctrinal integrity amidst these efforts. Romania's interwar political context, where nationalism and Orthodoxy were closely intertwined, heavily influenced the Church's cautious but constructive engagement in ecumenical dialogue.

The positions of the various Orthodox Churches at the Lambeth Conference and in dialogues with the Anglican Church reflected their theological, cultural, and political contexts. While the Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Alexandria were particularly open to ecumenical dialogue, emphasizing its potential for fostering Christian unity, Churches like those of Russia, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria adopted more conservative stances, prioritizing doctrinal integrity. The Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem maintained a balanced constructive approach, emphasizing the need for doctrinal clarification. These dialogues illustrate not only the diversity within Orthodoxy but also the broader challenges of interdenominational engagement in a tumultuous historical period.

THE LAMBETH DIALOGUES

The "Declaration of Faith" by Anglican clergy facilitated the positive decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in **Constantinople, which, on July 22, 1922, recognized the validity of Anglican ordinations**. Patriarch Meletios IV and the entire Synod of the Ecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople stated in the act of recognition that they had examined the validity of Anglican ordinations from an Orthodox perspective. The synod concluded that, within the Orthodox Church, ordinations to the episcopate, priesthood, and diaconate within the Anglican Episcopal Church held

the same power and validity as those in the Roman Catholic Church, being derived from apostolic succession.⁶

This declaration, however, was not a general decree of the entire Orthodox Church. The other Orthodox Churches were invited by the Patriarch of Constantinople to adopt the same position. Patriarch Meletios sent an encyclical letter to the seven Orthodox Churches, encouraging them to follow the example of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. By March 1923, **Patriarch Damianos of Jerusalem and Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus sent letters to the Archbishop of Canterbury, announcing that the synods of their Churches had recognized the validity of Anglican ordinations.**⁷

On July 28, 1922, Patriarch Meletios IV informed the Archbishop of Canterbury of the Ecumenical Patriarchate's decision regarding the validity of Anglican ordinations. The Romanian Orthodox Church, one of the seven sister Orthodox Churches, received the Patriarchate's decision on August 8, 1922, but did not adopt an immediate resolution. In a letter dated August 8, 1922, Constantinople Patriarch Meletios IV Metaxakis communicated the recognition of ordinations to the Romanian Church. In January 1925, under the leadership of Patriarch Miron Cristea, the Romanian Orthodox Church responded, requesting clarification from the Anglican Church on whether ordination was considered a sacrament.⁸

ARCHBISHOP CHARLES GORE AND THE PAN-ORTHODOX SYNOD

On May 23, 1923, Archbishop Charles Gore visited Constantinople and, during the sessions of the Pan-Orthodox Synod held there, presented two documents from the Anglican clergy to the Ecumenical Patriarch.⁹

1. **"Terms of Intercommunion"**: Signed by over 5,000 clergy, this document declared that the Anglican Church saw no difficulty in uniting with the Orthodox Church and becoming part of Orthodoxy. Archbishop Gore acknowledged that Anglicanism had its own historical development, influenced by Lutheran and Calvinist traditions, but he believed unity was achievable through recognition of mutual faith and practices.

2. **"Conditions for Unity"**: This second document outlined the terms for possible union and represented the collective ideas of the Anglican Church. While the Anglican Church demonstrated a spirit favorable to unification, doctrinal and sacramental divergences remained significant challenges.¹⁰

Archbishop Gore later visited Athens, where he was warmly received by the Archbishop and Synod of the Church of Greece. He expressed confidence that, despite the difficulties, unity would one day be achieved through mutual recognition.¹¹

PREPARATORY DISCUSSIONS FOR THE 1930 LAMBETH CONFERENCE

Discussions on Anglican-Orthodox unity continued in 1925 during commemorations in London marking the 1,600th anniversary of the First Ecumenical Council of Nicaea (325). Meanwhile, at the inter-Orthodox conference held between June 23 and July 23, 1930, at the

⁶ Ramureanu, Ion, "Direct Unity Negotiations Between the Orthodox Churches and the Anglican Church from 1920 to the Present" ("Tratative directe de unire dintre Bisericile Ortodoxe și Biserica Anglicană de la 1920 până azi"), in *Ortodoxia*, X, no.2, 958, Bucharest, p. 217-235.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*.

¹¹ Ramureanu, Ion, *op. cit.*

Vatopedi Monastery on Mount Athos, it was decided to include relations with heterodox Churches among the topics for a future Pan-Orthodox Synod.¹²

THE SEVENTH LAMBETH CONFERENCE (1930)

On February 24, 1930, the new Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Cosmo Lang, extended an official invitation to Patriarch Photius II of Constantinople, requesting that he, as "primus inter pares" among Orthodox patriarchs, coordinate with the heads of the sister autocephalous Orthodox Churches to organize an Orthodox delegation for the Lambeth Conference scheduled for July 1930.¹³

In response, Patriarch Photius II informed the Orthodox Churches of this invitation and urged them to designate representatives. On May 14, 1930, he assured the Archbishop of Canterbury of the Orthodox Churches' participation, listing the members of the delegation, which included representatives from:

- **The Ecumenical Patriarchate:** Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateira, Patriarchal Exarch for Western Europe and liaison to the Anglican Church.
- **The Patriarchate of Alexandria:** Patriarch Meletios II Metaxakis, who presided over the delegation.
- **The Patriarchate of Antioch:** Metropolitan Ignatius of Epiphany.
- **The Patriarchate of Jerusalem:** Archbishop Timotheos Temelis of Jordan.
- **The Romanian Orthodox Church:** Metropolitan Nectarios of Bukovina.
- **The Church of Greece:** Metropolitan Athenagoras of Corinth and Archimandrite Michael Constantinides.
- **The Church of Cyprus:** Deacon Leontios, later elected Metropolitan of Paphos.
- **The Bulgarian Orthodox Church:** Bishop Paisios of Zrievitsa, later Bishop of Vratsa.¹⁴

PRELIMINARY MEETINGS

Before the official sessions, the Orthodox delegation held three preparatory meetings with the Permanent Commission of the Archbishop of Canterbury on July 9–10, 1930. Archbishop Gore, a fervent advocate of Anglican-Orthodox unity, emphasized the need for clarity on matters of doctrine and sacraments before formalizing unity. Patriarch Meletios II identified key issues requiring resolution:

1. What is the official Anglican body authorized to decide on matters of faith and doctrine?
2. What is the status of an Anglican who opposes official doctrine?
3. Does the Anglican Church recognize ordination as a sacrament and maintain uninterrupted apostolic succession?
4. Does the Anglican Church affirm the transformation of bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ and the Eucharist as a sacrificial offering?¹⁵

PLENARY SESSIONS

From July 15–18, 1930, Anglican and Orthodox delegates held four plenary sessions, presided over by Sir Arthur Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester. In the first session, Anglican representatives affirmed that their General Assembly or **Synod of Bishops held authority over matters of faith,**

¹² *Ibidem.*

¹³ *Ibidem.*

¹⁴ *Ibidem.*

¹⁵ *Ramureanu, I, op.cit.*

with decisions requiring approval from diocesan synods. Patriarch Meletios expressed satisfaction with this clarification.¹⁶

Discussions progressed to the Eucharist, with Anglican representatives affirming belief in the real presence of Christ. While Orthodox delegates **acknowledged Anglican baptism**, they noted that sacramental administration by Anglican clergy could not be permitted for Orthodox believers except under exceptional circumstances.¹⁷

OUTCOMES OF THE LAMBETH CONFERENCE

Following these sessions, a summary of the debates was published in 17 points, approved by the Anglican Commission. A significant outcome was the **recognition of Anglican ordinations by the Patriarchate of Alexandria**. In 1930, Patriarch Meletios II communicated this decision to the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Anglican Primate, indicating that **Anglican clergy entering Orthodoxy would not require re-ordination, and baptized Anglicans would not need re-baptism**.

THE JOINT COMMISSION OF 1931

The Lambeth Conference requested the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury to participate in a meeting held in London between October 14–20, 1931, under the auspices of a joint commission.¹⁸ The commission consisted of 16 members representing both the Anglican and Orthodox Churches. The Orthodox delegation included representatives from the following religious institutions:

- **The Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Patriarchate of Jerusalem:** Represented by Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateira.
- **The Patriarchate of Alexandria:** Represented by Archimandrite Michael Constantinides.
- **The Patriarchate of Antioch:** Represented by Metropolitan Theodosios of Tyre and Sidon.
- **The Serbian Patriarchate:** Represented by Metropolitan Irinej of Novi Sad.
- **The Romanian Patriarchate:** Represented by Metropolitan Nectarios of Bukovina.
- **The Archbishopric of Cyprus:** Represented by Metropolitan Leontios of Paphos.
- **The Church of Greece:** Represented by Metropolitan Polycarp of Tricca and Stagoi.
- **The Polish Orthodox Church:** Represented by Nicholas Arseniev, professor at the Faculty of Theology in Warsaw.

This diverse delegation underscored the broad commitment of Orthodox Churches to ecumenical discussions.

The Russian Orthodox Church in the Soviet Union, though not represented at the Lambeth Conference in July 1930, expressed a vague agreement with the resolutions of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. In a letter dated September 30, 1931, Patriarchal Locum Tenens Sergius of Moscow

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *Ibidem*.

¹⁸ Geffert, Bryn. *Anglicans & Orthodox between the Wars*. 2003. Geffert, Bryn. *Eastern Orthodox and Anglicans: Diplomacy, Theology, and the Politics of Interwar Ecumenism*. University of Notre Dame Press, 2010. Hodges, H. A. *Anglicanism & Orthodoxy: A Study in Dialectical Churchmanship*. SCM Press, 1957. International Commission for Anglican-Orthodox Theological Dialogue, and Anglican Communion Office. *The Church of the Triune God: The Cyprus Statement Agreed by the International Commission for Anglican-Orthodox Theological Dialogue*, 2006. Anglican Communion Office, 2006. Joint Doctrinal Commission on the Relations of the Anglican and Eastern Orthodox Churches. *Report of the Joint Doctrinal Commission Appointed by the Ecumenical Patriarch and the Archbishop of Canterbury for Consultation on the Points of Agreement and Difference between the Anglican and the Eastern Orthodox Churches*. Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1932.

wrote to the Ecumenical Patriarch Photius II: "An elementary duty of Christian charity compels us to consider what we can do to assist the Anglican Church. The salvation of humanity inspires the Church's mission in this world."¹⁹

The Anglican delegation included the Archbishop of Canterbury, Lord Cosmo Lang; Sir Arthur Headlam, Bishop of Gloucester; the Archbishop of Dublin; the Bishop of Northern Ireland; Professors Dr. Goudge and Dr. Greenslade from Oxford University; Canon J.A. Douglas; and Philipp Usher, a former Anglican priest in Athens. Metropolitan Germanos of Thyateira and Sir Arthur Headlam served as secretaries of the commission.²⁰

The joint Anglo-Orthodox commission used the **13 official sacramental conditions** presented by the Anglo-Orthodox Commission in London in 1921 as the basis for discussion. However, three of these conditions had been addressed and integrated into the 17 points of the Anglo-Orthodox negotiations at the Seventh Lambeth Conference on July 18, 1930. As a result, the remaining conditions were streamlined into **six key points**:

1. **Recognition of Apostolic Succession**
2. **Scripture and Tradition**
3. **A Common Creed**
4. **Doctrine of the Sacraments**
5. **Diversity in Church Practices**
6. **Sacramental Intercommunion**

The joint Anglo-Orthodox commission acknowledged a significant mutual understanding between the two Churches, and consider this a matter to be decided by the higher authorities of each Church. This marked the end of negotiations between Anglicans and Orthodox representatives in London in October 1931.

THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE OF 1935

Following the Seventh Lambeth Conference in July 1930 and the Anglo-Orthodox negotiations in London in October 1931, discussions between Anglicans and Orthodox leaders continued in Bucharest in June 1935. The Romanian Orthodox Church conditionally recognized Anglican ordinations on March 19, 1936.²¹

In April 1938, Archbishop Cosmo Lang of Canterbury, Primate of England, visited the Church of Greece and later the Ecumenical Patriarchate. He engaged in discussions with Ecumenical Patriarch Benjamin (1935–1946) and the Holy Synod on strategies to achieve real unity between the Anglican Church and the Orthodox Church.²²

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCES

The outbreak of World War II (1939–1945) interrupted Anglo-Orthodox negotiations for rapprochement and unity. However, in May 1940, at the invitation of the Bulgarian Church, a delegation of Anglican clergy and theologians visited Bulgaria to examine the validity of Anglican ordinations alongside a commission of Bulgarian Church representatives. On June 20, 1940, the Bulgarian Holy Synod postponed its final decision, awaiting the opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church.

¹⁹ Ramureanu, I, *op.cit.*

²⁰ *Ibidem.*

²¹ Ramureanu, I, *op.cit.*, Vintilescu, Petre, "Bucharest Conference in 1935" (in Romanian), in *Ortodoxia*, 1958.

²² *Ibidem.*

In September 1943, at the invitation of the Moscow Patriarchate, an Anglican delegation led by Archbishop S.F. Garbett of York visited Moscow to gain a closer understanding of the state of the Russian Orthodox Church during the war.

The Pan-Orthodox Conference held in Moscow on July 18, 1948, reaffirmed the need for a more detailed analysis of Anglican ordinations to ensure unity of faith and confession between the two Churches.²³

In July 1956, the Anglican Church sent a significant delegation, led by Archbishop A.M. Ramsey of York, to Moscow to discuss rapprochement and potential union. The theological discussions, held from July 19–23, 1956, included Anglican and Russian Orthodox representatives. The delegations emphasized the necessity of reaching complete agreement on Holy Scripture, Holy Tradition, the hierarchy, and the sacraments.²⁴

CONCLUSIONS

Direct theological negotiations between Anglicans and Orthodox Churches played an essential role in fostering rapprochement and potential union.²⁵ These discussions began with the Sixth Lambeth Conference (July 5–August 8, 1920) and continued through subsequent conferences and negotiations, including:

- The **Seventh Lambeth Conference** on July 18, 1930, which published the six points of faith.

- The **1931 London Joint Commission**, which furthered these discussions.

- The **Bucharest Conference** of June 1935.²⁶

As a result of these efforts:

- The Ecumenical Patriarchate recognized the validity of Anglican ordinations on July 28, 1922.

- The Patriarchate of Jerusalem followed on March 12, 1923, and the Archbishop of Cyprus on March 20, 1923.

- The Patriarchate of Alexandria formally recognized Anglican ordinations on December 25, 1930.²⁷

- The Romanian Orthodox Church conditionally recognized Anglican ordinations on March 19, 1936.²⁸

The Pan-Orthodox Conference in Moscow (July 5–18, 1948) stipulated that union between the Anglican and Orthodox Churches would depend on unity in faith and confession.²⁹ The negative influence of the Stalinist Regime was obvious.

²³ Faith and Order Advisory Group. *Anglican - Orthodox Theological Dialogue: The Church of the Triune God: Briefing Paper*. General Synod of the Church of England, 2008.

²⁴ Miller, Charles. *Toward a Fuller Vision: Orthodoxy and Anglican Experience*. Morehouse Barlow, 1984. Leopold, Robert K. *Strangers, yet Brothers: The Present State of the Anglican - Eastern Orthodox Dialogue*. 2008.

²⁵ Davey, Colin. *Anglican-Orthodox Relations during the Patriarchate of... Athenagoras I, 1948-1972*. 1975.

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²⁷ Episcopal Church Advisory Council to the Presiding Bishop on Ecclesiastical Relations. *Orthodox Statements on Anglican Orders*. Edited by Edward Rochie Hardy, Morehouse-Gorham Co.; A.R. Mowbray & Co., Ltd, 1946.

²⁸ Miller, Charles. *Toward a Fuller Vision: Orthodoxy and Anglican Experience*. Morehouse Barlow, 1984. Moss, Claude Beaufort, and Anglican and Eastern Churches Association. "Our Ideas and Ideals." *The Orthodox Church*, 1935. Papadopoulos, Chrysostomos. *The Validity of Anglican Ordinations*. Faith Press ; Morehouse Pub. Co., 1931.

²⁹ Salomon, Richard G. *Orthodoxy, Ecumenical Movement, and Anglicanism: The Moscow Conference of 1948*. [publisher not identified], 1957.

The culmination of these negotiations demonstrated that five Orthodox Churches, alongside the Ecumenical Patriarchate, considered Anglican ordinations equivalent to those of the Roman Catholic Church and other Eastern heterodox Churches. They recognized the Anglican baptism as well. Nevertheless, the Orthodox Church retained the right to affirm or revoke such recognition as deemed necessary. Inter-religious and inter-confessional dialogues are fundamental for fostering harmonious multicultural societies on an international scale.³⁰

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SECTION 2

Russian Aggression, Deepfake and EU Enlargement

Defining Ukraine's victory in a war against Russia

MYKOLA KAPITONENKO¹

Abstract: *As the Russian-Ukrainian war has turned into a protracted conflict, the issues linked to elaborating long-term strategies for all parties involved are becoming increasingly pressing. One of them is about shaping a vision and defining criteria for victory, or at least for a range of possible outcomes of the war that may qualify as a victory. This vision is set to become a cornerstone for war planning, future negotiations and post-conflict settlement.*

This article aims at defining ways of understanding victory for Ukraine; showing variety of approaches to the term; and connecting success in the war with security of Ukraine in the future. The latter is linked to security commitments, which is another focus of the paper. I'll be comparing various approaches to defining victory in a modern war; outline general perspectives of de-escalation and ceasefire in the Russian-Ukrainian war; and address the problem of security guarantees for Ukraine by implying comparative analysis, theory of alliances, and a broader realist vision of security. Together these issues help understand how possible, achievable or close the victory in the war is for Ukraine.

Key words: *Russian-Ukrainian war, theory of victory, modern wars, security commitments, NATO.*

INTRODUCTION

The Russian-Ukrainian war has put several well-known puzzles of international politics into a new setting. Besides, it raised some urgent political issues, concerning the future of the war and elements of a post-war settlement, including security provisions for Ukraine.

One of such puzzles concerns definition of victory and, in a more general way, understanding of how modern wars end. There has been lack of consensus over the former and much more clarity over the latter: wars today tend to end without formal agreements and, thus, without clearly defined winners and losers. The notion of victory is much less clearly defined than it has been at times of classic interstate wars. Instead, it is nuanced and depends on theoretical perspective.

For Ukraine, one of these nuances is about security commitments. Membership in NATO, for which Ukraine has so much aspired, has set in motion fundamental developments in the regional security architecture, given Russia's desire and readiness to prevent it. Ukraine's relations with the Alliance are likely to remain in focus as the war proceeds. But how realistic is Ukraine's goal to join NATO?

This article explores these issues with the main focus being on how the war might end, Ukraine's security ensured, and victory is defined, both on political and theoretical levels. Lack of clear perspective and competing approaches tangle managing the conflict. These issues are also linked to ongoing debate within the security studies about how wars tend to end in today's world.

What can qualify as a victory in Ukraine's war against Russia? How important are security commitments for Ukraine to get a better prospect after the war? I assume that can hardly count on formal and/or rapid victory; that the price of the war will be high; and that the most constructive way to understand victory is by improving Ukraine's chances for deterring Russia in the future. Security commitments from the West are becoming pivotal.

To address these issues I imply theoretical frameworks of realism, in particular relative gains and balance of power concepts. Some aspects of theories of victory are examined through the lenses of just war theory. Conflict ripeness theory is utilized to assess the current state and possible developments of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Theory of alliances is applied within a general rationalist approach to examine perspectives of Ukraine to receive security commitments from the West.

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The article proceeds as follows. Its first part is concentrating on the concept of victory, describing existing theoretical approaches and providing a literature overview. It is followed by analysis of the trends in the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war with the view to demonstrate why this conflict is not ripe for settlement, and why it is most likely to continue. A protracted war scenario transforms the notion of victory, and places special significance upon security commitments for Ukraine. Analysis of this issue is presented in the final part of the text.

THEORIES OF VICTORY

Defining victory in a modern war is not easy. The term is overburdened with historic experience, emotions and uncertainty typically surrounding wars. Besides, it can be manipulated in a number of ways for political or ideological purposes. But it still needs explanation and definition, because understanding victory is the key to ordering preferences and elaborating a position in subsequent negotiations or a strategy for further fight.

Existing body of literature suggest different approaches to a concept of victory.

Raymond O'Connor suggests that a victory in modern wars – his article was published in late 1960-es – can seldom be equated with the military defeat and surrender of the enemy (O'Connor, 1969). Instead, he puts forward a more politically colored definition of victory as attaining one's stated objectives; as well as underscores the dynamic nature of war which makes can make victory possible even without enemy's surrender. In a more general way, victory can take different forms and can be achieved through different means. Apart from achieving military dominance, it is crucial for a victorious country to convert it into a negotiated settlement.

As the Cold War progressed and the role of the nuclear weapons in strategic considerations rose to pivotal, attention has been paid to framing a victory in a conflict where both nuclear parties have secured second-strike capabilities (Baylis, Garnett, 1991). As soon as that happened, old concepts of victory in a war, assuming surrender of the opponent resulting from a military defeat, became obsolete. That shift can be felt today in attempts to frame a victory over Russia in the Russian-Ukrainian war: how can one defeat a nuclear superpower militarily? Apparently, a victory in the Cold War didn't look like a Clausewitz-style imposition of political conditions upon a defeated opponent.

Another revision of Clausewitz approaches comes from Mary Kaldor, who generalized the experience of the new wars emerging with the end of the Cold War, which are no longer focusing on territorial conquest, battles, and military forces – all those typical for the old wars of the 19th and 20th centuries (Kaldor, 1999). Instead, new wars are waged by both state and non-state actors, and are driven by identity-related interests, not state ideologies. A victory in a new type of war is no longer linked to a state-dominated agenda, and not always can be secured by traditional attributes a state possesses, like military force.

Asymmetric warfare and 'small wars' are once again challenging traditional approach to victory by explaining the roots of defeat, in particular suffered by stronger democracies against their adversaries (Merom, 2003). Gil Merom suggests that stronger democracies fail to win because of various constraints, imposed by their societies upon an escalation needed to secure victory. This focus of attention brings Merom's ideas in line with other works dealing with asymmetric warfare (Mack, 1975; Arreguin-Toft, 2001). The main emphasis of theories of asymmetric conflicts is rather on why weak often emerge victorious than on what victory is per se. But analysis of outcomes of asymmetric wars helps more accurately assess the link between power of states and outcome of wars.

In many ways discussions about defining or measuring victory turned to be linked to realities of the US grand strategy in the 21st century. There has been a strong demand for a more specific understanding of victory in a country, engaged in several protracted conflicts, and pursuing broad strategic goals far beyond just toppling leaders or conventional defeats of weaker militaries. In

particular, intervention in Iraq seemed an undisputed military victory, but a strategic loss. One of the ways to overcome this difficulty was to put victory should into a broader context of grand strategy and possible costs, both of a war itself and of post-war risks (Martel, 2007).

Modern wars end differently than they did for the most part of the modern history. Quite seldom belligerents sign a formal peace treaty to end hostilities: from 1946 through 2003 only about 16% of interstate wars followed that trajectory (Kreutz, 2010). Much more frequently a war goes on, becoming less intensive and eventually turning into a frozen conflict, which, however, may erupt with violence again any moment. Besides, wars are dynamic and multifaceted. They engage both states and non-states; with balance of power, interests and perceptions constantly changing in the course. Under such circumstances, states have a wide array of ways and options to define victory – or defeat.

There is a classical understanding of victory as achieving a better prospect for a nation than if it had not gone to war (Liddell Hart, 1952:2). 'A better prospect' can imply a variety of things: achieving a better balance of power, diminishing security risks, getting more freedom, receiving a better access to political or economic gains, and a lot more. Picking one of these benefits depends on a theoretical perspective and understanding of what states are generally after under given historic, geopolitical, economic and social conditions. From a realist viewpoint, which is concentrated on organized violence in relations among states more than any other paradigm, a war can be seen as a way to exchange available military resources for some political or geopolitical gains. There are cases when one can easily see if a state succeeded in that exchange, for instance, if a war ends with territorial conquests for one country and losses for another. However, even such cases may be misleading examples of victory's simplicity: territorial gains in the end may prove to worsen a country prospect in international politics. Russia has annexed Crimea from Ukraine in 2014; but increased territorial control has hardly resulted in a better prospect for Moscow, given the price it had to pay. Two primary reasons: inaccuracy in defining better prospect, and inability to run an alternative scenario without a war and see what happens – make this description of victory insufficient.

Understanding contemporary victory, and in particular in a defensive war, may be seen as a restoration of status quo. That is what Ukrainian president most likely means when putting forward his peace formula (President of Ukraine, 2023). Significant part of its requirements is about restoration: of Ukraine's territorial integrity and justice, in particular. It is also about just, comprehensive and lasting peace, which puts the Ukrainian visions of a victory within a just war perspective (Walzer, 2002).

This perspective is mostly about why how the wars should be fought and also about how post-war settlement should be managed (O'Driscoll, 2020). Just wars are those which are fought for justice, at least in what concerns protecting a state's sovereignty and territory. A victory in a just war can be seen as a successful completing of the mission for getting back to status quo, compensations at the expense and legal punishment for those responsible – justice, to put it shortly.

The key problem with this approach is that very few contemporary wars end in such a way. Status quo is hardly returned as a result; rather it is changed. Violators of rules are seldom held responsible; and it may be generally problematic to measure success in restoring justice. In a particular case of the Russian-Ukrainian war this perspective narrows victory for Ukraine to Russia's withdrawal from all occupied territories, compensations for all losses, and legal responsibility for the Russia's leadership – a perspective quite difficult to achieve. Appeals to justice are politically relevant and effective; but a just war theory's understanding of victory can be too vague and ill-suited for realities of modern warfare.

One more way a victory in the Russian-Ukrainian war can be described, is through improvement of one's position in comparison to the opponent's, which is a more specified understanding of 'a better prospect'.

It is predominantly about managing the balance of power. Getting a better prospect through a war in this case means increasing a state's chances to win the next war. If a previous balance of power has been shifted in a state's favor due to a war, it may be considered victorious. This understanding of victory is heavily concentrating on a notion of relative gains, which is one of the key concepts of realism (Powell, 1991). States care about their relative advantages, comparing them to those of other states. If both states win as a result of cooperation, the one which gets less is a loser. The opposite is also true: if both states lose as a result of war, the one which loses less is victorious. Victory is defined through measuring distribution of gains and losses. It is about maximizing relative power by using war as a tool. Some wars end with all parties weakened, but even if a state pays a higher price for taking part in a war than any possible prize it gets, it may still emerge victorious – if others pay more. A shift in a balance of power in one's favor is enough to qualify as a victory even if all are losing in absolute terms.

Putting together a theory of victory in a modern war is complicated by competition among various IR theories, changed dynamic of a military standoff, and high level of uncertainty with which a huge share of wars actually end. Replacing 'victory' with 'success' can help dismiss some of the formal requirements for a military victory, but it does not make it easier to understand winners and losers.

In dealing with what can be defined as Ukraine's victory in a war against Russia, I suggest keeping in mind realistic approach with its emphasis on relative advantages for both countries; with specific attention additionally paid to the contours of the future international arrangements and, in particular, to security commitments for Ukraine.

PROTRACTED WAR AND SECURITY COMMITMENTS PROBLEM

Approaches to define Ukraine's victory against Russia must take into account high probability of a prolonged standoff. In such a war, a victory will be measured by the costs both parties pay, relative gains balance, and the future peace arrangements.

Long-lasting modern wars are difficult to end. There is a mix of strategic calculations and miscalculations of the parties, political pressures, international factors and political costs making it problematic to find a sustainable and stable solution. Even a ceasefire requires considerable efforts. Almost half of wars since 1946 lasted longer than a year; and most of those running beyond one-year mark tend to go on for over a decade. That points to a high probability of the Russian-Ukrainian war to significantly extend its life span.

Perspectives to end a war are shaped by existing or perceived balance of power, political framework for decision-making, costs of war, and a principal possibility of a negotiated settlement – the latter two elements are often referred to as conflict's ripeness (Zartman, 2000).

So far battles and maneuvers in the Russian-Ukrainian war are pointing at military equilibrium. No side has been able to significantly shift the frontline after the initial stage of the war, marked by Russia occupying large parts of Ukraine's territory in the South and leaving area around the country's capital, Kyiv. The war has turned positional.

Under these conditions, political constraints are pushing leadership of both countries away from any concessions. Costs of war are rising, but they are asymmetric for the two parties. Devastation of Ukraine's infrastructure and equipment is being compensated by foreign supplies of weapons and money; while Russia's losses sensitivity threshold is higher because of its larger potential and due to the fact that the war is happening on Ukraine's territory, not Russia's. Overall, both countries seem to tolerate the costs of war as long as Ukraine is receiving massive foreign support, and Russia is escaping a major economic crisis.

A negotiated settlement stays out of reach. Russia's territorial claims reflected in constitutional amendments of October, 4th, 2022, leave no zone of possible agreement. Ukrainian leadership and public opinion are strongly opposing any territorial concessions. Level of mutual trust remains extremely low, and there are no visible lines along which Ukrainian-Russian relations could be arranged after the war.

Under any post-war settlement Ukraine will face an unfavorable balance of power vs. Russia, a state which will remain a geopolitical reality on Ukraine's border and a long-term threat. The experience of the current war will increase the risk of another escalation in the future. Thus, the issue of security guarantees becomes fundamental for Ukraine's future, an element of conflict management, and a key to understanding victory. Membership in NATO is widely perceived in Ukraine as a reward for protecting Europe from a threat from Russia; but on a more general level any sustainable ceasefire may need extended security guarantees for Kyiv, whether in a form of NATO membership or in any other.

NATO membership is a problematic option in this regard for at least two reasons. The first one deals with Russia's perceptions. Claims of Kremlin that expansion of NATO is a threat to Russia's security may be playing head games; but from a strategic perspective it can be a trigger for a security dilemma (Mearsheimer, 2014). From certain perspectives, in particular realist, Russia's aggressive steps can be seen as a response to its uncertainty about what NATO would do next. Uncertainty provokes worst-case scenario thinking; which, in turn, may lead to preventive actions – including war. Within such a perspective, NATO's policy towards Ukraine's aspirations for membership has been criticized as the one which maximized risks while providing no protection for Ukraine. It has taken effects of the security dilemma for the Russian leadership to their height; while opening widely a window of opportunity for Russia to attack Ukraine, while it still got no security commitments from the Alliance. If there has been a fundamental flaw with this strategy before the war, hardly conditions have changed to make it more successful.

The second reason deals with the NATO itself. The logic of the alliance implies that deterrence is assured by all of its members, and that a potential aggressor should expect a collective response. A high probability of such a response defines alliance's credibility and is a major deterrent. That is what NATO's major strength lies in. It is a well-balanced alliance: combined power potential of its members match credibility of its commitments.

Credibility of commitments is both leading to and resulting from a low probability of aggression against any of its members. A gentlemen agreement in the 1990-ies has been rumored to require any potential members to be free from territorial disputes with neighboring states. That claim seems in line with the Alliance's general logic: absence of territorial disputes with neighboring non-NATO states helped to keep the probability of any escalation requiring NATO's involvement low. No opponent was willing to test NATO's resolve for defending its members; but NATO's security commitments have also been carefully measured as to not engage allies into unnecessary conflicts (Yarhi-Milo, Lanozska, Cooper, 2016).

This logic was also functioning in dealing with Ukraine's aspirations for membership. The key difference between Ukraine and her Western neighbors, which joined NATO, is that Russia's response for Ukraine's NATO membership aspirations might go as high as a war. A high probability of Russia's aggressive response generated unnecessary risks for the Alliance: if Russia opted for a war in case Ukraine is granted membership, other members of the Alliance would have to face a choice of either confronting Russia on the battlefield or dissolving the alliance which has been the foundation of their security for decades. That seems to be a choice most of Alliance members would like to escape. That is the main reason why Ukraine has never been able to enter the door to NATO, which claimed to be constantly open.

These considerations imply that the primary prerequisite for Ukraine's invitation to join NATO is a significant decrease of probability of another Russian-Ukrainian war. That means that security commitments under NATO membership can be provided for Ukraine not before, but after the war is over and a stable peace is established.

Alternative options of providing Ukraine with security commitments are located on a bilateral level. Any country could enhance Ukraine's security by signing a mutual defense pact; however, only American guarantees seem sufficient.

That, however, may also be problematic. The US is facing a wide broad of challenges globally and may tend to more carefully manage its security commitments. There are powerful voices in favor of reshaping American grand strategy by significantly its global objectives and the decreasing the level of international involvement (Posen, 2014). Although the Russian-Ukrainian war and other symptoms of international security crisis might have changed the calculus of American grand strategy, the United States may face too many challenges simultaneously. Besides, providing security commitments to Ukraine carries high risk of directly confronting Russia, something Washington is willing to avoid. One of the lessons so far drawn from the experience of the Russian-Ukrainian war is that the West is trying to limit the risks in dealing with Russia.

But not only confronting Russia is a challenge. Another factor the US would like to keep under control is its client states' policies, in particular when it comes to protracted territorial conflicts. While American power resources may be depleting, careful selection of not only allies, but enemies, is crucial. The problem with defense pacts is that they can easily involve allies into each others' security issues. With the US having issued dozens of security commitments in recent decades, these issues are becoming difficult to manage. Given intensification of struggle for international hegemony and the future of the world order, the US might be willing to secure more freedom in choosing the challenges it wish to confront. Defense pacts are narrowing that choice.

Reluctance to confront Russia on the battlefield and desire to keep more freedom of actions will be powerful preventers of any American security commitments issued to Ukraine. Instead, Washington is likely to stick to weapons supplies strategy. A more sophisticated choice would be asymmetric architecture of a defense pact, which would leave an option for the US not to directly participate in a war against Russia. Possible security guarantees for Ukraine will also be heavily impacted by the result of the current struggle for international order and general architecture of post-war international security.

Credible and firm security commitments from the West, framed as defense pacts, could qualify as an important element of victory for Ukraine as they will ensure a better prospect for its security. But this perspective is highly unlikely before the war is over and stable peace is established.

CONCLUSION

This article has been aimed at providing frameworks for understanding how Ukraine's victory in a war against Russia might look like by addressing specific features of current wars, theoretical approaches to victory or success, and special attention to security commitments Ukraine can or can't get under realities of a protracted war against Russia.

Victory is a contested term. The way modern wars most often end does not look like a victory for one side or a defeat for another. Under lack of formally accepted victory, success can be measured in different ways, mostly taking into account the results of war, the price of participating in it, changes in the balance of power, and a better prospect. All these considerations can be applied when attempting to define what qualifies as a victory for Ukraine in its war against Russia.

At the minimal level, a victory for Ukraine would mean denying Russia's attempts to destroy its statehood or put the nation under its control. Formulated in such a way, this notion of a victory fits

the framework of asymmetric conflicts theory. A better victory would also include restoration of pre-war status quo and, in particular, regaining territories occupied by Russia. That is what President Zelenskyy's Peace Formula stands closest to; and such a notion of victory carries elements of just war theory. Another version of a better victory would not only be about restoration of status quo, but also shift the balance of power versus Russia in Ukraine's favor.

Security commitments by the West are an essential element of Ukraine's victory, given its vulnerability to Russia's military superiority. Without them it will be highly unlikely for Ukraine to get a better prospect after the war. But the way Western alliances, in particular NATO, operate under modern geopolitical conditions makes Ukraine's membership extremely unlikely, especially before the war is over. Bilateral security commitments by the US, the only credible security guarantee to deter Russia, will also be problematic, given strategic goals of US security policy and growing risks of long-term commitments. These developments make Ukraine's chances to significantly improve balance of power versus Russia extremely small.

Overall, regardless the importance of defining and measuring Ukraine's victory in the war against Russia, it remains controversial and a matter of debate. Uncertainties around this issue contribute into a lack of a long-term strategy in the war and growing risks for European and global security.

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Focus Areas to Act upon to Enable the EU Integration Readiness of the Republic of Moldova¹

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Abstract: *As the Chisinau administration³ is currently the most pro-European in the country's history, and considering the great mobilisation towards integration on Brussels's side, it is a very relevant endeavour to analyse Moldova's main opportunities and barriers. The country's main impediments towards Europeanization and the recent solutions found towards these problems are examined here. The essay provides a set of areas to focus on to enhance the Republic of Moldova's European integration, coupled with a review of future potential geopolitical scenarios.*

Keywords: EU, Moldova, European integration, hybrid threats

The Focus areas to act upon to enable the EU integration readiness are the following:

1) Equal access to correct information for both Romanian and Russian speakers

Russian disinformation is a considerable challenge. According to the latest polls released in the Republic of Moldova, there's a clear gap between the political opinions of those who answered in Romanian, as opposed to those answering in Russian. Only 20% of Russian-speaking respondents answered positively that Russia poses a security threat to Moldova, as opposed to 52% of the Romanian speakers. Confidence in Putin is at 29% among the Romanians, while the Russian speakers registered a 57% confidence. One of the clearest differences regards the of EU accession: 67% of Romanian speakers support it, as opposed to 21% of the Russian-speaking population which is much more prone to Moscow's manipulated narratives.⁴

While it is very difficult to sway people away from their pro-Russian views, it is important for those Moldovans to receive an alternative viewpoint from a pro-Western perspective that can counterbalance Kremlin's propaganda and help them expand their information bubble. This leads to the following recommendation: to successfully prepare the integration of the Republic of Moldova into Europe, Moldovan and European authorities need to penetrate the Russian-language information sphere. This should be done through campaigns that showcase the results of European investments, the financial and educational opportunities that would be available to Moldovan citizens in the EU, contrasted to the actual financial contributions the Russian Federation has brought to the country in the latter years. In the use of Russian language, it is essential to reach currently isolated audiences and break the Russian information monopoly. The true fight for Europeanization revolves around changing the mentality of ordinary individuals and keeping a significant percentage of the population connected to the course and outcome of reforms.

2) Act with urgency: the reform timeframe of the Maia Sandu administration is limited

Unlike other post-Soviet countries, such as Ukraine and Georgia, where there is a large political and especially social consensus regarding the country's future, the Republic of Moldova is prone to

¹ This article is a continuation of a paper previously published in *L'Europe unie* by the same author, entitled "A Window of Opportunity with an Existential Stake: The European integration of the Republic of Moldova",

² Marcu-Andrei Solomon is an MA graduate in Russian and Eurasian Studies at Leiden University and the Research Department Coordinator of New Strategy Center, a Bucharest-based think tank. Disclaimer: the views and scenarios presented above reflect the personal views of the author and not of the organisation he represents.

³ President Maia Sandu in 2023.

⁴ "WatchDog.MD community presented the results of a sociological survey", Watch Dog.md, February 3, 2022, URL: <https://watchdog.md/en/polls/206024/comunitatea-watchdog-md-a-prezentat-rezultatele-unui-sondaj-de-opinie/>

180-degree changes in foreign policies from one electoral cycle to another. The next presidential elections will be held soon and the parliamentary elections in 2025. Moldovan society is still relatively equally divided between pro-Europeans and pro-Russians. It is important for Moldovan society to be embarked into the practical reforms within the country now, as the pro-Russian political forces can regroup at any moment.

3) Extensive use of European expertise in implementing institutional reform

While financial aid is definitely valuable to the Republic of Moldova, who is facing a clear economic and energy crisis, there is nothing more prized than European expertise. Civilian and official missions should become the norm through which reform can be accelerated in the candidate state, since that involves a direct implication and monitoring process.

Considering Moldova's aforementioned vulnerabilities, the following sectors could benefit the most from the expertise of European civilian/official missions:

- The monitoring of the **financial sector**, so that money laundering schemes, involving both private and state actors, can be prevented.

- The **defence sector**, especially when it comes to aerial surveillance. In the case of destabilizing acts from Russia, such as violent actions or kidnapping attempts against public officials (as revealed in official documents received by Moldova's president from Volodymyr Zelensky in February 2023)⁵, it is necessary for Moldova to have a modern and enhanced special forces unit that can prevent small-scale destabilizing acts.

- Legislation such as **anti-oligarch laws** to ensure that all loopholes are avoided, while also making sure the laws are tailored to the national context.

Potential geopolitical scenarios in relation with the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war

1) Russian advancement:

According to analysts and military sources, the Republic of Moldova's future as an EU member and as a sovereign state will be determined to a large extent by the outcome of the Russian-Ukrainian war. In the case of a Russian advancement in the South, in the Odessa region, Moldova would be pinned and would most likely represent Moscow's next target.⁶ From that point, Russia could either increase hybrid attacks on Moldova, from protests, instigation to violence, disinformation, cyber-attacks, bomb threats etc. (either directly or by using Transnistria and Gagauzia as proxies), or it could directly invade the country, whose army would not last for long. In that scenario, not much can be done. If NATO avoided a conflict with Russia after invading Ukraine, it will most likely not get involved in one for the Republic of Moldova. Thus, supporting Ukraine's war effort is significantly impacting the prospects of Moldova's reform process.

2) Stagnation of the front or Ukrainian advancement

If Russian advancement is blocked or if Russia loses the war, the Republic of Moldova's pathway towards the European Union is fully in its own hands. If the current flow of governmental reforms is maintained and progress in important legal cases is registered, Moldova could become an EU member in the late 2020s-early 2030s. Still, the EU will have to monitor this process carefully, as

⁵ "Maia Sandu seconds Zelensky, warning of Kremlin plans to overthrow Moldova government". Meduza, February 13, 2023, URL: <https://meduza.io/en/news/2023/02/13/maia-sandu-seconds-zelensky-warning-of-kremlin-plans-to-overthrow-moldova-government>

⁶ Christine Karelska, "Odesa Defends Not Only Itself but All of South Central Europe". Visegrad Insight, July 20, 2022, URL: <https://visegradinsight.eu/odesa-ukraine-russia-war-CEE/>

it could lead Moldova towards being either a revitalizer of European values or a factor of instability due to its vulnerability to Russian hybrid aggression.⁷

Moldova as a Trojan horse is a clear possibility, if oligarchic influence persists and if Russia's influence in different Moldovan institutions and especially in the informational sphere persists. Furthermore, Transnistria could be considered a separate *de facto* entity in the case of EU membership (similar to the Northern Cyprus case), which would entail a relative preservation of the *status quo*, but still represent a constant threat. Gagauzia could become an even more insidious element. **There is no pro-European force within the autonomous region Gagauzia** and it could become problematic for the European Union. Thus, it is a justifiable concern of the European Union that Moldova could become a Trojan horse, an EU member state through which Russia could infiltrate in Europe and sabotage it from within. To prevent that, Moldova's separation from Russia must be comprehensive and include the more pro-Russian regions of the country, such as Gagauzia. If maybe the European ideals would not be an argument for the Russophiles or for the undecided population, then the economic incentive might be more fruitful for the integration process.

If the integration process is done correctly and in full, having **Moldova as a revitalizer of European values** is a probable scenario. In the current geopolitical climate in which, through populism, the efficiency and advantages of European democratic values are put under scrutiny in Western Europe, new Eastern European members could revitalize the European ethos. With a young, Western-educated political leadership, a large diaspora already integrated in mainly Southern and Western European countries and an ever-increasing pro-European sentiment (especially among the younger generations), Moldova could be a reminder as to what Europe stands for, and what its benefits are, as opposed to being under Russia's serfdom.

3) The “operation unthinkable” scenarios

This scenario category is named after the eponymous May 1945 British plan ordered by Winston Churchill, which entailed an Allied Forces attack on the Soviet Union after the defeat of Nazi Germany. Since the plan was as its name suggests, unthinkable, the next two scenarios seem very unlikely to happen, but are worth to be mentioned for an exhaustive view.

The first one would be **The Republic of Moldova's European integration by unifying with Romania**. The current government has recently accepted reforms that draw it away from Russia and closer to Romania. The clearest example is changing the official language of the country from “Moldovan” (a Soviet invention meant to create an artificial ethnic divide) to Romanian.⁸ Besides the clear ethnic and linguistic links between the populations of the two countries, Romania is currently the Republic of Moldova's main commercial partner,⁹ donating significant funds for modernization,¹⁰ infrastructural and energy¹¹ projects in the country, meant to reduce Chisinau's dependency on Moscow. According to recent polls, **around a third of Moldovans support the unification with**

⁷ Thomas de Waal, “A Fragile Stability in Moldova”. Carnegie Europe, May 10, 2022, URL: <https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/87099>

⁸ “Moldovan parliament approves law on Romanian language”. Reuters, March 16, 2023, URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/moldovan-parliament-approves-law-romanian-language-2023-03-16/>

⁹ “Romania, our country's main trading partner: Igor Grosu: More than 1,500 investors are operating successfully”. Radio Moldova, February 22, 2023, URL: <https://radiomoldova.md/p/6644/romania-principalul-partener-comercial-al-tarii-noastre-igor-grosu-pest-1-500-de-investitori-activeaza-cu-succes>

¹⁰ Vitalie Călugăreanu, “Romania's full support for the Republic of Moldova”. Deutsche Welle, March 23, 2023, URL: <https://www.dw.com/ro/sprijin-total-din-parte-rom%C3%A2niei-pentru-republica-moldova/a-65095276>

¹¹ “Romania Starts Sending Natural Gas to Moldova Through Pipeline”. Radio Free Europe, December 5, 2022, URL: <https://www.rferl.org/a/romania-gas-supply-moldova-ukraine-war/32162977.html>

Romania,¹² the same figures being registered vice versa,¹³ when looking at Romania's support for uniting with Moldova.

There is an ever-increasing percentage in the Republic of Moldova, not necessarily out of a rising national emancipation aspiration, but more like seeing Romania as a lifeboat in the current crisis situation that the country is, both economically and geopolitically. A unification would entail a European integration process from within Romania, which would be swifter and would be realized while Moldova is already considered an EU territory. Since the majority in neither of the two countries supports this scenario, it is highly unlikely, but not impossible, to see it happening.

Another scenario which has been very little discussed in Western media, some even labelling it as a possible Kremlin propaganda narrative to denigrate Ukraine,¹⁴ is **a Ukrainian intervention in Transnistria**, which could eliminate a 30-year-long, Moscow-initiated frozen conflict in the Republic of Moldova. Nevertheless, Ukrainians have neither admitted nor denied this declaring that "solving the Transnistrian problem belongs only to the Moldovan side".¹⁵ Considering that Ukraine is in an all-out war against Russia, and that Transnistria is a separatist regime harbouring thousands of Russian soldiers, it is clear that Ukraine has had this option on its agenda since February 24th, 2022. Such a scenario, from a military perspective, is more likely to occur in the event of a great Russian defeat, which would permit opening a second frontline in Transnistria. While defeating Transnistria should not be a great challenge for Ukraine, there are other geopolitical factors to consider.

Firstly, one of Ukraine's main advantages is its international image, mainly its rightful perception as a victim of Russian aggression. In the case of a Ukrainian attack on Transnistria, even a justified/provoked one, Ukraine could be portrayed as an aggressor and lose its credibility and public support in many nations. It could also cause other issues, since legally speaking, Ukraine would be attacking one of the Republic of Moldova's *de jure* territories. Secondly, the **Moldovan side is unlikely to accept a Ukrainian intervention**, as it does not want such a process on its territory over which it has no control. That could lead to great internal problems, such as social upheavals from pro-Russian citizens outside of Transnistria or to another refugee crisis that Chisinau would have to deal with, (in a brutal economic crisis out of all situations).

Recently, at the European leaders' summit from June 1, 2023, that took place in the Republic of Moldova, President Zelensky expressed his clearest intention so far, of solving the Transnistrian issue. He declared the following: "why is the Russian contingent still in Transnistria? The Kremlin only needs it to one day to "unfreeze" an attack on Moldova. How much longer will Europe put up with this? The question is 30 years old. It deserves an answer. There should be no place for any frozen or hot war on our continent!".¹⁶ Ukraine is still keeping Transnistria in its sight and it remains to be seen whether Chisinau will be open to looking for solutions on the separatism issue with its neighbour.

¹² "Survey: Majority of Moldovans support EU membership, but not union with Romania", G4Media, April 7, 2023, URL: <https://www.g4media.ro/sondaj-majoritatea-cetatenilor-moldova-sustin-aderarea-la-ue-dar-nu-si-unirea-cu-romania.html>

¹³ "POLL What Romanians think about the union with the Republic of Moldova". G4Media, May 4, 2023, URL: <https://www.g4media.ro/sondaj-ce-cred-romanii-despre-unirea-cu-republica-moldova-ce-parere-au-despre-maia-sandu-si-ce-spun-despre-eventuala-invazie-a-rusiei-ar-trebui-sa-ajute-romania-militar-statul-moldoveean.html>

¹⁴ "The narratives about Transnistria draw public attention away from Russia's plans to destabilize Moldova and its defeats in Ukraine". Veridica.ro, March 1, 2023, URL: <https://www.veridica.ro/en/acf/the-narratives-about-transnistria-draw-public-attention-away-from-russias-plans-to-destabilize-moldova-and-its-defeats-in-ukraine>

¹⁵ "Moscow accuses Kyiv of increasing military presence near the border with the Transnistrian region. Podolyak: "Never listen to the Russian Defence Ministry"". Radio Moldova, February 23, 2023, URL: <https://radiomoldova.md/p/6759/moscova-acuza-kiyul-ca-spoeste-prezenta-militara-in-apropiere-de-granita-cu-regiunea-transnistreana-podoleak--nu-ascultati-niciodata-ministerul-ru>

¹⁶ "Zelenskyi in Moldova named three steps on how Europe can help Ukraine win". Evropeiskaya Pravda, June 1, 2023, URL: <https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2023/06/1/7162836/>

If this unlikely scenario were to happen, assuming Moldova would be supported in dealing with the subsequent refugee crisis and with the reintegration process, it would help create a reintegrated country in which Russia would have significantly lower power grips. Either way, if it wants a European future, **the Republic of Moldova will have to find a solution to its dispute with Transnistria**, whether it is a diplomatic or a military one.¹⁷

CONCLUSION

The Republic of Moldova benefits from a great window of opportunity to join the EU and this comes with a real existential stake for the determining its democratic future, prosperity, and freedom. What seemed as an unthinkable prospect just a few years ago, it is now a clear possibility, as we are witnessing the greatest and most accelerated European integration process in the history of the European Union.

The Republic of Moldova is a country with a population of 2.6 million who, unlike Ukraine, is not in an active war and thus it should be easier to deliver on reforms for integration. While the nation has a government that is determined to follow a European path and that has made tremendous reforms in that sense, **there is a sense of volatility**, and the Chisinau leadership can change from pro-Russian to pro-European from one election to another. Therefore, time is of the essence, and as the timeframe becomes shorter, it is possible that the EU will look towards an acceleration of the integration process, while the Republic of Moldova will start thoroughly analysing all options on the table. In the end, the Republic of Moldova will have to find a solution to the **Transnistrian issue, integrate Gagauzia with the rest of the country, counter the remaining influence of the oligarchs-in-exile and tackle Russian disinformation**.

Ukraine's counteroffensive measures and resistance to Russian bombardments, especially during the upcoming winter, will prove decisive not only for the war outcome in itself, but also for the European integration roadmap of both Kyiv and Chisinau. The Republic of Moldova's fate hangs in the balance and a Ukrainian failure will trickle down to the small nation as well.

Looking at the larger geopolitical framework, these European integration efforts are quintessential to the defence of a principle: the right of a free, democratic country to choose its path and future, regardless of the imperialistic geopolitical ambitions of another actor (Russia). The Republic of Moldova, but also countries other EU-aspiring post-Soviet nations, have more than a duty towards the welfare of their citizens and fighting for a better future. The Republic of Moldova could prove that there is a light at the end of the grey zone, one that is forged by determination and the strong belief in the shared values of democracy.

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¹⁷ "Ukraine's accession talks need bold action in Kyiv and Brussels". EPC.eu, March 24, 2023, URL: <https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/Ukraines-accession-talks-need-bold-action-in-Kyiv-and-Brussels~4f3f1c>

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In electoral competition without a political party. Motivations, context and legal resources for independent candidates in the Republic of Moldova

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Abstract: *Electoral competition is a fundamental attribute of democratic systems. Modern American-inspired democracy, essentially, has established and supported electoral competition between political blocs, capable of supporting and justifying multi-partyism as an expression of the capacity for political organization of society. In recent decades, many states have adopted regulatory frameworks and electoral rules that facilitate independent candidacies, mainly in local and regional elections. In this article we debate, in what extent does the cooperation of masses of individuals, of a subnational collectivity, influence the political goals of the electoral system, to what extent does the institutional context influence the emergence of independent candidates, to what extent do the beliefs of collectivities allow the emergence of such candidates in the Republic of Moldova.*

Keywords: democracy; multi-party system; political party; independent candidate

LEGITIMIZING INDEPENDENT COMPETITORS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY

In democratic systems, the country's leadership and the administration of subnational collectivities are carried out by elected representatives. Administration through representatives has become necessary with the evolution of the complexity of social life and the changing role of state authorities, becoming the most widespread form of materialization of democracy. It is suspected of introducing a systematic distortion between the expectations of some and the decisions of others and is closer to a political bargain than to an ideal of rational legitimation¹, representation has profound sociological connotations that justify its necessity. At least three arguments explain the goals for representation²: collective action for a common purpose becomes difficult because of the impossibility of physically and timely assembly the entire community; in a large group countertendencies are imminent; the quality of collective action will suffer because of those fatal downward leveling which conditions the cooperation of a mass. If a majority really acts together, then this will only happen in those directions which make possible a descent of the higher-placed individual to the level of the lower-placed individual. Experience shows that in a crowd gathered, the leadership will fall to the most temperamental, most radical, most noisy elements, and not to the most intellectually representative, and often the mass gatherings make the most reckless and harmful decisions. For these reasons, by choosing the most capable persons in the community, a transfer of authority occurs from a collective "we" to a nominal "they" for the achievement of the goals of the whole community. It is about a transfer of functions from the total group, of the collectivity, to a partial, smaller group.

In old democracies, considered to be authentic, the institutional mechanisms, the strong political structures, the clear electoral system, are somehow designed to make the appearance of independent candidates in the electoral competition unlikely. The systemic explanation is relatively

¹ Nelly Haudegand, Pierre Lefebvre, *Dictionnaire de probleme politice: 60 de mize ale Franței contemporane*. Chisinau, Museum, 2002, p. 204.

² Valentina Cornea, (2009) *Activitatea administrației publice locale: abordare sociologică*. Cahul: „Prin-Caro” SRL, pp. 43-44.

simple, authentic democracy incubates the idea of procedures, of institutional capacity, of an infrastructure that controls the issue of the political conception within a political formation and that suppresses the traditional idea, this time, of the appearance of an independent, messianic candidate, detached from the idea of the system and that brings to the political game a new discourse considered to be outside the complicated inertia developed by the classic political parties, conformist placed to the right or left of the political spectrum.

The concern of modern sociology for such a theme is major in the context of a European continent that is currently discussing the sum of threats to democracy and the European construction. The problem of administration through legitimate representatives is likely to explain, to some extent, the complexity of social and political life within a society. In this sense, the Republic of Moldova is undoubtedly a society that allows for a deep debate on the emergence of divergent political interests in relation to the European construct that a part of the society in question particularly emotionally contests.

In the debates on the functioning of representative democracies, as well as for development projects initiated outside the target community, two fundamental questions are of interest: 1) to what extent can a person understand and represent the interests of another person or a community? and 2) how is the process of selecting representatives, subsequently invested with the power to lead, carried out.

Regarding the first aspect, there are two beliefs of the quality of representation: the belief of demographic representativeness and the belief of political representativeness. The belief of demographic representativeness assumes that the possibility of an individual to actively representing the interests of another person is all the greater the more similar the individual is to that person in terms of social position. According to this principle, it is essential that the different social categories are represented in decision-making bodies by their own members, and not by people from outside them. This theory implies that the interests of women will generally be better represented by women than by men, the interests of ethnic minorities - by members of those ethnic minorities, etc. In the sense of social psychology, we consider that belonging to a group also means a high degree of fidelity in knowledge of the group's problems, and in the sense of representativeness, we tend to choose someone whom we consider relevant in terms of understanding the problems faced by the group to which we belong.

The concept of political representativeness emphasizes not the similarity of social characteristics, but the sharing of common worldviews, communication and mutual knowledge. Thus, the key to effective representation of interests lies in identifying people with similar values (who may or may not be members of the same socio-demographic categories) and who have the necessary competence to know and communicate the life situation of those they represent, as well as the political skill necessary to negotiate their interests in the political environment.³

Regarding the selection method, in democratic societies representativeness is ensured through elections. Elections, in a narrow sense, constitute the designation by voters of their representatives in a frame of power.⁴ The democratic way of electing authorities is a public operation and represents the result of a value selection in which the social status, political and civic culture of the average citizen, traditions, etc. are considered. In an idealized account of the role of elections, Maravall J. M. explains how the selection process of those to whom the right to represent is delegated works: 1). Candidates compete, transmitting prospective messages about their future policies and signals about their competence; 2) Voters select those candidates closest to their ideal political positions and more capable of implementing their program; 3) Once elected to office, the people who hold elective

³ Norma M. Riccucci, & Marcia K. Meyers, Linking passive and active representation: The case of frontline workers in welfare agencies, *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, vol. 14, nr. 4, 2004, pp. 585-597.

⁴ Sergiu Cornea, *Introducere în politologie*, Cahul, USC, 2008, p.180

positions adopt policies and dedicate efforts to fulfill them; 4) Policies and efforts, under particular exogenous conditions, produce results that modify the well-being of citizens; 5) At the time of the next election, voters retroactively evaluate these results and attribute them to the policies and efforts of the incumbent and the influence of exogenous conditions; 6) Voters update their preferences regarding policies and candidates; 7) Voters re-elect or reject the holder. Elections, therefore, select and assess"⁵.

The necessary and (not always) sufficient condition for different candidates or parties to participate in the political selection process is political competition. Largely, competition for the designation of representatives acting on behalf of the state or local community has involved the entry into electoral competitions of political parties. In recent decades, many states have adopted regulatory frameworks and electoral rules that facilitate independent candidacies, especially in local and regional elections.

Open lists have increasingly become the norm in European democracies⁶. Even though the votes accumulated by independent candidates are sometimes significantly lower than those accumulated by parties, there is a growing interest in non-party politicians. Their role is important because:

- "*change the game*" and destabilizes existing political models by: 1) creating electoral competition and 2) putting specific issues on the political agenda. These two aspects are seen to ensure better representation of voter preferences.

- Encourages those who do not usually vote to vote, offering an alternative to traditional parties⁷.

REQUIREMENTS AND CONDITIONS FOR INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

Most countries that allow independents to run in elections require certain requirements for independent candidates. Beyond requirements such as age, residency, citizenship or lack of convictions, there are also requirements for supporting signatures, and proof of financial resources (financial deposit requirement) to register. The supporting signature requirement requires lists signed by a certain number of eligible voters. Signature requirements are usually not very high, but without a massive party infrastructure to collect signatures door-to-door, independent candidates may have difficulty collecting even a small number of signatures. Some countries, such as Belgium and Luxembourg, make exceptions to these requirements. In these countries, candidates without the required number of signatures can run if they have the support of a certain number of parliamentarians, a practice that inevitably favors political insiders. In Slovenia, exceptions are not made based on political connections, but on ethnicity, with independents of Italian or Hungarian origin needing fewer signatures than others.⁸ Deposit requirements vary from country to country. In most countries, deposits are defined in absolute terms, but in some they vary from year to year, depending on a country's average monthly wage (Lithuania) or minimum wage (Estonia). For example, in the Netherlands the deposit exceeds \$15,000, and in Turkey it exceeds \$30,000. The

⁵ José María Maravall, „Accountability and the Survival of Governments”, in Carles Boix, and Susan C. Stokes (eds), *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (2009; online edn, Oxford Academic, 2 Sept. 2009), <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199566020.003.0037>, accessed 18 Sept. 2023.)

⁶ Ehin Piret et al, *Independent candidates in national and European elections*, European Parliament, Directorate general for internal policies, p. 10,

⁷ Vlada Ciobanu, De ce restricțiile în participarea independentilor la alegeri ne afectează democrația, 2019. Available at: <https://watch.cpr.md/de-ce-restrictiile-in-participarea-independentilor-la-alegeri-ne-afecteazademocratia/>, (accesat 20.06.2023).

<https://watch.cpr.md/de-ce-restrictiile-in-participarea-independentilor-la-alegeri-ne-afecteaza-democratia/>

⁸ Dawn Brancati, Winning Alone: The Electoral Fate of Independent Candidates Worldwide!, *The Journal of Politics*, 2008, vol. 70, No. 3, p. 650.

difficulty that candidates face in meeting the deposit requirements depends not only on the size of the deposit, but also on the level of economic development of a country. Obviously, a deposit of \$1,000 in the United States is much easier to meet than a deposit of \$1,000 in Turkey or Niger. As with signature requirements, some countries provide exceptions to the deposit requirements under specific conditions. In India, for example, independent candidates representing scheduled castes and scheduled tribes pay a deposit that is half that of other independent candidates. As with signature requirements, some countries offer exceptions to the deposit requirement under specific conditions. In India, for example, independent candidates representing scheduled castes and tribes pay a deposit that is half that of other independent candidates.⁹

The Venice Commission recommends that the number of monetary deposits, where they are prerequisites for registration, should be of a sufficient amount to deter frivolous parties and candidates, while at the same time not being so high as to prevent legitimate parties or candidates from gaining access to the vote. Furthermore, excessive amounts of monetary deposits may be considered discriminatory, as they limit the right of citizens without adequate resources to stand for election, as protected by human rights instruments. Furthermore, the deposit should be refundable if the candidate or party exceeds a certain number or percentage of votes. The amount requested should reflect the economic realities of the country. While this practice may be considered more efficient than collecting signatures, the threshold required for a refund should be reasonable.¹⁰

Although the possibility of running as an independent candidate seems to be implicit in the right to be elected, not all countries ensure this. In 13 EU countries it is allowed to run as an independent candidate, in five others there is no explicit provision about independent candidates, but in theory you can run alone on a list, in nine other countries you cannot run as an independent candidate.¹¹

LEGAL PROVISION REGARDING THE RIGHT TO BE ELECTED

Since the declaration of independence and so far, 6 general elections have taken place in the Republic of Moldova. The Constitution of the Republic of Moldova, the Electoral Code, the Labor Code, the Audiovisual Media Services Code, the Contravention, Criminal and Administrative Code of the Republic of Moldova, as well as over 20 laws and regulations provide the framework for the realization of the right to vote and to be elected. All these acts provide for the conditions that must be observed in the process of designating representatives for the legitimate exercise of power at the level of local territorial collectivities. These provisions impose age, structural, financial conditions, etc.

In art. 1 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Moldova, by independent candidate refers to a person who is running for elected public office independently of political parties and electoral blocs and is duly registered. Political non-affiliation is the defining characteristic of all independent candidates. This is a major obstacle to their electoral success, as parties perform several functions: they reduce the cost of voting, they allow individual candidates to benefit electorally from their association with party colleagues, and they provide candidates with significant organizational and financial support. However, parties may endorse independent candidates and encourage people to vote for them, which is often the case if parties do not have their own candidates. In the most basic sense, the lack of partisan affiliation means that an independent's name appears alone on a ballot and

⁹ Brancati, op. cit. p. 650

¹⁰ Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe, Vladimir Prebilib (Rapporteur). *The situation of independent candidates and the opposition in local and regional elections*, Council of Europe, p. 40 Available at: <https://rm.coe.int/0900001680a5ae6f> (Accessed: 25.06.2024).

¹¹ Vlada Ciobanu, op. cit.

not alongside a particular party. As such, independents are not affiliated with any political party. In developing their own agendas, independents often do not develop complete political programs, but compete based on single issues¹², such as environmental protection, equal opportunities, operation of social institutions, etc.

In the Republic of Moldova, citizens have the right to run independently for the position of president of the country, mayor or councilor in the local council. According to the provisions of the Electoral Code (art. 164), filing a candidacy for the position of councilor is conditional on the support of 2% of the number of voters in the electoral district, divided by the number of mandates for the respective council, but not less than 50 people, and to be elected mayor – if supported by 1% of the number of voters in the constituency, but not less than 100 people. Prior to the amendments to the Electoral Code, this number was 5%. This high ceiling did not consider the recommendation of the Venice Commission according to which “the law should not provide for the collection of signatures from more than 1% of the voters in the respective constituency”. A person can run for the position of councilor both in the council of the first-level administrative-territorial unit and in the council of the second-level administrative-territorial unit. A person can run for both the position of mayor and the position of local councilor but cannot run for these positions in more than one electoral district of the same level, (art. 163, p. 5).¹³

In order to be elected, they become part of the local electoral process, that is, they are involved in all the activities and procedures carried out consecutively related to the organization, conduct and totalization of the results of the local elections. Local elections, by their very essence, aim to promote worthy individuals, knowledgeable about the specific problems of the localities, in accordance with the legitimate demands of the inhabitants, to the eligible positions of the local public administration¹⁴. The submission of one's own candidacy for the position of mayor and/or local councilor is carried out by applying to the district electoral councils. After submitting the application, the stage of collecting signatures by the people submitting their own candidacy follows. The signatures of support are collected in a model subscription list, issued by the electoral body, individually or by support groups established under the law. Voters can support several independent candidates for several elective positions, but they cannot support the same candidate, by signature, two or more times. Prior to the amendments to the Electoral Code, voters could support, by signature, only one candidate. The new provision, promoted and supported by Promo-LEX, facilitates the right to be elected by potential independent candidates¹⁵. Signatures are collected in the place/places within the electoral district in which the candidate is running.

A special condition for being elected is age. For the position of mayor, the legal age requirement is 23 years. Reducing it by 2 years, compared to the previous provisions, is considered reasonable and in line with international standards¹⁶. People who have reached the age of 18 can apply for the position of councilor. Also, candidates for elective positions at the local level must hold the citizenship of the Republic of Moldova, have a residence permit on the territory of the Republic of Moldova, including in the administrative-territorial unit, for no less than 3 years; have no criminal record for crimes committed intentionally; are not deprived of the right to hold public positions of responsibility by a final court decision.

¹² Dawn Brancati, op. cit. p. 654.

¹³ Codul Electoral, Published: 23-12-2022 in the Official Gazette at no. 426-427 art. 770.

¹⁴ Sergiu Cornea, Valentina Cornea, *Autoadministrarea colectivităților locale: aspecte teoretico-practice*, Cahul: US „B. P. Hasdeu”, 2010 pp. 84-85.

¹⁵ Promo-Lex, *Noutățile Codului electoral pentru alegerile locale generale din 5 noiembrie 2023*. Available at: <https://promolex.md/23977-noutatile-codului-electoral-pentru-alegerile-locale-generale-din-5-noiembrie-2023/?lang=ro> (Accessed: 20.09.2024)

¹⁶ Ibidem.

For the organization of the electoral campaign, independent candidates benefit from material support from the state. In this regard, candidates can take out an interest-free loan, in the amount determined by the Electoral Commission. The application for obtaining the loan is submitted to the Ministry of Finance. The interest-free loan granted to independent candidates in 2019 represented 10,000 lei for each independent candidate¹⁷. It is reimbursed by the state within three months of the election date, depending on the election results.

Briefly presented, the requirements for the registration of independent candidates for mayor, which will be presented to the district electoral council, are¹⁸:

- Written application requesting registration as an electoral competitor;
- Subscription lists with a sufficient number of signatures of the independent candidate's supporters;
- Biographical data of the candidate;
- Candidate's declaration regarding its consent to run for elective office;
- Declaration of assets and personal interests for the last year before the local elections;
- Affidavit confirming that it has not been sentenced to prison or has a criminal record and that no final findings have been issued against it;
- Declaration regarding the suspension, during the term of office, of positions incompatible with the position of mayor, if the person is elected and the mandate is validated;
- Declaration regarding the suspension from the position held since the start of the electoral campaign;
- Copy of the diploma of studies – in the case of candidates for the position of mayor, certifying that they have at least mandatory general education;
- Copy of the candidate's identity card;

Even a brief analysis of the legislation shows that the registration of independent candidates in electoral elections is sufficiently burdened with rules and requirements as complex as for parties. In addition, independent candidates also submit subscription lists with enough signatures of supporters. To register, they must appear in person at the district electoral council, where they submit the subscription lists together with the documents required for registration.

CAPITALIZING ON THE RIGHT TO RUN INDEPENDENTLY IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

All elections in the Republic of Moldova have been held against the backdrop of developments in the national political and judicial sphere. The desire of Moldovan citizens to run as independents crystallized in a winding way - with enthusiasm in the first years after the declaration of independence, followed by a period of decline, then a substantial revival. The Republic of Moldova is among the countries where no more than 15% of candidates running for elective office are independents and they win on average between approximately 2 and 5% of the votes¹⁹. The only legislature that included independent candidates was the one elected in the February 24, 2019, elections organized under the mixed parallel system. Even so, only 3 of the 59 people who ran in 51

¹⁷ Prom-Lex, Raport final „Misiunea de observare a alegerilor locale generale și parlamentare noi din 20 octombrie”, 3 noiembrie, 2019, p. 61. Available on: <https://promolex.md/16461-raportul-final-misiuneade-observare-a-alegerilor-locale-generale-si-a-alegerilor-parlamentare-noi-din-20-octombrie-3-noiembrie-2019/?lang=ro>. (Accessed: 26.09.2024)

¹⁸ Comisia Electorală Centrală a Republicii Moldova. Official page. Available on: https://a.cec.md/ro/main-19-septembrie-incepe-perioada-de-depunere-a-documentelor-2781_107415.html

¹⁹ Dawn Brancati, D (2008), op. cit. p. 655

single-member constituencies obtained a mandate as a deputy²⁰. In the case of elective positions at the local level, the desire to run as an independent candidate is expressed by a larger number of citizens. In the 2019 general local elections, at least 3,778 candidates were registered for the position of mayor. The most candidates were registered in Orhei – 198, Florești – 172 and Ungheni – 161²¹. Women represented 8% of all independent candidates. For the position of councilor, compared to the general local elections of June 14, 2015, 5,353 files (over 51.4 thousand people) were registered in the 2019 elections. The most files were registered in UTAG (424), Orhei district (240) and Ungheni district (214).²²

Table 1 Independent candidates elected to local public positions

Independent candidates	Councilor level II	Councilor level I	Mayors	Votes
1999	6	292	191	6.83%
2003	23	479	157	5.43%
2007	19	333	95	4.4%
2011	9	336	69	4.06%
2015	6	372	67	3.18%
2019	24	510	112	5.74%

Source: synthesis made by the authors based on official data, Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Moldova

Analyzing the rate of independent candidates elected to local public offices since the 1999 elections until now, in the period 2007-2015, citizens' intentions to run as independent candidates were lower compared to the previous period. The revival is attested in the 2019 general local elections. Out of 898 mayoral positions, 112 (12%) were occupied by independent candidates. Of the total number of elected mayors, 22% (195) are women, 13% (26) of whom ran as independent candidates. The 510 local councilor mandates are found in 26 local councils. The intentions to run as independent candidates for the position of councilor at level II local public authorities are limited.

The largest number of independent mayors are elected in the Găgăuzia and in the districts Ștefan Vodă, Hâncești, Edineț, Căușeni and Cahul. The intention to run independently is largely attested in villages and townships. Of the 112 elected mayors, only 7 are elected in cities and municipalities. Considering that we are talking about the 2019 general local elections, that is, until the amendments to the Electoral Code come into force, we can state that "the restrictions and discrimination of independent candidates regarding their right to run for elections are contradictory to international standards and best practices", a finding made in an interim report on the observation of local elections in the Republic of Moldova²³. Perhaps, indeed, collecting several signatures that would reach the level of 5% of the total number of voters with the right to vote is an impediment, given the limited logistical resources available to independent candidates. These provisions led to the fact that in the local elections of 2015 and 2019, no independent candidate was registered for the position of mayor of Chisinau. There was an intention, but the candidate was not registered in the electoral elections, following the decision of the Chisinau District Electoral Council. The Chisinau

²⁰ Arina Kraijdan, Doina Bordeianu, *Șansele candidaților și candidatelor independente de a accede în Parlamentul Republicii Moldova în cadrul sistemului electoral proporțional*, CICDE Policy Brief, no. 4, p. 3. Available on: https://cicde.md/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/policy-brief_4_6867931.pdf (Accessed: 30.08.2024)

²¹ Promo-Lex, 2019, op. cit., p. 37

²² Ibidem.

²³ Misiunea Internațională de Monitorizare a Alegerilor ENEMO, *Alegeri Locale Generale, 20 octombrie – Moldova. Raport interimar 20 septembrie - 11 octombrie 2019*. Available on: http://enemo.eu/uploads/file-manager/1stInterimReport-LocalElectionsOct_2019Moldova-13Oct_2019.pdf (Accessed: 18.09.2024)

District Electoral Council did not validate about a thousand signatures collected by Codreanu's team from Chisinau residents²⁴. The November 2023 election will show whether the new amendments to the Electoral Code, which reduce the number of signatures, will encourage citizens to run independently.

One of the possible explanations for the decrease in the desire to run as an independent candidate could be migration and political drift, a phenomenon fueled by the parties in power and the poor management of human resources within the party to which the mayors who obtained a mandate were members were affiliated politically. The merits and talents of people within the party were not appreciated by the party leadership. A study addressing the issue of the political affiliation of mayors shows that out of the 504 mayors re-elected in the 2015 local elections, 101 changed the political party that promoted them to the mayor's seat in 2011, 22 mayors from the ranks of independent candidates joined a political party, and 16 mayors, who belonged to a political party in 2011, preferred to run independently and won the mayor's position in 2015. During the period 2015-2017, out of the 69 independent candidates who won the mayor's position in the 2015 local elections, 16 or 23% preferred to affiliate with a political party, this being the Democratic Party of Moldova²⁵.

One reason that can be considered a discouraging to run as an independent is unequal treatment. Sometimes, subtle repressions faced by candidates can be considered forms of discrimination, detrimental to political pluralism. Even when independent candidates are allowed to run and have a de facto chance of being elected, they may face many administrative obstacles and structural disadvantages that diminish their competitiveness against party candidates. As a result, many become discouraged. For example, before/during the 2019 local elections in the Republic of Moldova, administratively burdensome procedures for collecting an unjustified number of supporting signatures from voters (one voter could support only one candidate) reduced the chances of independents running and being elected. No such requirement was imposed on political party candidates.²⁶ ENEMO observers found that the signature collection process was problematic in several cases. Insufficiently clear legal provisions left room for different interpretations of the terms "locality", "municipality", "suburb" and "territorial-administrative unit". Due to discrepancies in the legal interpretation of the provisions of the electoral legislation, the CECEs rejected several candidates' applications, which led to several court disputes and appeals of first instance court decisions. In several cases, the reasons for the rejection of independent candidates by the CECEs were based on minor errors, small technical mistakes and different interpretations of the law.²⁷

The general local elections of November 5, 2023, were organized according to the new provisions of the legislation in force and in a complex political and social context, marked by intense competition between traditional political parties and independent candidates. These elections were essential for the configuration of local administrations and for determining the direction of community development in the next four years. According to the provisions of the new Electoral Code, approved on December 8, 2022, and entered into force on January 1, 2023, the most important areas were modified regarding the mandate, the age of candidates, the process of designation and registration, the method of administering electoral lists and the strengthening of the control attribution of the Central Electoral Commission.

In the report provided by the CEC, a total of 116 independent candidates were elected to the

²⁴ Codreanu a atacat în instanță decizia Consiliului Electoral prin care a fost exclus din cursă. Available on: <https://tv8.md/2019/10/01/codreanu-a-atacat-in-instanta-decizia-consiliului-electoral-prin-care-a-fost-exclus-din-cursa> (Accessed: 20.08.2023)

²⁵ Ion Meleștean, „Traseismul politic al primarilor în Republica Moldova (2011-2017)”, *Administrarea Publică*, 2017, nr. 3(95), pp. 153-158.

²⁶ Prebilic, op. cit.

²⁷ ENEMO, op. cit., p. 10.

position of mayor in the localities of the Republic of Moldova, 26 women and 90 men, with only 4 more candidates compared to the 2019 election, where the total number of independent candidates elected to the position of mayor was 112. A possible cause of the large difference between men and women may be the increased degree of distrust in women's ability to administer public affairs.

SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF INDEPENDENT CANDIDATES

The exercise of the positions to which independent candidates were elected requires a certain level of experience and knowledge to resolve and oversee, within the framework of the law, an important part of the public affairs of the territorial community they represent. The exercise of these powers also implies an increasingly high level of experience and knowledge, which, however, proves to be unevenly distributed among the elected officials, for reasons that are not so much related to the person as to the means available to each within its community.²⁸

Because public data on the electoral campaigns of independent candidates are very brief, the analysis is limited to 12 independent mayors. We refer to the longest-serving mayors, who have run as an independent candidate at least once, and 6 independent mayors from Cahul district. Their profile and activity are analyzed based on the following criteria: age, education, professional experience, motivation to run as an independent candidate, assuming the role, challenges in exercising the position, and perceptions of citizens.

The data highlight that the most represented category for the position of independent mayor are people who held administrative positions before the proclamation of the independence of the Republic of Moldova. In most of the analyzed situations, positions in district executives, district party committees, and councils of deputies are attested. The young mayors, who ran for the 2015 and 2019 elections, have extensive volunteer experience, work as advisors, or have worked in local public services. The average age of an independent mayor is under 50 years old.

On the administrative agenda of mayors are primarily issues related to social services, utilities and infrastructure for a decent life. They are aware that they have assumed a role of great responsibility and at the same time demanding. From the reports available in the media, the activity of independent mayors is quite intense. Even if they allocate days for the audience, where they meet with over 30 citizens, they discuss their problems outside of office hours. "I am not tied to working hours, I am tied to problems", admits a mayor (city of Cricova), "The mayor is not only a representative person, but also an executive, and the problems of the village end up on the mayor's head", "the mayor should be a village manager, and the city hall an administrative structure, not a political one" says another mayor (village of Banesti, district of Telenesti). In addition to administrative issues, they also deal with "more mundane" problems. Whether someone is beaten or kicked out of their home, someone's dog has been poisoned or neighbors are burning their garbage (mayor of Budești township, Chișinău city), or a mediator in love relationships (mayor of Caracusenii Vechi, Briceni)²⁹.

Reduced budgets, the unwillingness of citizens to be more cooperative in solving local problems, political pressures are the problems they face most often. In these conditions, they must be quite "creative", good communicators and negotiators, with a keen sense of prioritization. If a city hall building or a cultural center "remains repetitive" in terms of repairs, it is because "the money went [first] to the needs of the village".³⁰

Financial challenges are most often the result of poor relationships with institutions

²⁸ Sergiu Cornea, op. cit., p. 16.

²⁹ Raisa Răzmeriță, „Forever primar”, 2017. Disponibil: <https://oamenisikilometri.md/forever-primar/>. (Accessed: 10.08. 2024)

³⁰ Ibidem.

responsible for distributing financial resources. Political non-affiliation is openly mentioned as a reason for financial non-support. It is a widespread phenomenon in the Republic of Moldova. Data shows that mayors politically affiliated with the ruling parties received more money than those of the opposition or independents. For example, in 2018, in the "Good Roads for Moldova Program", allocations favored jurisdictions where, based on the new mixed voting system, representatives of the Democratic Party ran. A maximum index of political clientelism was recorded in 2012, when the probability of receiving funds for capital investments from the State Budget was on average 4 times higher in local territorial collectivities where a mayor affiliated with the governing alliance was elected than in those that elected mayors affiliated with other parties³¹.

Financial challenges are also among the factors that affect the quality of being "independent", with mayors having to join a political party. Mayors appreciate that one of the advantages of being independent is the freedom to make decisions. However, 4 mayors from those targeted in the study migrated to several parties, arguing their gesture by the need for "political capital" to carry out projects at the local level. "Whoever will give me money for the village - I'll go with that one!" becomes a generalized expression through which city councilors explain their gestures of political transition. One mayor exercised all its mandates independently but had the support of several parties. At the same time, there are also mayors who resist the phenomenon, maintaining their independent status. 3 of the six independent mayors in Cahul district ran independently for a second term, obtaining an overwhelming number of votes. All three mayors obtained the mandate by running independently, after a term in which they were politically affiliated.

Citizens' perceptions unanimously indicate that the preference for an independent candidate is due to their "good householder" qualities and the way they are treated. The most appreciated are their "kind words", their willingness to listen, their moderation and their dignity.

Other aspects associated with the ability to manage that we can discern are the motivation and will to achieve their goals, as well as the emphasis on values, competence, devotion and sacrifice. The fact that they are more community-oriented than party-oriented helps them somewhat to defy the "Iron Law of Oligarchy", formulated by Robert Michels³² and it is precisely the skillfulness to be "political people" that ensures their re-election for a new term.

In an electoral campaign, electoral competitors try to make their programs known by distributing leaflets, but also by direct speeches to the public. Independent candidates are more reserved when it comes to promises and there is an increase in the professionalism with which they come to the political market. For them, the marketing of promises, in a way, manifests itself through awareness of the current reality. They analyze all sources so that they can then offer people what they want to hear. For example, if the community budget does not allow the construction of an access road or the start of a new aqueduct project, they avoid making promises that cannot be fulfilled within a mandate.

The success of the independent candidate's electoral campaign is largely due to the image and content strategies it follows and applies during the electoral period. "The world sees well what you are on the outside and few see what you are on the inside; and those few do not dare to contradict the opinion of the crowd (...) the people only judge what they see"³³, said Machiavelli in the „Prince”. They can opt for active, passive or positive electoral strategies. Each strategy has specific characteristics, which highlight the qualities and active attitude of the independent candidate, do not emphasize attacking opponents, choose appropriate moments for action, positive speech, use

³¹ Expert Forum, *Profilul clientelismului politic în regiune: România, Moldova și Georgia, 2018*. Disponibil: <https://expertforum.ro/profilul-clientelismului-politic-in-regiune/>. (Accessed: 10.08.2024).

³² Robert Michels, *Political parties. A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*. Kitchener, Batoche Books, 2001, p. 224.

³³ Niccolo Machiavelli, *Principele*, Bucuresti, Humanitas, 2019, p. 26.

messages that urge calm, balance, stability, dignified reactions to opponents' attacks. The case of Mayor Vasile Popovici, re-elected even when the opponents' election campaign flyers contained a list of reasons why he should not be re-elected, is instructive in this regard.

An eloquent example that demonstrates how a well-designed strategy works is Nicolae Dandiș, the mayor of Cahul. Before being elected mayor in 2015, beyond the big objectives that he brought to the attention of the people of Cahul, and what is within the powers of a mayor in this regard, he insisted on the fact that the biggest priority as mayor is to make people believe that the one they elect is doing everything in his power to work for the community, and for people to regain trust in what local public administration means.³⁴ Showing that you are not above those you represent has become a benchmark for citizens. People no longer believe in promises. In many cases, promises to create the feeling of candidates bidding for votes.

A special significance in the attitude of the independent candidate in the electoral campaign is also because they do not emphasize attacking their opponents. Campaign programs are built around questions aimed at achieving concrete results, in how long, with what means, with what efforts, what are the resources, what are the obstacles, who are they addressing, what they should say to the voters and how to send the message.

While all independent candidates are similar in their lack of political affiliation, they are different from each other in many ways. This is not the case for the individuals included in the study, but many independents are strangers to politics and have no experience in government. They are often drawn into the political arena by a single issue about which they feel passionate. Many even use their independent positions to present themselves as the only ones who can come up with solutions to collective problems, can successfully negotiate deals with different parties for the benefit of the community. Others, on the contrary, are political insiders who have previously participated in governance processes as members of certain political formations or have been part of the administrative bureaucracy. Many of these have left parties due to disputes over the direction of their parties, personal conflicts with other party members, or failure to win a seat on party lists.³⁵ Although dominant, this view of independent candidates is not universal. A considerable number of scholars, policymakers, and activists suggest that independents enhance democracy by proposing new and innovative solutions. Others suggest that independents strengthen democracy by reducing corruption, restoring the integrity of government, and reviving citizen interest in politics.³⁶ These things depend on their electoral strength, which varies greatly within the country.

CONCLUSIONS

The electoral power of independent candidates is influenced by the electoral system and the administrative culture of the country. Reforms that promote candidate-centered politics have as a secondary effect a leveling of the playing field for independent candidates. The relevance of representation in a democratic state lies in the action of all members of a local territorial collectivity to elect the most suitable persons to represent them. The presence of independent candidates is an indicator of representative democracy and the affirmation in practice of the right to vote and to be elected.

In the conditions of the Republic of Moldova, one can speak of political rather than

³⁴ Radio Europa Libera Moldova, Nicolae Dandiș: „Daca vrei ca oamenii sa aiba incredere in tine, trebuie si tu sa ai incredere in ei” October 23, 2019, [https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/nicolae-dandis-dac%C4%83-vrei-ca-oamenii-s%C4%83-aib%C4%83-%C3%AEncredere-%C3%AEn-tine-trebuie-%C8%99i-tu-s%C4%83-ai-%C3%AEncredere-%C3%AEn-ei-\(video\)/30232050.html](https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/nicolae-dandis-dac%C4%83-vrei-ca-oamenii-s%C4%83-aib%C4%83-%C3%AEncredere-%C3%AEn-tine-trebuie-%C8%99i-tu-s%C4%83-ai-%C3%AEncredere-%C3%AEn-ei-(video)/30232050.html) (Accessed: 01.08.2023)

³⁵ Ibidem.

³⁶ Dawn Brancati, op.cit., pag. 648.

demographic representativeness. Citizens are more likely to elect people who can solve community problems, appreciating negotiation and leadership skills. The desire to run independently has existed since the declaration of independence of the Republic of Moldova, going through a period of decline in the period 2007-2015. Currently, there is a growing trend in the involvement of candidates in electoral processes. The participation of independent candidates in local elections is a means of ensuring a functional democratic system, without diminishing the importance of parties. Electoral campaigns have become more dynamic, due to the growing number of electoral competitors. Independent candidates, who responsibly assume the role of local elected officials, are gaining ground against party representatives. The success of independent candidates, despite the unequal conditions compared to candidates with political support, is largely due to the positive electoral campaign strategies adopted. However, their independent status makes them more exposed to political pressures, the consequence in some cases being migration and political party switching.

The relevance of representation in a democratic state lies in the action of all members of a local territorial collectivity to elect the most suitable persons to represent them. The presence of independent candidates is an indicator of representative democracy and the practical affirmation of the right to vote and to be elected. At the same time, modern information and communication technologies can have the same effect, as they allow individual candidates to reach many voters at low cost, thus reducing the dependence of candidates on political campaigns of party organizations. An open question is whether the increase in the number of independent candidates is an expression of pluralism or a partisan strategy of political parties.

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Deepfake: Implications and Solutions in the EU

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Abstract: Deepfakes are hyper-realistic videos that apply artificial intelligence to depict persons' images and voices. Deepfake came into our lives when a Reddit moderator began posting videos that used face-swapping technology to insert celebrities' likenesses into existing pornographic videos in 2017. Despite a long time having passed, there is still no legal and technical solution in the European Union (the EU) to prevent creating or viraling of deepfake videos.

This paper addresses the pressing need for effective measures to combat deepfake proliferation, acknowledging the inadequacy of existing legal and technical frameworks in the EU. Due to its technical aspects, privacy rights, intellectual rights, and criminal law are not good enough to protect the rights of persons' whose image or voice is used in deepfake videos. By undertaking a thorough examination, this study seeks to bridge the gap between the current state of technology and the legal safeguards required to protect individuals from the detrimental effects of deepfakes in the EU.

Keywords: Deepfake, defamation, privacy, pornography, EU.

INTRODUCTION

Deepfakes originated in 2017. An influential Reddit user utilized open-source software from Google and other platforms to leverage scattered academic research on face-swapping. This mentioned individual uploaded the manipulated clips that featured the faces of celebrities like Scarlett Johansson, Gal Gadot, and Taylor Swift superimposed onto the bodies of adult film actresses, marking an early and controversial use of deepfake technology.²

In 2018, a viral trend emerged on the internet involving the manipulation of videos featuring Nicholas Cage's face inserted into scenes from various Hollywood films, achieved through the use of deepfake technology. Despite the initial appearance of genuine performances, none of the showcased scenes originally involved Cage. The rise of deepfakes, powered by artificial intelligence, allowed users to seamlessly replace original actors' faces in videos. Nicholas Cage's prominent role in these manipulated videos, given his history in the film "Face/Off," where characters swap faces, added a notable dimension to the phenomenon.³

In another example, a deepfake video featuring Barack Obama surfaced online, depicting him referring to the then US President Donald Trump as a 'complete dipshit.' Another deepfake video emerged, showcasing Mark Zuckerberg falsely asserting 'complete control over people's data.'⁴ And, finally, in October 2023, actor Tom Hanks warned fans not to fall for deepfake advert using his face and added 'I have nothing to do'⁵.

All these examples and also pornographic videos which are mostly used with deepfakes show how deepfake could be creative and disruptive. Because of the technology behind it, deepfakes remains unsolved and lack of specific regulations makes it harder to solve the problem. This article explains deepfakes in a comprehensive review, examines the current legal implications, and casts about for a solution in legal and technical ways in the EU.

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² Catherine Kerner & Mathias Risse, "Beyond Porn and Discreditation: Epistemic Promises and Perils of Deepfake Technology in Digital Lifeworlds," in *Moral Philosophy and Politics*, VIII, No.2, 2020, p. 84

³ Erik Gerstner, "Face/off: 'deepfake' face swaps and privacy laws," in *Defense Counsel Journal*, LXXXVII, No. 1, 2020, p. 1

⁴ Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, IV, 2021, p. 2269

⁵ See <https://news.sky.com/story/tom-hanks-warns-fans-not-to-fall-for-deepfake-advert-using-his-face-12974902> Accessed 13.03.2024

1. WHAT IS DEEPPFAKE?

Before deepfake, it is useful to define what synthetic media which consists deepfake as a subbranch in its family. Content categorized as synthetic media is wholly or partially crafted or altered through the application of AI or other technological methods. Deepfakes are the most advanced and realistic form of synthetic media.⁶

Deepfakes, a fusion of "deep learning" and "fake," are highly realistic videos digitally manipulated to portray individuals engaging in actions or utterances that never occurred in reality. This manipulation relies on neural networks, utilizing extensive data samples to emulate a person's facial expressions, gestures, voice, and tonal nuances. The process entails training a deep learning algorithm by inputting footage of two individuals, enabling it to interchange their faces seamlessly. In essence, deepfakes employ facial mapping technology and AI to substitute the face of one person in a video with that of another individual.⁷

The technology behind deepfake, rooted in deep learning, operates by analyzing extensive datasets of real recordings or images to learn and replicate the facial and vocal characteristics of a person. This adaptable model is then digitally imposed over another person's face seamlessly, resembling a mask. Early versions of deepfakes invoked an uncanny valley effect, generating somewhat human-like but clearly artificial outputs. However, the advent of generative adversarial networks (GANs) has significantly enhanced the sophistication and believability of deepfake outputs. GANs employ two neural networks, a generator and a discriminator, in an adversarial relationship, with the generator creating fake images and the discriminator learning to distinguish between authentic and computer-generated images. Through a continuous feedback loop, both networks improve, resulting in the generator producing highly realistic images that increasingly challenge detection by the discriminator. This reciprocal refinement process allows deepfake generators to create convincing content that closely resembles genuine images and recordings.⁸

2. BENEFITS OF DEEPPFAKE

Even though there are negative examples and concerns about it, deepfake technology has numerous benefits. As like all technologies can be used for the advancement of science and society. For instance, the online gaming industry is exploring the use of deepfake technology, specifically 'artificial intelligence-generated voice skins,' to elevate the gaming experience for players. Through the incorporation of face cloning and voice cloning, the entertainment and advertising sectors can harness the full potential of this technology.⁹

Also, deepfake technology extends its utility to automatic and authentic voice dubbing for movies in various languages, enhancing accessibility for diverse audiences in enjoying films and educational content. Illustrated by a 2019 Malaria awareness campaign featuring David Beckham, deepfake applications successfully transcended language barriers through visual and voice-altering technology, presenting the celebrity as multilingual. Furthermore, in video conference calls, deepfake technology proves valuable by translating speech, synchronously adjusting facial expressions and mouth movements, thereby breaking down language barriers and fostering

⁶Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagenveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in *Computer Law & Security Review*, XLVI, 2022, p. 4

⁷Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in *Technology Innovation Management Review*, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 40

⁸Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 314

⁹Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, IV, 2021, p. 2269

improved communication where participants appear to be speaking the same language, enhancing eye-contact and overall engagement.¹⁰

Deepfake can serve as a tool for individuals coping with the loss of loved ones by digitally resurrecting a deceased friend, providing an opportunity for grieving loved ones to say their goodbyes. Moreover, deepfakes can digitally recreate limbs for amputees, assist transgender individuals in visualizing themselves as their preferred gender, and facilitate interactions for individuals with Alzheimer's by presenting familiar faces. Scientists are exploring the technology's potential in medical fields, including the detection of abnormalities in X-rays and the creation of virtual chemical molecules for accelerated materials science and medical discoveries. Lastly, in the business realm, deepfakes have caught the attention of brands, enabling transformative applications in e-commerce and advertising.¹¹

3. THREATS OF DEEPPFAKE

The prevalence of deepfake content is prominently skewed towards pornography, with a 2019 study revealing that 96% of the 14,678 deepfake videos on the internet were of a sexual nature. While initially featuring celebrities, the disturbing trend extends to ordinary individuals, turning deepfake pornography into a new form of non-consensual exploitation comparable to revenge pornography. Unlike traditional revenge porn, deepfake pornography allows perpetrators to create explicit videos using publicly available images, making virtually anyone susceptible to being victimized. Actress Scarlett Johansson highlighted the distressing reality, emphasizing the lack of control over one's image being manipulated and inserted into explicit scenarios, with potential severe consequences for victims.¹²

Another pervasive use of deepfake technology has the potential to sow widespread confusion and undermine the value of truth in today's world. The mere suspicion of deepfake manipulation can trigger chaos, leading to a significant erosion of trust in genuine content.

Moreover, even if the subjects immediately denounce the falseness of the content, the public may still be misled. The act of retracting the fake video often proves insufficient in countering the spread of misinformation. People's inclination to act on false information before retractions, as well as their tendency to reject evidence if it contradicts their preexisting beliefs, contributes to the persistence of misinformation.¹³

As deepfake content becomes increasingly prevalent, there is a heightened risk of discrediting authentic material as fake, contributing to what is termed 'the liar's dividend.' This phenomenon entails a pervasive suspicion surrounding all forms of media, creating a substantial trust deficit between public institutions and the general populace.¹⁴

Another potential threat of deepfake that offers criminals new avenues for deceiving individuals and organizations. Instances of fraud involve a CEO being duped into transferring \$243,000 to a fraudster who used deepfake technology to replicate the boss's voice. Celebrities and public figures face misappropriation of their images for unauthorized advertising, such as Elon Musk impersonators promoting Bitcoin scams on Twitter and synthetic media images of BBC presenter

¹⁰ Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in *Technology Innovation Management Review*, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 41

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 317

¹³ Nina I. Brown, "Deepfakes and the weaponization of disinformation", in *Virginia Journal of Law & Technology*, XXIII, No.1, 2020, p. 10

¹⁴ Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, IV, 2021, p. 2273

Carol Kirkwood being used to endorse diet pills without her knowledge. Martin Lewis, founder of MoneySavingExpert, took legal action against Facebook for allowing thousands of fake advertisements using his name and photo to circulate on the platform, citing defamation. These deceptive practices, leveraging the trust in well-known personalities, are poised to escalate with the advancement of deepfake and synthetic media technologies.¹⁵

Lastly, deepfake technology has extended into courtrooms. A notable instance occurred in the UK, where deep fake audio was introduced as evidence in a custody battle, depicting a father as threatening. The critical concern arises in ensuring the authenticity of video, images, or audio evidence presented in legal proceedings, especially given the increasing sophistication of deep fake technology.¹⁶

4. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEEPAKE

Despite the use of a technology that creates contents that closely resemble genuine images and has a big potential to create chaos and crime, current legal frameworks are still not good enough for solving the problem in the EU.

Various countries, such as India, Scotland, and the USA, have enacted laws related to information technology and data protection, criminalizing the sharing of intimate or private images online without consent. Despite these legal measures, the global proliferation of deepfake technology poses a widespread challenge that transcends borders. Dealing with the transnational nature of these crimes presents a significant hurdle, necessitating a coordinated international approach. Existing legal avenues, such as copyright protection, privacy infringement regulations in cyberspace, or defamation actions, offer only limited effectiveness and may not fully achieve their intended purposes. Once a malicious deepfake video is uploaded to the internet, eradicating all copies from the digital space becomes an exceedingly difficult task.¹⁷

In the current legal framework, in the US both federal and state laws, encompassing civil and criminal domains, are insufficient to prevent or remedy the harms caused by deepfakes, with the First Amendment complicating regulatory efforts. However, there is a need to be dealt with under existing U.S. law such as defamation, copyright infringement, pornography, and harassment.¹⁸

On the other hand, in the EU the GDPR (General Data Protection Right) that brings consent obligation for using personal data of data subjects, the European Convention on Human Rights that allows public figures to demand their privacy right to protect their name and reputation while the expectation of more tolerative, and Digital Services Act (DSA) that rules providers are obligated to take action only when there are indications that the content is unlawful, placing a significant burden on citizens or trusted flaggers.¹⁹

¹⁵ Frederick Mostert & Sheyna Cruz, "Image rights in the digital universe", in *Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice*, XVII, No.7, 2022, p. 7

¹⁶ Francesca Palmiotto, "Detecting Deep Fake Evidence with Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Look from a Criminal Law Perspective", 2023, p.1

¹⁷ Madhura Thombre, "Deconstructing Deepfake: Tracking Legal Implications and Challenges," in *International Journal of Law Management & Humanities*, IV, 2021, p. 2271

¹⁸ Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 320

¹⁹ Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagenveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in *Computer Law & Security Review*, XLVI, 2022, p. 9

Lastly, The AI Act²⁰ which was proposed by the European Commission, the first regulation on AI in April 2021 defined the deepfake as a "limited risk" AI system. Article 52 of the AI Act regulates when an AI system creates deep fake content or manipulates text for public information, the deployers must disclose that it's artificially generated, unless authorized by law for criminal investigations. The disclosure should be clear and provided during the first interaction. These rules do not override existing laws, and an AI Office will encourage codes of practice for detecting and labelling artificially generated content, subject to approval by the Commission.

It is uncertain if this regulation will be a concrete solution for the deepfake threat. The effectiveness of disclosure requirements for deepfakes relies on robust enforcement mechanisms and underscores the challenge of balancing transparency with potential restrictions on artistic expression. Also, despite being currently classified as "limited risk" under the AI Act, the harmful impacts of deepfakes warrant reconsideration, advocating for their classification as high-risk AI systems.

4.1. Privacy and Data Protection Law

If deepfake technology generates video content portraying an individual in private situations they would never willingly share publicly, and if this synthetic content is virtually indistinguishable from authentic material, the affected individual may argue that the impact on them is akin to a genuine invasion of privacy. Currently, deepfake technology is exploited to create non-consensual pornographic content featuring celebrities, violating their likenesses without consent. This raises concerns as obtaining and distributing such explicit footage previously required filming the individual without their consent, constitutes a clear invasion of privacy. The use of deepfake technology intensifies the ethical and legal challenges associated with privacy breaches and unauthorized exploitation of individuals.²¹

However, there are five borderline areas that pose challenges to existing regulations. Firstly, deepfakes can facilitate live anonymous conversations, complicating issues of identity. Secondly, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) does not apply to deceased individuals, allowing for the creation of deepfakes involving historical figures without falling under data protection laws. Thirdly, deepfakes about organizations and states are exempt from GDPR regulations. Fourthly, when deepfakes merge images or voices of multiple persons, it remains unclear whether the final result qualifies as personal data. Lastly, the creation of entirely fictitious persons through deepfake technology raises concerns about the scope of personal data and the household exemption. Also, the household exemption also presents challenges, as certain deepfake applications, such as revenge scenarios, fall outside the scope of GDPR coverage, highlighting potential gaps in legislative frameworks.²²

4.2. Intellectual Rights

In April 2020, the YouTube creator Vocal Synthesis faced the first copyright claim for deepfaked audio content. The contested videos involved AI-generated voice impersonations of Jay-Z rapping Shakespeare and Billy Joel's songs. Jay-Z's legal team issued a DMCA takedown notice, arguing the unauthorized use of AI to mimic his voice. Initially removed by YouTube, the claim

²⁰ Regulation Of The European Parliament And Of The Council Laying Down Harmonised Rules On Artificial Intelligence (Artificial Intelligence Act) And Amending Certain Union Legislative Acts, Brussels, 2021, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52021PC0206>

²¹ Francesco Stellan Sturino, "Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights", in *Social Theory and Practice*, XLIX, No.1, 2023, p. 164

²² Bart van der Sloot & Yvette Wagenveld, "Deepfakes: Regulatory challenges for the synthetic society," in *Computer Law & Security Review*, XLVI, 2022, p. 9

proved unsuccessful, and the videos were reinstated due to insufficient grounds. The incident highlighted the limited applicability of copyright law in addressing deepfake issues, as a person's general appearance or sound is typically not copyrightable, and fair use doctrines may provide a First Amendment which guarantees freedoms concerning religion, expression, assembly, and the right to petition defense for transformative content like deepfakes. The text underscores that copyright protection primarily applies to the creator of source material, making it challenging for deepfake subjects to claim infringement unless they own the content used in the deepfake creation.²³

On the other hand, addressing the unwanted use of an individual's image through deepfake technology can be approached through legislative and legal measures. Some U.S. states, such as California, Texas, and Virginia, have enacted specific deepfake legislation, criminalizing actions like non-consensual pornography and deceptive political videos. Additionally, existing image rights laws may be updated to encompass deepfake instances; for example, New York amended its Civil Rights Law to include wholly computer-generated digital likenesses under post-mortem publicity rights. Deepfake litigation will necessitate applying established case law principles, with precedent evolving to adapt to new technologies. Notably, in a case involving video game depictions of college athletes, the 'transformative use' defense was not applicable when the portrayal aimed for realistic likeness. Claimants against deepfake misuse may draw analogies from the treatment of video games as expressive works subject to image rights, demonstrating the evolving nature of image rights law to confront challenges posed by emerging technologies.²⁴

4.3. Tort Law

Defamation law is relevant to the threat posed by deepfakes, as the technology allows anyone's image to be manipulated, potentially causing significant harm to reputations. However, establishing defamation liability requires proving the publication of false and defamatory content. As the quality of deepfakes advances, verification of falseness may become challenging and require sophisticated technology. Deepfakes explicitly labeled as such, or presented as parody, may be protected from defamation claims, as disclaimers negate the assertion of factual accuracy. Drawing on the precedent set by the Supreme Court case *Hustler v. Falwell*, where a satirical ad with a disclaimer was deemed immune from defamation liability, deepfake creators can argue that their content is a form of parody and not to be taken as factual statements.²⁵

5. SOLUTIONS FOR DEEPAKE

5.1. Legal Solutions

The evolving landscape of technology demands a re-evaluation and expansion of legal definitions pertaining to rights, infringements, crimes, and punishments. As it stands, the current legal framework falls short in addressing issues related to emerging technologies like deepfakes, primarily due to the inadequacy of existing definitions and scopes for copyright infringements.²⁶

²³ Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 323-324

²⁴ Frederick Mostert & Sheyna Cruz, "Image rights in the digital universe", in *Journal of Intellectual Property Law & Practice*, XVII, No.7, 2022, p. 8

²⁵ Lindsey Joost, "The place for illusions: deepfake technology and the challenges of regulating unreality", in *University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy*, XXXIII, No.2, 2023, p. 322

²⁶ Chochia, Archil; Sicat, Eden Grace Niñalga (2023). Ethics and Modern Technologies: Example of Navigating Children's Rights in an AI-Powered Learning Environment. In: Ramiro Troitiño, D.; Kerikmäe, T.; Hamulák, O. (Ed.). *Digital Development of the European Union*. (129–141). Springer, Cham. DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-27312-4_9; Chochia, A.; Nässi, T. (2021). Ethics and Emerging Technologies – Facial Recognition. *IDP Revista de Internet Derecho y Política*, 34, 1–12. DOI: 10.7238/idp.v0i34.387466; Joamets, K.; Chochia, A. (2021). Access to Artificial Intelligence for Persons with

There is a pressing need for a comprehensive understanding of AI, guided by the expertise of scientists, to inform a regulatory overhaul that aligns with the intricacies of artificial intelligence.²⁷

Moreover, it is essential to establish AI-specific regulations that parallel the pace of advancements in technology, similar to regulatory frameworks in other domains affected by emerging technologies. These regulations should extend across jurisdictions, recognizing the global nature of the internet and the rapid dissemination of content. Striking a balance between the potential threats and benefits of AI is crucial, necessitating a careful consideration of the ethical and legal implications. This involves a delicate calibration of the rights of individuals and the continued development of technology, ensuring that legal safeguards are in place to mitigate risks while fostering innovation responsibly. In essence, the law must adapt to the challenges posed by AI, taking into account its unique characteristics and impact on society.

It might be considered that these solutions are long-term strategic mindsets for the framework of a new legal system in the world of AI. Therefore, here are some short-term legal solutions to find out a legal way to protect rights of people against the threats of deepfakes:

First solution might be a legal arrangement similar to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) which empowers the proprietor of intellectual property to petition hosting platforms for its removal. By complying with such requests, hosting platforms are relieved of liability.²⁸

Additionally, exploring "marketplace solutions" as alternative strategies for controlling the creation and distribution of Deepfakes without solely relying on individual rights as a basis for regulation might be a short-term solution.²⁹

On the other hand, an offer for a regulation that would prohibit the online dissemination of deepfake content, comparing it to the unauthorized online release of intimate videos. It suggests that the inability to permanently remove such content from the internet causes significant mental, emotional, and physical harm, justifying the need for prohibition without requiring an intent to harm. The proposed regulation would classify sending personal deepfakes as online publication, encompassing both real private videos and computer-generated deepfakes.³⁰

Lastly, a legal regulation similar to Virginia state law which includes deepfakes in the category of "falsely created" images and videos, making their distribution a misdemeanor might be a solution to solve pornographic contents that are made by deepfake technology.³¹

5.2. Technical Solutions

Even if the legal regulations are good enough, the law is not a convenient way to stop the viraling of the contents that are made by deepfake fastly and effectively. For this reason, while the current legal system is improving, it needs to find technical solutions to cease spreading the contents.

The forefront of deepfake technology research emphasizes the use of AI detectors, with the past two years witnessing a concentrated effort to develop automated tools for detection. Various

Disabilities: Legal and Ethical Questions Concerning the Application of Trustworthy AI. *Acta Baltica Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum*, 9 (1), 51–66. DOI: 10.11590/abhps.2021.1.04.

²⁷ Mazur, V.; Chochia, A. (2022). Definition and Regulation as an Effective Measure to Fight Fake News in the European Union. *European Studies: The Review of European Law, Economics and Politics*, 9 (1), 15–40. DOI: 10.2478/eustu-2022-0001.

²⁸ Erik Gerstner, "Face/off: 'deepfake' face swaps and privacy laws," in *Defense Counsel Journal*, LXXXVII, No. 1, 2020, p. 9

²⁹ Francesco Stellin Sturino, "Deepfake Technology and Individual Rights", in *Social Theory and Practice*, XLIX, No.1, 2023, p. 161-162

³⁰ Douglas Harris, "Deepfakes: False Pornography Is Here and the Law Cannot Protect You", in *Duke Law & Technology Review*, XVII, 2018-2019, p. 17, 124

³¹ Mika Westerlund, "The Emergence of Deepfake Technology: A Review", in *Technology Innovation Management Review*, IX, No.11, 2019, p. 44

techniques, such as analyzing eye blinking, face warping artifacts, heart rate estimation, and facial regions, have been proposed to ensure reliable results. However, a recent survey indicates that detection methods are still in an early stage, lacking generalization capability. Current challenges arise from the opacity of many deep fake detectors, which rely on machine or deep learning techniques, leading to algorithmic opacity. This opacity raises concerns about the introduction of potentially unreliable methods, known as "junk science," into criminal trials. Suggestions for addressing these concerns center on transparency and interpretability.³²

Another solution that is offered is banning the use of these videos on their platforms by websites. Some websites, including Pornhub and Reddit, have taken measures such as removing deepfake content, with the former relying on user reports and the latter deleting the subreddit where deepfakes originated; additionally, platforms like Discord, Gyfcat, and Twitter have specified a prohibition on face-swap porn without universally banning deepfake videos³³.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, deepfake technology, an intricate form of synthetic media crafted through artificial intelligence (AI), introduces a spectrum of both advantages and challenges. On the positive spectrum, deepfakes demonstrate potential applications in diverse fields such as gaming, entertainment, language accessibility, medicine, and business, underscoring their capacity to contribute positively to societal advancements. However, the substantial threats associated with deepfakes, such as non-consensual exploitation, the erosion of truth, and the creation of new avenues for deception and fraud, cannot be overlooked.

The legal ramifications of deepfake technology, especially concerning privacy, intellectual property rights, and tort law, are intricate and present formidable challenges within existing legal frameworks. While certain jurisdictions have enacted specific legislation targeting deepfakes, the legal landscape remains in a state of evolution, necessitating comprehensive regulations to effectively address the multifaceted issues arising from this transformative technology. A critical emphasis is placed on the urgent need for clearly defined terms, rights, and corresponding penalties, alongside the establishment of AI-specific regulations tailored to the unique characteristics of deepfake technology.

In response to the challenges posed by deepfakes, various technical solutions, including AI detectors, are emerging to counteract the proliferation of deceptive content. However, challenges persist, notably in terms of algorithmic opacity and the potential introduction of unreliable methods into legal proceedings. As the deepfake landscape continues its evolution, a balanced approach that integrates legal, technical, and ethical considerations becomes imperative. This approach is essential for mitigating risks associated with deepfake technology while harnessing its positive potential responsibly and ethically.

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³² Francesca Palmiotto, "Detecting Deep Fake Evidence with Artificial Intelligence: A Critical Look from a Criminal Law Perspective", 2023, p.8

³³ Elizabeth Caldera, "Reject the evidence of your eyes and ears: deepfakes and the law of virtual replicants", in *Seton Hall Law Review*, L, No.1, p.189

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SECTION 3

Building-up resilience: policies and human dimensions

Preventive program for developing psychological resilience in people living in countries neighboring international military conflicts

ANGELIKA KLESZCZEWSKA-ALBIŃSKA, PhD¹

Abstract: Presented paper includes description of psychological risks and protective factors connected to the threat resulting from military conflict, and description of a preventive program aimed at increasing resilience of people living in close proximity to military conflict. Such programs are crucial but currently they are not available to the public.

Key words: resilience, prevention, well-being, countries neighboring military conflict

INTRODUCTION

The military conflicts have an enormous impact on physical and mental health, and general well-being of civilians who are under its direct or indirect influence. Due to lack of psychological safety and general instability an increase in levels of stress, anxiety and depression symptoms or some form of so-called survivor's guilt is observed in groups of direct survivors of the conflict and in citizens of other regions in close geographical proximity to the conflict. Usually in the literature negative social, and economic consequences of wars are mentioned together with data on increased mortality rates and significant decrease in quality of life. At the same time, there are many psychological consequences of military conflicts. There are correlations between traumatic experiences and psychological problems reported by individuals. The mental well-being of persons living in close proximity to military conflicts is lower in individuals suffering other difficulties, such as family or interpersonal problems, or not having any social support. It was also discovered that females in comparison to males experience more intensive psychological consequences of military conflicts².

Most of the data published in the literature concerns the functioning of survivors of military conflicts, but there are study results proving the decrease in mental health of people living in neighboring countries after the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine³. Among the mental problems observed in residents of neighboring countries there were symptoms of depression, anxiety and PTSD. It is underlined in the literature that military conflicts heavily influence psychological well-being and may lead to serious, long-lasting consequences in mental health of people involved in the conflict as well as in people living in countries neighboring the conflict⁴. The quality of life observed in countries directly neighboring an area affected by armed conflict may decline as a result of the increased level of uncertainty and fear for one's own future and security. The standard of living may decline due to the economic, social and natural consequences of the conflict. Additionally,

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² R. Srinivasa Murthy, Rashmi Lakshminarayana, *Mental health consequences of war: a brief review of research findings*, in "World Psychiatry", 5(1), 25-30, February, 2006, pp. 25-28.

³ Angelika Kleszczewska-Albińska, Krystian Ptak, Małgorzata Wiśniewska, Agata Wziątek, *Funkcjonowanie psychologiczne wybranych studentów psychologii i bezpieczeństwa narodowego w obliczu konfliktu zbrojnego na Ukrainie*, in „Studia Społeczne”, 39(4), 7-23, 2022, pp. 7-22.

⁴ Mateusz Babicki, Krzysztof Kowalski, Agnieszka Mastalerz-Migas, *The outbreak of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian war: mental health of poles and their attitude to refugees*, in "Frontiers in Public Health", 11, 1-9, June, 2023, pp. 1-7.

environmental pollution, increased exposure to radioactive substances, heavy metals or infectious diseases can lead to increased anxiety levels.

Among other important factors leading to decrease of the mental well-being of residents of countries neighboring the areas of armed conflicts there is the feeling of helplessness. Such a feeling results from inability to modify the observed situation. It can lead to the development of depressive symptoms, especially in the long-term period. The migration of civilians from the war zone is also heavily influencing the well-being of citizens of countries neighboring the area of armed conflict. It results in an increase of stress, and can cause secondary trauma, and compassion fatigue due to the exhausting process of helping the migrants. As it was proved in previous studies, engagement in helping, providing support and compassion to people who have recently experienced traumatic events increases the risk of secondary trauma in helpers. The highest risk of secondary trauma is observed in persons with previous traumatic experiences, and people suffering from mental disorders⁵.

In the literature there are mentioned protective factors important in maintaining high levels of mental well-being. They include a small number of mental problems, especially lack of previous traumas experienced before the exposure to the military conflict, social support and resilience. Also helpful in sustaining good mental conditions are psychological support, engagement in religious practices, and adaptive coping strategies⁶. It is therefore crucial to plan and organize supportive programs aimed at increasing the levels of resilience presented by citizens of countries neighboring to the areas of armed conflicts. Such programs are crucial since mental health problems contribute to socio-economic problems of societies and result in decrease of general well-being and happiness of entire populations, but currently they are not available to the public.

RESILIENCE ITS DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE

Resilience is defined as a process responsible for successful adaptation to difficult and challenging life experiences. It is connected to high emotional and behavioral flexibility and openness to new reactions in response to external and internal demands. Among factors responsible for high levels of resilience there are individual beliefs about oneself, others and the world, individual coping strategies, availability and quality of social resources⁷. According to the studies published up to date it was proved that resilience can be developed and strengthened⁸.

Resilience is achieved by overcoming everyday adversities, challenges and traumatic events that lead to significant stress. It is perceived as a process of recovery from difficult experiences and opportunity for personal growth. Resilience is connected with an ability to differentiate between controllable and uncontrollable situations that develops based on considerable emotional distress that an individual overcomes. It involves certain behaviors, thoughts and actions that people can learn thorough their lifetime.

⁵ Ali Jawaidd, Magdalena Gomolka, Anastasiia Timmer, *Neuroscience of trauma and the Russian invasion of Ukraine*, in "Nature Human Behaviour", 748-749 June, 2022, 6, pp. 748.

⁶ Emilia Zamora-Moncayo, Rochelle A. Burgess, Laura Fonseca, Mónica González-Gort, Ritsuko Kakuma, *Gender, mental health and resilience in armed conflict: listening to life stories of internally displaced women in Colombia*, in "BMJ Global Health", 1-13, October, 2021, 6(10), pp. 1-11.

⁷ Anat Shoshani, Michelle Slone, *The resilience function of character strengths in the face of war and protracted conflict*, in "Frontiers in Psychology", 1-10, January, 2016, 6, pp 1-9.

⁸ Erio Ziglio, "Strengthening resilience: a priority shared by Health 2020 and the Sustainable Development Goals", World Health Organization, Italy, 2017, pp. 4-7, 19.

Since resilience depends mostly on social interactions and resources⁹ preventive programs for developing resilience should include modules aimed at increasing individuals' knowledge about the importance of social relationships, and connections. It is important to increase individuals' levels of empathy and skills important for active listening. Social connections are important, because they improve the quality of social support. Helpful in the process of strengthening an individual's resilience is engagement in helping others. Therefore it is important to teach people useful tools they can apply while helping others. At the same time it is crucial to give them some tips on how to prevent their own well-being while helping others.

Strengthening resilience also requires validation of all the feelings an individual experiences. It is therefore required to offer people psychoeducation on the role and meaning of emotions and to teach them adaptive ways of coping with emotions. Data on basic self-care methods is also needed while developing resilience of an individual. It is therefore important to help people to discover their strengths and pleasurable leisure activities. Another factor helping maintain high levels of resilience is connected with an individual's meaning of life, and having measurable short-term and long-term goals. During preventive programs aimed at developing resilience people are taught to set reasonable, measurable and achievable goals.

In order to become resilient or to sustain high levels of resilience an individual has to trust themselves in solving problems and making appropriate decisions. It is often connected with the need to see specific problems in a broad context. Additionally, resilient behaviors require some levels of positivity and optimism for the future. Therefore whenever an individual is facing adversities in their life they should have an opportunity to discuss the situation they experience. Also they need to identify their own strengths and opportunities in those challenging experiences. Since difficulties usually lead to changes in life it is important to help people to prepare for those changes. It can be helpful to underline the inevitability of change, and to find a way to use it as an asset in life.

Development and maintenance of resilience in some cases requires involvement of professionals who serve as models. They also provide necessary information, scientific data and offer specific tools helpful in the process of discovering individuals' strengths and weaknesses, and providing adaptive coping methods useful in difficult situations. It is therefore crucial to offer people an opportunity to participate in preventive programs and supportive groups in which they will be able to discover their ways for developing resilient attitudes.

Maintenance of high levels of resilience requires high levels of awareness of individual strengths. It is connected with individuals' beliefs about their competencies and confidence. Keeping high levels of resilience is possible for persons who stay connected with others and for those who develop and sustain healthy interpersonal relationships. It is also connected with an ability to ask for help when it is needed, and use of adaptive, and situationally adequate coping strategies and stress management techniques. It also requires constant attentiveness, awareness of difficulties and willingness to learn new methods of problem solving. Therefore, a high level of resilience is usually connected to high openness to experience, proneness to accept uncontrollable events and modify situations controlled by an individual. It also requires high levels of optimism, and a task-oriented approach in which an individual believes they are able to achieve their goals, and they take the responsibility for their actions. Resilience also correlates with highly developed abilities for planning¹⁰. All of the above mentioned factors should be strengthened in persons developing and maintaining their resilience.

⁹ Linda M. Hartling, *Strengthening resilience in a risky world: it's all about relationships*, in "Jean Baker Miller Training Institute at the Wellesley Centers for Women", 1-12, 2003, Paper No. 101, pp. 1-9.

¹⁰ Elisabeth S. Blanke, Florian Schmiedek, Stefan Siebert, David Richter, Annette Brose, *Perspectives on resilience: Trait resilience, correlates of resilience in daily life, and longer-term change in affective distress*, in "Stress Health", 39(1), 59-73, February 2023, pp. 59-70.

PREVENTIVE PROGRAM FOR DEVELOPING RESILIENCE IN PEOPLE LIVING IN COUNTRIES NEIGHBORING MILITARY CONFLICTS

People living in close proximity to the military conflict suffer many psychological problems that in the long-term can lead to the general decrease in the mental well-being and quality of their lives. They can experience heightened levels of anxiety and depression symptoms. Young people and women are especially vulnerable to the development of mental problems as a result of military conflicts. Additionally, people who help and volunteer asylum seekers and refugees are at higher risk of depressive and anxiety symptoms. People helping others coming directly from the war zone are also more prone to the development of secondary traumatic stress. It is therefore important to offer those people help and support they need. As it was stated before, one of the most important factors corresponding to the mental well-being of an individual is resilience. It is then justified to develop preventive programs aimed at development and strengthening resilience of the citizens of countries neighboring military conflicts.

Preventive program devoted to the resilience of citizens of countries in close proximity to military conflicts should start with a thorough diagnosis of individuals' needs and problems. At first the conceptualization of individuals' life lines with special attention to current factors contributing to increased stress and mental health concerns should be prepared. Such diagnosis should be addressed especially to people volunteering and offering help since they are at greater risk of developing compassion fatigue¹¹. Whenever persons helping others experience feelings of helplessness, become less empathic and sensitive, feel overwhelmed, exhausted, detached, numb or emotionally disconnected they should be offered psychoeducation on compassion fatigue and given useful tips concerning adaptive coping strategies. After the psychoeducation phase people should be offered a chance to participate in a support group. Additionally, they can be offered individual or group professional help. It is important to underline that all the above mentioned interventions cannot be obligatory. They will be more effective in situations in which people get the chance to decide for themselves whether they are interested in participating in such activities.

After people decide to join support groups, ask for individual or group help aimed at developing their resilience they should be offered a chance to better understand their strengths and weaknesses and to learn about the impact their past experiences have on their present functioning. During the activities in support groups individuals will get the chance to observe and listen to others and – based on their experiences – learn more about their own history. In therapeutic groups individuals will be offered not only the knowledge about other people's experiences but also psychological knowledge concerning specific mechanisms described during the group meetings. Finally, during individual sessions persons will be able to discover their own beliefs based on their previous experiences and to understand an impact their past had on their present well-being. Support groups are therefore the least personalized support methods while the most individually oriented are individual sessions with a professional. At the same time it has to be underlined that the best way to increase or maintain resilience in persons living close to military conflicts would be to combine engagement in support groups and individual sessions with a professional.

The next step of developing resilience should be devoted to the recognition and application of individually fitted adaptive ways of coping. Based on previously discovered individual histories and preferences, individuals should be able to learn about coping techniques used by other people, and decide whether those methods are useful for them. While working in a group led by professional participants can receive additional psychoeducation on each coping method described by group

¹¹ Compassion fatigue is a result of helping others who experience many psychological problems and distress, and in some cases were exposed to traumatic events. It is connected with emotional exhaustion and numbness, psychological overwhelm, and deep fatigue. In the long-term it can cause emotional burnout.

participants, while during individual work participants will be able to analyze all the advantages and disadvantages of each coping method. Additionally, while working individually, people will be able to test every coping method during the session and in real life situations and later will be able to discuss the outcomes of every method for their functioning in order to decide which of the coping strategies are the best for them.

Another important factor corresponding to the increase of resilience is self-compassion. Therefore, after gaining knowledge concerning individual strengths and weaknesses, and learning how to cope with adversities in an individually oriented manner there is a time for learning how to be kind and compassionate about oneself. During supportive group meetings individuals can therefore learn how other people deal with critical thoughts about themselves, and how they overcome unpleasant emotions about themselves. In professionally lead group interventions participants will receive additional psychoeducation concerning efficacious methods of self-compassion. During individually oriented sessions participants not only learn about self-compassion but also have the chance to practice different methods before deciding which to use on a daily basis.

Generally speaking while helping people living in close proximity to military conflicts to sustain in good mental condition and to develop resilience it is important to learn how they cope in the beginning. It is crucial to learn about their life history and previous adversities they've experienced in their lives and to recognize the main problems they are facing in the current situation, then to teach them about the most adaptive coping strategies they can apply in different conditions. In order to increase resilience levels it is necessary to develop self-compassion, develop and maintain supportive relationships with others, and learn how to ask for help from others. All the main steps needed while developing and maintaining resilience of people living close to military conflicts are given in Table 1.

Table 1. *Elements of resilience increasing program for people living in close proximity to the military conflict*

Type of activity	Module	General aim of the module
Supportive groups	Recognizing individual strengths, weaknesses, and needs	Learning about oneself, one's needs, abilities, and its connection to the resilience
	Developing self-supportive network	Giving individuals an opportunity to meet other people who share similar experiences and learning from them
	Strengthening individual skills	Giving individuals an opportunity to discover and develop their skills while helping others experiencing similar difficulties
Group work with a professional	Psychoeducation	Providing current empirically-based knowledge on compassion fatigue, burnout, coping strategies, self-compassion
	Activities aimed at strengthening individual abilities to help others	Giving individuals an opportunity to share their knowledge with other group members, offering individuals opportunities for serving as an expert in certain domains, encouraging people to help other group members
	Activities aimed at strengthening individual abilities for self-help and search for help from others	Giving individuals an opportunity to learn from their own experiences, encouraging individuals to ask for help from others, reinforcing individual's behaviors aimed at searching support from others

Individual work with a professional	Diagnostic assessment	Recognition of individual strengths and weaknesses, case conceptualization
	Recognition of individual needs	Recognition of basic problems that cause individual's emotional suffering
	Recognition of individual styles of coping with adversities	Recognition of preferred styles of coping needed for individualized preventive programs, finding the best, most adaptive ways of solving problems adequate for an individual
	Recognition of individual preferences in self-care	Identification of self-care methods used by an individual on a daily basis, finding the best individually fitted methods of self-care
	Supportive sessions	Discussing the outcomes of individual sessions, identifying problems, and looking for solutions
	Mentoring sessions	Giving individually fitted advices adequate to the needs and constitution of an individual

All of the activities described in Table 1. can be used independently or can be offered as separate parts of one complex preventive program. Independent modules can be useful especially for people that do not have much contact with military conflict abroad, for those who only hear or read about it in the media. People who are living close to the borders should be offered at least the possibility of participation in support groups and professional group interventions. All persons directly engaged in helping others and having direct contact with refugees, people seeking for shelters etc. should be offered all three types of interventions, since they are at greater risk of developing compassion fatigue, secondary stress or emotional burnout. Activities aimed at increasing or maintaining resilience can help people to sustain good mental health, overcome adversities, and model adequate coping behaviors for others. Greater resilience can serve as a factor decreasing the risk of psychological crises. Whenever simple support and activities aimed at increasing levels of resilience are not sufficient it is recommended to search for empirically-based therapeutic interventions such as cognitive-behavioral therapy.

Taking into account the number of ongoing military conflicts across the world it is necessary to plan and organize help for people indirectly engaged in war-related situations, such as citizens of neighboring countries, volunteers helping refugees etc. Offering those people support developing, increasing, and maintaining their resilience can result in an increase of the general well-being of those people as well as in other persons they're working with. Such correspondence is possible, since data published up to date proves that psychologically stable individuals helping others contribute to better functioning of persons they offer their support to¹².

DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING RESILIENCE: FINAL REMARKS

Living in a close proximity to the military conflict can cause high levels of emotional distress, symptoms of anxiety and depression and in some cases secondary traumatic stress. It is therefore important to provide citizens of countries neighboring with military conflicts with preventive programs aimed at development and maintenance of resilience. Increasing resilience is a time consuming process that includes taking necessary steps to improve social interactions, and developing social support, developing adaptive methods of coping with adversities and investing in

¹² Kathryn Bamforth, Pamela Rae, Jill Maben, Helen Lloyd, Susie Pearce, *Perceptions of healthcare professionals' psychological wellbeing at work and the link to patients' experiences of care: A scoping review*, in "International Journal of Nursing Studies Advances", 5, 1-24, December 2023, 5, pp.1-21.

self-care techniques. Methods of work offered for persons living in a close proximity to the military conflict should be diversified according to the needs of individuals. Special attention should be given to people helping others since they can experience compassion fatigue and are at heightened risk of secondary traumatic stress. All of the methods aimed at resilience development and maintenance can be divided into self-help supportive groups, group interventions offered by professionals and individual interventions led by professionals. All of those approaches aim at the increase of individual self-awareness and self-compassion, lead to the development of efficacious coping strategies, and underline the role of social support and ability to ask for help when needed.

Regardless of the method used for supporting its development certain conditions have to be met in order to increase the levels of resilience. An individual has to experience positive, empathetic, trustworthy and compassionate interpersonal relationships, they have to feel they are not alone in difficult situations. Also important is asking for help from others and accepting the support they offer. Sometimes in order to receive adequate help and support it is helpful to be a part of a bigger group. Practicing mindfulness can increase self-awareness and self-acceptance, and decrease the symptoms of stress and anxiety that is needed for high resilience levels. In order to maintain resilience it is necessary to learn how to cope with stress and regulate emotions in an adequate way. Higher levels of resilience are observed in people perceiving their life as meaningful, so in order to sustain resilient it is important to set short-term and long-term realistic goals as well.

Crucial for well-being and high levels of resilience is also awareness of individual strengths and successes. It is important to notice any struggles and individual attempts to overcome those, and to interpret such situations as evidence of success. Whenever some anxious thoughts or catastrophic visions come to mind it is necessary to identify its irrationality, and make an effort to adopt a more balanced thinking pattern. When needed it is also recommended to modify previous goals in such a way it will be possible to fulfill it in specific socio-cultural and historical circumstances. It is also important to take into consideration past personal experiences and life events. Based on previous experiences it is possible to identify successful methods of overcoming new adversities. Finally, when all other methods and individual attempts fail it is needed to ask for professional help. Then it is recommended to engage in a therapeutic process based on empirically verified methods of work.

While providing help and support for others, e.g. refugees from war zones it is also important to be attentive not only to the needs of those people but also for one's own feelings. It is recommended to work in a group of people, to have leisure time, and some time for pleasant activities and hobbies as well. Crucial for sustaining a good mental condition is working in a community that is able to offer support when needed. It means that offering help to others requires giving attention to oneself as well, and whenever it is necessary to take care of one's own emotional and mental condition.

CONCLUSIONS

Based on the information given in the previous sections it can be stated that resilience as a process of successfully overcoming difficulties, adaptation to challenging life events can be developed or increased during the lifetime. In order to do so an individual has to take into consideration their needs, develop optimistic instead of catastrophic expectations, develop and sustain supportive relationships. Since resilience is based on previous experiences, its development requires an ability to learn from previous situations, to have an open mind, accept changes, and practice self-compassion. It is also important to set realistic goals, work on skills development and have purpose in life. When it comes to the resilience development in the face of close military conflict it is important to pay attention to everyday activities, basic beliefs, and emotions of individuals. Different approaches and models of support can be offered for persons simply living in a country in

direct proximity to military conflict, for those living close to the borders, and others offering help and support for refugees, and other people in need in the war zone.

It should be underlined that the ideas presented in the article are theoretical. Therefore they can serve only as an introduction to the topic of resilience of people living in close proximity to the war zone and do not present fully worked out solutions to the problem. In the next steps, the focus should be directed to diagnosis of the citizens of countries neighboring military conflicts. Data concerning psychoemotional condition of people living in countries close to the war zones should be collected. It is necessary to describe the prevalence of the psychological, and emotional problems observed in people living close to the military conflict. It is justified to analyze those people functioning according to their age, gender, work experience, and other sociodemographic variables. Next, it is necessary to develop preventive programs that help them to increase their levels of resilience. In the next step short-term and long-term effectiveness of such programs should be empirically verified.

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Sport and foreign policy during the communist regime

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Summary: Sport in Romania and foreign policy are two areas which, although seemingly distinct, intersect in significant ways, especially through the prism of sports diplomacy. Sport was used as a tool to promote the country's image on the international scene, strengthening bilateral relations and contributing to Romania's soft- power. In this article, I set out to highlight how sport was the main pawn of political promotion abroad.

Keywords: *sport, political promotion, foreign policy.*

INTRODUCTION

Sport was seen as a platform through which the regime could demonstrate the effectiveness of its political system. The performances of athletes from the Eastern Bloc, including Romania, were used to emphasize the superiority of the socialist regime over the West. These achievements were widely promoted as a symbol of the success of communism.

The Romanian Communist Party (PCR) used sport as an essential foreign policy tool, especially during the regime of Nicolae Ceausescu. In the context of the Cold War, sport was a significant platform for promoting Romania's image internationally. The PCR saw sport as an opportunity to demonstrate the superiority of the Romanian communist system and to promote a foreign policy autonomous from the direct influence of Moscow.

After the 1968 break with the line imposed by the Soviet Union, Ceausescu sought to assert Romania's independence, and the success of Romanian athletes was used to legitimize this position.

The communist regime used sport to convey the image of a strong and unified society. International sporting success was often associated with the regime's achievements. International competitions, such as the Olympic Games or World Championships, were also opportunities to show the "superiority" of socialist regimes over capitalist ones. Athletes from communist countries were often seen as "national heroes" and were used to strengthen the image of the regime.

The communist regime established a rigorous system of sports selection and training. Talented children were identified from an early age and integrated into specialized training centres. Training was intense and performance was measured in terms of a "contribution to national glory". In Romania, for example, "centers of excellence" were created where athletes trained under the supervision of experienced coaches and were supported by the state, both financially and logistically.

World Championships were used to show the strength and success of the regime.

Athletes under communist regimes were sent to international competitions to boost the prestige of the regime. For example, Romania, as part of the Eastern Bloc, sent athletes to international competitions as part of a wider plan to increase political influence. Their performances at the Olympic Games or World Championships were seen not only as personal achievements, but also as a way to promote the positive image of the regime.

They received considerable financial support from the state, but this was conditional on their performance. Training was supported by the state, and sports infrastructure was also modernized, especially in the capitals and big cities.

Athletes' personal lives were also often influenced by the totalitarian regime. Many athletes were forced to follow a strict schedule, which included not only training, but also rehearsing for various public events, promoting the regime's image or even international promotional trips.

Athletics, gymnastics, football and hockey were areas where Romania excelled. Medals won by Romanian athletes at the Olympic Games or World Championships were used to show the strength and success of the regime.

The most widespread means of propagandizing the communist regime was the results obtained at the Olympic Games, which increased Romania's prestige worldwide.

Romanian athletes who are successful internationally often become ambassadors for the country, and are a vector for Romania's image in the world. They are considered symbols of national values and identity.

Nadia Comăneci, Ilie Năstase, Gheorghe Hagi, are just a few of the athletes who have been extremely influential in promoting Romania's image internationally. Their success has helped consolidate the country's prestige on the world sporting map.

Romania made significant progress in sport during Nicolae Ceausescu's time in power between 1965 and 1989, which was reflected in outstanding performances at the Olympic Games. In the four editions held during this period - Montreal 1976, Moscow 1980, Los Angeles 1984 and Seoul 1988 - Romanian athletes achieved outstanding results, consistently ranking among the top ten nations in the world.

The communist regime particularly supported sports where outstanding international performances could be achieved. These included individual sports such as gymnastics, athletics, weightlifting, swimming and wrestling, but also team sports such as football and handball. Gymnastics, for example, was a very successful discipline for Romania during the communist period, and Romanian athletes won many Olympic and world medals.

Nadia Comăneci became a world legend and a symbol of the success of the communist regime with her 7 A's at the 1976 Olympic Games. Similar gymnastics victories were achieved by other sportswomen such as Ecaterina Szabo and Teodora Ungureanu.

Nicolae Ceausescu's regime had a profound impact on Nadia Comăneci's career and life. The Romanian Olympic Committee and the Romanian state invested heavily in gymnastics, and Nadia was considered an "ambassador" of the communist regime, being supported financially and organizationally to become a world champion. At the time, Romanian gymnasts benefited from rigorous preparation and training conditions, as well as some pressure from the authorities to bring home medals that reflected the regime's success.

Nadia came to international attention in 1976 at the Montreal Olympics, when she achieved the first perfect 10 in the history of Olympic gymnastics, a performance that sparked a real buzz and strengthened Romania's image in the world. This achievement had a considerable impact, not only in the field of sport, but also in international politics, given that Romania was a socialist country under communist rule.

Nadia was also under strict surveillance by the authorities at the time. Her career was closely linked to the imagination and manipulation of the communist regime. As Nadia became better known, the Romanian state used her achievements to promote the regime's image internationally. Sport was seen by the communist regime as a means to improve the country's prestige in the capitalist world and to showcase the achievements of socialism. In this context, Nadia and other athletes were often treated as "products" of the state, and their achievements were used to support communist ideology.

Romanian athletes also excelled in other sports such as swimming, rowing, handball and wrestling. In these fields, Romania won many medals at international competitions.

Many football clubs were associated with state institutions, such as Steaua Bucharest (military apparatus) and Dinamo Bucharest (Ministry of Interior). These teams benefited from considerable financial and administrative resources. Other long-established clubs, such as Rapid or Universitatea Cluj, were marginalized because they did not have direct links with the power institutions.

The communist regime used the performances of Romanian teams to show the superiority of the regime. Stele Bucharest's success in the 1986 European Champions Cup was presented as a triumph of the Nicolae Ceausescu regime. Players were often transformed into symbols of patriotism and devotion to the regime. Players like Gheorghe Hagi, Ilie Balaci and Helmuth Duckadam became legends of Romanian football. Footballers who wished to play abroad were often prevented from leaving until a certain age (usually 28) so as not to "leave their homeland."

After 1989, the influence of politics on football decreased and clubs had to adapt to the market economy. However, many believe that the communist period left deep marks on the organization and mentality of Romanian sport.

At the same time, the communist regime built sports facilities and athletics tracks, but also in supporting sports science, such as sports medicine and advanced training methods. However, sometimes the training methods were excessive, focused on performance at any cost. Iolanda Balaş, Maricica Puică and Doina Melinte are the most important personalities in Romanian athletics who won gold medals at the 1960, 1964 and 1984 Olympic Games. Although they achieved notable performances, there were suspicions of the use of doping substances to obtain better results, a phenomenon also seen in other communist countries. Performance was often achieved under intense pressure.

The sport of wrestling, both Greco-Roman and freestyle, has been another discipline in which Romania has been consistently successful. Romanian wrestlers such as Nicolae Martinescu and Ioan Silvăşan won medals at various Olympic Games.

Romania has also excelled in weightlifting, where Romanian athletes have won numerous gold, silver and bronze medals at the Olympic Games and World Championships, with notable examples such as Ivan Ghiţă and Toma Bălescu.

Romania achieved excellent results in rowing, where Romanian teams, especially in the 8 or 4 rowing events, won numerous gold and silver medals.

Athletes under the communist regime were not only athletes but also active members of the political system. Their careers were often influenced by party loyalty. Many athletes had the status of "professional workers" and were integrated into party structures or communist youth organizations. The fact that an athlete won medals at international competitions was used as a way of promoting communist ideology, and the regime made sure that they behaved according to the ideological norms it imposed. Elite athletes enjoyed certain privileges such as access to rare goods, better housing and social prestige. In return, they were closely monitored by the Securitate and had to maintain an image in line with the regime's values.

Athletes were seen as tools of political propaganda. When an athlete managed to win an Olympic medal, this victory was used to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime and communist ideology. However, athletes who failed to perform to expectations were often considered a "national disgrace" and the pressure on them was immense.

Sport was also used to show the superiority of the communist system over the West. During the Cold War, the Olympic Games became an arena of ideological competition, and the success of communist athletes against Western ones was seen as proof of the regime's efficiency and power.

Romanian athletes sometimes chose to stay abroad during competitions, fleeing the communist regime. Famous cases include footballers such as László Bölöni or gymnasts who chose not to return home.

Another form of foreign propaganda was the attempt to support less developed countries both materially and with specialists. For example, only in 1973, with the approval of the C.C.C. of the P.C.C.R. (A.N.R., Fond CC of the PCR, Propaganda and Agitation Section, file 3/1973), the C.N.E.F.S. sent several coaches, from disciplines where Romanian athletes were achieving good

results internationally, to countries with less tradition in practicing the respective sports: Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Albania, Syria, Upper Volta, Libya.

In 1973, (A.N.R., Fonds CC of the PCR, Propaganda and Agitation Section, file 3/1973) Fernand Sastre, president of the French Football Federation, wrote to N. Ceaușescu asking him to intervene with "the Romanian sports authorities to allow the arrival in France of Mr. Stefan Kovacs and to strengthen the friendly relations between our two countries".

In 1977, Nicolae Ceaușescu personally, while watching the competition on television, ordered the withdrawal of the women's gymnastics team from the European Championships in Prague. This was because of the abuses committed by the refereeing brigades against the Romanian gymnasts in order to favor the Soviet delegation, which "had" to show the world that the Soviet Union was "the leading country in sport" through the results obtained by its athletes. (Kukuskin G.L., 1955) The process of formation of international sports structures began in the second half of the 19th century, diversified in the inter-war period and intensified after World War II (Matache C., 2006).

International sports structures under the communist regime were also used as a propaganda tool, with national prestige often placed before sport itself. Sport was subordinated to state ideology and participation in international competitions had clear political goals. The first Romanian sports structures became affiliated to specialized international bodies in the first part of the last century, but Romania did not join the entire international competition system until the 50s.

Between the 1950s and the 1980s, Romanian athletes took part in competitions reserved for athletes from socialist countries, which were organized according to the rules of international sports federations: the military spartachiades organized in rotation in the member countries under the aegis of the Sports Committee of the Friendly Armies (CSAP) based in Moscow; spartachiades of athletes belonging to the clubs of the Ministries of the Interior, also called "Dinamoviade"; spartachiades of athletes belonging to the clubs of the craft cooperative system, competitions of trade union clubs, competitions of railwaymen from the socialist countries.

Since 1986, Romanian athletes have participated, on the basis of nominal invitations, alongside the best athletes in the world, in the "Goodwill Games", a multi-sport competition between the USA and the USSR (Russia), organized every four years, in rotation, in the middle of the Olympic cycle. The competition was the result of the loosening of Soviet-American relations after Mikhail Gorbachev's accession to the Soviet leadership (1985). The involvement of Romania, through its athletes, in this sporting competition was a desperate measure by Nicolae Ceaușescu to mitigate his political isolation from both Moscow and Washington.

The most powerful blow to the Ceaușescu regime's image in the West was linked to sport. This was Romania's non-alignment with the boycott of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, a decision accepted by all the other communist bloc states at Moscow's express request (Hoberman J, 1990).

On July 28, 1984, at the Colosseum Stadium in Los Angeles, during the opening ceremony of the XXIII edition of the Olympic Games, the Romanian delegation was given a particularly warm welcome by the 92,655 spectators. Apart from the host country team, the Romanian delegation was the most cheered delegation (Alexandrescu H, 1985).

This was part of a wider boycott organized by the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc states in response to the United States-led boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics. The New York Times (quoted in ProSport, July 17, 2009) reported in July 2008 that the US had paid \$39 120 000 to Romania not to join the boycott of other communist countries in support of its participation in the Los Angeles Olympics (Pro Sport, 2009).

The 1984 boycott was coordinated by the Soviet Union, which invited several Warsaw Pact countries (including Romania) and other communist countries not to participate in the competitions

in Los Angeles. The reasons cited were security concerns and the alleged politicization of the 1984 Olympics, as well as dissatisfaction with US foreign policy.

Romania, led at the time by Nicolae Ceausescu, chose not to participate in the boycott imposed by the Soviet Union, and Romanian teams took part in the 1984 Olympics. Romania won 53 medals at those Games, including 20 gold, 16 silver and 17 bronze, making it one of the countries that performed remarkably well.

Juan Antonio Samaranch, president of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) at the time, honored Ceaușescu with the Olympic Order, a prestigious distinction awarded for outstanding contributions to the Olympic movement. Samaranch later made it clear that this decoration was not a gesture of support for Ceaușescu's authoritarian regime, but a recognition of his decision to participate in the Games, which had positive implications for the future of Olympism.

After the 1989, Revolution and the fall of the communist regime, Samaranch emphasized that the awarding of the Olympic Order was not related to Romania's domestic politics, but to its role in ensuring a more balanced participation in the Olympic Games, mitigating the effects of the Eastern boycott.

CONCLUSION

Sport in Romania has been and continues to be an effective means of political propaganda. From the consolidation of the communist regime to gaining popular support in the post-1989 democracy, sport provides a platform for politicians to influence public opinion and associate their image with national success.

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Author presentation

After completing master's studies, I was admitted to the Interdisciplinary Doctoral School in Brasov ,in September 2022.

As a PhD student in the discipline of physical education and sport, my goal is to improve the motor and functional ability of students from non-professional specializations as well as to teach the practical elements of basic gymnastics and acrobatics to students from the specialization of physical education and sport.

For the discipline of Physical Education, together with my colleagues, I would like to lay the foundations for new sports disciplines that will attract as many students as possible in this field.

Football, a factor of globalization

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Abstract: Football, the most popular sport globally, is a global phenomenon, being considered one of the most important factors of globalization that continues to play an essential role in promoting values such as team spirit, respect and perseverance. From a simple sports game, football has become a real complex social phenomenon.

In our study, we aimed to address a phenomenon increasingly encountered both on and off the football field. Thus, we analyzed the incidents triggered during the Romania vs. Kosovo football match, which resulted in the Kosovo team leaving the field with only two minutes of play remaining. We also discussed a more severe incident that led to the outbreak of a war, the so-called "Football War." We deemed it necessary to analyze the behavior of players, as many specialists argue that the spectacle of football has turned into a stage for violence, with these violent tendencies among players being driven by the athletes' anxiety.

Keywords: football, global phenomenon, globalization, anxiety

Football, the most popular sport globally, is a global phenomenon, being considered one of the most important factors of globalization that continues to play an essential role in promoting values such as team spirit, respect and perseverance. From a simple sports game, football has become a real complex social phenomenon.(2)

In the current context, the focus is increasingly on inclusion, diversity and sustainability, which makes football a powerful tool for education and social cohesion. The role of the ambassadors of this sport is to inspire future generations, promote fair play and support initiatives that contribute to the development of this global phenomenon.

In his ethnological analysis, Christian Bromberger notes that football evolved into a "small but extremely serious thing", gaining "academic legitimacy" in England in the 1970s and becoming a well-defined field of research today.

Shortly before the start of the Paris 2024 Olympics, a Parisian magazine publishes detailed information about football, highlighting its links with various societies and highlighting its status as a global sport. Football is considered by some to be the most practiced sport worldwide and is perceived as a complex social phenomenon, in which the public plays an essential role.

The first researches, carried out especially by sports journalists, focused on the legends and history of football as a phenomenon of global proportions. Subsequent studies have sought to analyze the social and political impact of the sport, as well as its organizational structure and day-to-day functioning, including controversies and scandals that reflect the dynamics of society as a whole.

From this perspective, social psychology and ethnography analyze in particular themes such as "the revitalization of nationalisms", social identity, relations between different groups, the hooliganic behaviors of supporters and their involvement in the phenomenon of "collective disorder". (1)

Other research on football addresses its economic dimension, including labour migration, with a particular focus on the migration of English players between 1945 and 1995. Nowadays, football has become a topic of major interest in the fields of communication and media, being considered a global phenomenon and described as "the supreme stage of globalization."(16)

Recent studies present another aspect, namely that the game of football is perceived as a form of addiction for the public, a psychological regression, a return to archaic models or an activity characteristic of a certain social class. Also, some specialists believe that researchers tend to ignore the important role that football can play as a "cultural and symbolic binder". (3,8)

Football has become the success story that dominates the twentieth century, due to the superior valences that. (20)

Sport brings people together. At its best, it contributes to their health and happiness by breaking down barriers and creating trust and community spirit. For more than four decades, the Council of Europe has supported fair play and respect in sport, fighting corruption and contributing to the practice of sport that is safe, ethical and accessible to all. This work contributes to the creation of inclusive democratic societies that respect human rights and the state.(24)

In a society of the twenty-first century, where the principles and rules of civilization promote tolerance and respect for the fundamental rights of every person, and xenophobic, extremist and intolerant manifestations seem to be, paradoxically, more frequent than exceptional, it is no coincidence that this dark side of society often comes to light in the context of sporting events.

Initially, the Olympics represented the essence of the Olympic spirit, including games, observance of the principles of fair play, control of aggressive impulses and the establishment of a truce between opponents. Today, however, it has become a competition between individuals and nations, an opportunity to gain fame, financial gain, admiration, and the desire to dominate.

Aggressive instincts manifest themselves obviously within the limits set by the sports rules, and the social need to belong to a group is reflected in the support of a team or a representative team, often degenerating in an irrational way.

Sportsmanship has also changed, it is not necessarily the favorite team that proves to be more talented and wins the match, but rather the feeling that "we" are beating "them". The frustrations and dissatisfactions of everyday life are, in a surprising way, transferred to the sports context, and a victory in this field becomes an event of national scope.

"Games and sports in highly competitive Western societies are characterized by anything but cooperativeness."

Sport has become, in the modern world, the only activity in which violence is accepted. Therefore, in order to understand the violence associated with sport, we must not limit ourselves only to acts of interpersonal aggression on the field, but also to the mentality specific to this form of sports organization within our society.

In this context, the football match between Romania and Kosovo who met in the Nations League is also part of it, when in the minutes of extra time, at 0-0, Amir Rrahmani, the Kosovar captain and player for Napoli, had a physical conflict with Denis Alibec, who reacted in his turn. In a tense context, apparently premeditated by the visiting team, they caused an incident in the last minutes of extra time, when it was obvious that they could no longer get the victory. The behavior of the Kosovars aroused the discontent of the supporters on the pitch, who began to chant the name of Serbia, a country with which Kosovo continues to have an unresolved conflict.

This moment caused the Kosovo team, coached by Franco Foda, to leave the field, although there were only two minutes left to play.

This is where the Kosovo team's tense show began, with captain Rrahmani leading his teammates off the pitch. This gesture was perceived as a defiance of the Danish referee brigade, which refused to suspend the match. Given that only the Romanian team remained on the field, the discussions continued. At first, the Kosovar coach, Franco Foda, seemed willing to accept the resumption of the game for the remaining two minutes, and the match was to restart with a free kick in favor of Romania, from the corner of the box, on the right side.

After almost an hour of waiting, during which the Kosovo team remained in the locker rooms, and the Romanian players endured the cold, with temperatures of -2 degrees Celsius at midnight, referee Krogh returned to the field and blew the final whistle, in the absence of the Kosovars.

Amir Rrahmani, the defender of the Kosovo team, said: "After we entered the dressing room, the fans started shouting even louder 'Kosovo is Serbia'. At that moment, we decided not to return to the field," according to Telegraf Sport.

Tensions continued at the press conference, where the visiting team maintained a provocative and confrontational attitude.

The tense relations between Romania and Kosovo seem to be getting worse, especially in the context of the September 2023 match at the National Arena, played in the Euro 2024 qualifiers.

Although Romania won 2-0, the game was marked by an incident that led to a 49-minute interruption due to chants from the stands. Before the meeting, the Romanian Football Federation had initiated a campaign calling on supporters to avoid challenges addressed to the visiting team.

The main heroes of these political disputes on the football fields become the supporters, numerous studies reporting on the emotions they experience at football shows, (23), about the way the supporters manage their emotions, feelings, (17), or the rivalry between the fans of the teams on the field.(9)

Some research has also revealed the violence on numerous levels. (21, 22)

At the press conference, coach Mircea Lucescu had a vehement reaction, criticizing a behavior that, in his opinion, should not exist at such a competitive level.

Mircea Lucescu, Romania's coach, said: "Nothing happened against them. Nothing was said about Kosovo, no banners were displayed, nothing. Their behavior shows that everything was prepared for such a situation. Certainly, it was premeditated."

The incident was also reported by the biggest sports publications in Europe. L'Equipe noted: "Romania - Kosovo, interrupted due to racist chants from the public."

The Serbian supporters of Red Star Belgrade also had numerous reactions to the incidents in Romania, at the National Arena, painting graffiti on a building in Kraljevo. The painting made by Serbian supporters represents the flags of Serbia and Romania along with the following messages: **"Orthodox brothers! Kosovo and Serbia! Bessarabia is Romania!"**

On November 24, 2024, the UEFA Disciplinary Committee officially announced the result of the Romania-Kosovo match in the Nations League, in which the Romanian team won 3-0, but the Romanian Football Federation was fined 128,000 euros.

Romania will play an official match without supporters in the stands, which will lead to financial losses that can reach up to one million euros.

The Kosovo players, who incited the public and displayed indecent gestures when leaving the field, were not sanctioned. The Kosovo federation was fined €6,000 for "inappropriate behaviour", without further details.

The incidents during the match took place in a very delicate political context, due to the emergence of government policies that run football both nationally and internationally.(15)

Kosovo proclaimed its independence from Serbia in 2008 after a violent conflict in the 1990s. However, not all governments recognize Kosovo as a sovereign state, among the countries that have not accepted it are Romania, Spain, Greece, Cyprus, Slovakia and, of course, Serbia. In this context, UEFA's decision could include measures to prevent future meetings between Romania and Kosovo, given recent events.

Kosovo, officially **the Republic of Kosovo**, a partially recognized state and disputed territory, located on the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe, which declared its independence from Serbia in February 2008.

Kosovo was a province of Yugoslavia, with a long history under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, and since 1918 it has been part of the federal state of Belgrade.

After its dissolution following the German-Italian occupation of 1941-1944, Kosovo was annexed to Albania, which in turn was part of fascist Italy.

After 1944, the region returned to the authority of the new Yugoslav communist state led by Josip Broz Tito, but benefited from considerable autonomy.

After Tito's death, the authorities in Belgrade began to put increasing pressure for the integration of the province into Serbia, and this step was materialized in 1989 under the leadership of Slobodan Milošević.

UN Security Council Resolution 1244 of 1999 gave Kosovo a "significant autonomy" within Yugoslavia. Supported by most Western countries, including the United States, Kosovo forces unilaterally declared independence in 2008.

In 2010, the UN's International Court of Justice ruled that Kosovo's declaration of independence did not violate international law.

So far, 99 states out of the 193 members of the UN have recognized Kosovo, but Russia and China, permanent members of the Security Council, have not done so, thus blocking Kosovo's accession to the UN.

At the same time, five of the 27 member states of the European Union (Spain, Romania, Greece, Slovakia and Cyprus) have not recognized Kosovo's independence.

Serbian supporters reacted immediately after the events of the Romania-Kosovo match at the National Arena.

After the match, Red Star Belgrade fans made a graffiti on a street in Kraljevo, through which they wanted to express their solidarity with the Romanian supporters. The graffiti featured the flags of Serbia and Romania, accompanied by the messages: "Orthodox brothers! Kosovo and Serbia! Bessarabia is Romania!", according to the source Casual Romania. In competitions organized by UEFA, such messages are strictly prohibited.

There are also other political, military or diplomatic conflicts that prevent football matches from being played, such as Armenia – Azerbaijan, Serbia – Kosovo, Spain – Gibraltar and Russia – Ukraine.

Due to the invasion of Ukraine by the Russian army on February 24, 2022, measures have been taken regarding sports competitions.

Thus, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) issued a statement asking international sports structures to cancel the events that were to be held in Russia or Belarus.

At the same time as these actions, many teams have stopped participating in sports actions in Russia, and some European and international sports federations have imposed indirect sanctions on Russia and Belarus, including the disqualification or withdrawal of football teams.

There are few studies that present the cruel truth that exists behind disputes on the football field, and present the truth about supporters, tradition, history, conflicts, Buhler and Nufer (2012), Ferrand and McCarthy (2008), because extremely complicated relationships have been created between sport and politics.

Nelson Mandela, 2000, at the first Laureus Awards ceremony "Sport has the ability to transform the world. It manages to unite people in a unique way, difficult to achieve by other means. It is a form of communication that young people understand instinctively. Sport brings hope where despair reigns and has greater power than governments in removing racial barriers. It defies any form of discrimination. The heroes that sport gives birth to are proof of this strength. They are brave not only on the ground, but also in their communities, where they inspire and offer hope to people around the world.

But unfortunately some disputes on the field even led to the outbreak of wars, the "Football War" or "Guerra del futbol" being a military conflict that broke out between El Salvador and Honduras, triggered after a football match between the two Central American teams.

Although there were some military tensions, the event that triggered the "100 Hour War" was the confrontation of June 26, 1969, held as part of the qualifiers for the 1970 World Cup.

The conflicts between the two Central American states had older roots. While in El Salvador the four million inhabitants lived on a small area of 21,146 km², a similar population in Honduras enjoyed a much more generous territory, of 112,088 km². (5)

In 1969, in the midst of the qualifying campaign for the World Cup in Mexico, Honduras and El Salvador faced each other in two play-off matches for a place in the tournament. The first game, held on June 6, 1969, in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, takes place in the context of a teachers' strike. They, as a form of protest, scatter nails on the roads, causing numerous punctures of rubber. Among those affected are the players of the El Salvador team, who interpret the incident as a deliberate act of sabotage.

The game itself was extremely tense, and the Honduran national team managed to win 1-0, thanks to a goal scored by Welsh in the last moments of the game. Enthusiastic about the victory, the hosts' supporters set fire to the stadium in celebration!

The second match took place on June 15, 1969, in San Salvador, where the Honduran team was received in an extremely hostile atmosphere. Honduras' national symbols, such as the flag and coat of arms, were desecrated, and the hotel where the players were staying was set on fire by angry locals. After moving to a new location, the footballers were kept awake all night by noisy serenades under their windows.

The victory went to the team from El Salvador and won with a score of 3-0.

The decisive match scheduled for June 27 in Mexico City attracted huge attention throughout the Central American region. Newspapers and radio stations dedicated ample space to this event, and thousands of fans from Honduras and El Salvador headed for the Mexican capital, wanting either to attend the match or to be as close as possible to the epicenter of the action.

Following a balanced confrontation marked by numerous acts of violence, El Salvador won with a score of 3-2.

An explosion of violence engulfs spectators outside the stadium, where fighting and chaos result in casualties and injuries, surpassing the capacity of Mexico City hospitals to handle the situation.

The losers launch accusations of corruption against the referees and unfair behavior against the winning team. The threats and insults, initially subtle and unofficial, quickly become direct, involving even the highest political levels of the two states. A few hours after the end of the match, Honduras decides to break diplomatic relations with El Salvador.

On July 14, the conflict known as the "football war" escalates, and El Salvador initiates military operations.

These include both ground attacks, where they mobilize 12,000 soldiers, and air strikes. Within a day, the Salvadoran army occupied several cities, but the advance was halted due to lack of fuel, after Honduras, better prepared in terms of aviation, bombed the oil depots in Acajutla.

For El Salvador, the return of refugees has caused considerable economic hardship, but it has also led to an intensification of guerrilla warfare and the outbreak of a civil war.

In 1976, the two countries agreed to resolve the conflict with the help of a Peruvian mediator.

It was not until 1980, in Lima, that a peace treaty was signed that provided for the peaceful resolution of border disputes.

There are also numerous examples of this kind, in which the football spectacle turned into a violent scene, but specialists believe that these violent outbursts of the players are determined by the anxiety of the athletes. (4)

According to the Psychological Encyclopedia (Kazdin, 2000), anxiety is defined as an emotion marked by states of tension, worrying thoughts and physiological changes, such as increased blood pressure, muscle tension, palpitations, feeling faint, headaches, nausea, feeling empty in the stomach.

Holdevici (2002, 13) - Highlights that anxiety is a "vague" fear, lacking a clearly defined object, and emphasizes that an anxious person feels constantly threatened, living in a perpetual state of restlessness, without fully understanding what exactly causes this fear.

This aspect is very important in the current context, which coaches must also take into account because conflicts on the field can easily turn into disasters.

In the sports context, especially the football one, anxiety occurs when the athlete is afraid that he will not respond appropriately to the situations or incidents that have arisen during the match.(10)

Specialists have defined this state of anxiety among footballers as a succession of events that unfold over time, each triggering the following: a stressful factor leads to the perception of danger, which, in turn, generates the state of anxiety. (7)

Starting from this state of anxiety manifested during sports competitions, specialists have come to the conclusion that the ability to regulate emotions can translate into emotional intelligence in sports. This has been defined -the aggregated or overall capacity of an individual to act with purpose, think rationally, and navigate the environment they are part of.(19)

Salovey and Mayer (1990) defined emotional intelligence as "the ability to monitor one's own feelings and emotions, as well as those of others, to differentiate between them, and to use information to guide an individual's thinking and action." (19)

Analyzing the subject from the perspective of sport, the literature reveals that) have highlighted the link between emotional intelligence and sports activity, emphasizing that athletes tend to accept the emotions they experience without analyzing them critically and constructively.(14)

Meyer (2007) points out that emotional intelligence includes various components, such as perceiving and managing emotions, that play a significant role in optimizing performance.

Laborde, Dosseville, Allen highlight, based on the analyzed research, that athletes with a high level of emotional intelligence, tend to achieve better results and be more successful both mentally and physically, contributing to improved performance and satisfaction related to it.(13)

Finally, the European political socialization of the individual was achieved by combining a logic of involvement, by participating in specially designed activities, with one of competences summarized in knowledge about the EU. The analyzed campaign is part of the double approach necessary for public actors: resizing the place of politics in society and resuming the way of communicating with the public.

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Study on the optimization of the physical component of the training process at the level of juniors a by educating the motor quality resistance

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Abstract: *The theme chosen by us is a topic of great relevance, its importance consisting in trying to find some means and methods for developing motor quality - resistance, which, in the end, contributes to good physical training. Following the implementation of the training program, the results of the football team (juniors A) had a remarkable progression, the team physically performed well and the results confirm what they said.*

Keywords: *resistance, football, athlete, the ball, technical elements.*

INTRODUCTION

Instructive-educational methods are treated differently by specialists in the field, but some of them are used by teachers or permanent coaches: Exercise, personal example, conviction, praise and punishment. The teacher or coach is obliged to know the method of education by persuasion, because its consequences are different. The main weapon is the word.

Moving from teaching in physical education classes to training in football, it should be noted that during the speech the pronouncement of phrases will be slow, following the reaction of the auditor. If questions, misunderstandings or doubts arise from what the coach has reported, the explanations need to be repeated.

In this regard, speaking to a group of players or all team members, the stamp should be increased only if the player is remote, during a friendly or official match, when the conversation becomes difficult due to the presence of the spectators.

At the level of the junior A performance teams, we are witnessing a continuous acceleration of the pace of play. There is also an increase in the force of the attack but also of the defense in the sense that very well trained players appear.

PROBLEM STATEMENT

Motor skills must be discovered and improved by knowing the internal support, on which any of the body's movements are based (Macquet, A-C., Fleurance, F., 2006. pg. 313).

The motor measures of the body are materialized in the harmony and ease of motor expression in various bodily, playful, sporting or expression activities (Hale, D., Lauzon, L., quoted in Neagu, N., 2010, pg. 35), by performing motor activities, requiring either one or more parts or an assembly of body parts, which require the intervention and coordination of important muscle groups (Rigas, E., quoted in Neagu, N., 2010, pg. 35).

Prof. Dragnea Adrian considers that the motor act is a basic element of any movement, performed to build a motor action. This can be reflected as a reflex act (Dragnea, A., Bota, A., 1999, p. pg. 35).

The variety of content and form, the variety of functions performed by human motor activities, carried out at the most diverse ages, whether those with so-called direct or indirect actions, are characterized by the omnipresence of the formative function (Neagu, N., 2012, p. 21).

As an organized educational and educational process, performance sport is a bilateral process, in which, under the leadership of the specialists, subjects are systematically subjected to influences in constant accordance with the objectives of sport in general and those for each stage regarding the improvement of physical development and motor capacity (Turcanu, F., 2013, pp. 9).

The development of general resistance can be achieved using the following methods (Turcanu, F., Turcanu, D.S., 2010, pg. 70):

- Method of uniform efforts
- Method of variable efforts
- Method of repeated efforts
- Interval training method.

In the training of the players, we start from the premise that the athlete is coachable and also that his level of performance capacity changes in a positive sense (Drăgan, A., 2012, pg.7).

The content of the football game must be known both by players and, more importantly, by specialists. Efficiency in the game is demonstrated by the players; they are the ones who demonstrate during the 90 minutes, all the knowledge accumulated in the training process, a process elaborated and led by the coaches (Turcanu, F., Dragan, A., 2014, pg.24).

METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH

Purpose of the study

The main goal was to design a set of exercises specific to the game of football and its implementation in the sample of subjects (Juniors A) with the role of improving the indices of motor quality – endurance.

The main objective of the study

The acquisition of theoretical knowledge in the field of football, one of the important means of education in general in relation to harmonious physical development, the development of motor quality – resistance, training and improvement of basic and specific motor skills.

The general hypothesis

We assume that by creating and implementing a specially designed set of exercises with specific means of playing football in juniors A (experimental group), we can record higher indices of basic motor quality – resistance to final testing compared to the initial one, but also results close to the norms and requirements of the Romanian Football Federation, specific to this motor quality.

Working methods

Analytical methods – the study of bibliographic materials

Descriptive methods – observation

The experimental method

Method of organizing and presenting data.

The graphic method

Mathematical-statistical method

Method of classification/ordering

The comparison/reporting method

To determine the performance level of motor quality – endurance, we used running over a distance of 2000 meters (control test used for testing junior football players):

Assigned score: (Table 2)

Table 2

PUNCTE	14-15 ani	16 ani	17 ani	18 ani	19-20 ani
100	6.04	5.57	5.57	5.49	5.59
95	6.49	6.40	6.45	6.33	6.35
90	7.07	6.58	7.01	6.50	6.52
85	7.20	7.11	7.12	7.03	7.04
80	7.30	7.22	7.20	7.12	7.13
75	7.39	7.31	7.28	7.21	7.22
70	7.47	7.40	7.35	7.29	7.30
65	7.55	7.47	7.42	7.37	7.38
60	8.03	7.55	7.48	7.44	7.45
55	8.10	8.02	7.54	7.51	7.52
50	8.17	8.10	8.00	7.58	7.59
45	8.25	8.17	8.06	8.06	8.06
40	8.33	8.25	8.13	8.13	8.13
35	8.41	8.34	8.20	8.21	8.21
30	8.50	8.43	8.27	8.30	8.30
25	9.01	8.53	8.35	8.40	8.40
20	9.13	9.04	8.46	8.52	8.51
15	9.28	9.18	8.59	9.06	9.07
10	9.49	9.37	9.21	9.25	9.32
5	10.22	10.07	10.03	9.55	10.15
0					

Research Methods

➤ *Technical complex 1:*

The athlete throws from the edge into the line. Athlete B moves toward A, takes a 180 degree turn, picks up the ball and crosses the ball. Athlete A goes on the long corner of the field (10 m) and C on the short corner. The completion is done alternately (Figure 1):




Figure 1

➤ *Technical complex 2:*

The athletes are arranged in groups of 3 such: Athletes B and C near the side bars of the football goal at a distance of 1.5 m., while the athlete A (with the ball) at the side of the field. The athlete A

cu performs a autopasa, followed by the ball centering in the box to clear the other two who, through energetic execution, hit the ball as far away as possible from the goal. The athlete who has not released, runs a run launched to retrieve the ball (Figure 2):




Figure 2

➤ **Technical complex 3:**

Two strikers (X1 and X2), half-way with the ball, try to overcome an athlete as a defender (O) by a two or two preceded by doubling. The two later perform a goal-cut (Figure 3):




Figure 3

Findings

Table 2 resistance 2000 m. (sec.) Experimental group

No crt.	Name and first name	Initial testing	Final testing
1.	V.S.	7'40"	7'10"
2.	F.B.	7'58"	7'35"
3.	B.R.	7'30"	7'10"
4.	M.C.	7'43"	7'13"
5.	B.B.	7'44"	7'21"
6.	G.C.	7'43"	7'13"
7.	U.M	7'12"	7'00"
8.	K.B.	7'45"	7'15"
9.	R.R.	7'54"	7'44"
10.	S.C.	8'02"	7'44"

11.	B.P.	7'15"	7'05"
12.	M.Z.	7'58"	7'38"
13.	M.T.	7'30"	7'25"
14.	G.E.	7'43"	7'30"
15.	T.A.	7'24"	7'11"
16.	T.R.	8'43"	8'13"
17.	D.L.	7'12"	7'00"
18.	D.E.	7'24"	7'02"
19.	K.G.	7'34"	7'31"
20.	T.S.	7'05"	6'34"
21.	I.C.	7'15"	6'00"
22.	V.D.	6'58"	6'28"
23.	H.D.	7'30"	7'11"
AVERAGE		7'37"	7'10"


The test values converted from seconds to points (according to F.R.F table) corresponding to the experimental group are shown in Table 3:

Table 3 resistance 2000 m. (points)/ experimental group


<i>No crt.</i>	<i>Name and first name</i>	<i>Initial testing</i>	<i>Final testing</i>
1.	V.S.	60	80
2.	F.B.	50	65
3.	B.R.	70	80
4.	M.C.	60	75
5.	B.B.	60	75
6.	G.C.	60	75
7.	U.M	80	85
8.	K.B.	60	75
9.	R.R.	50	60
10.	S.C.	45	60
11.	B.P.	75	80
12.	M.Z.	50	60
13.	M.T.	70	70
14.	G.E.	60	65
15.	T.A.	70	80
16.	T.R.	20	75
17.	D.L.	80	85
18.	D.E.	70	85
19.	K.G.	65	65
20.	T.S.	80	90
21.	I.C.	75	95
22.	V.D.	90	95
23.	H.D.	70	80
AVERAGE		63,91	76,30

DISCUSSIONS

From the study of tables, a progress can be observed between the resistance values (expressed in seconds) of the two tests corresponding to the experimental group: Initial and final testing. This progress is exemplified by Figure 4:

**Figure 4**

Also, from the study of tables, a progress can be seen between the resistance values converted into points of the two tests corresponding to the experimental group: Initial and final testing. This progress is exemplified by Figure 5:

**Figure 5**

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

Following the conduct of this study, the research hypothesis is confirmed in the sense that, by introducing specific technical complexes for football games in juniors A (experimental group), we can record higher indices of basic motor qualities – resistance to final testing compared to initial testing. Following the implementation of the training program, the results of the football team

(juniors A) had a remarkable progression, the team physically performed well and the results confirm what they said.

Recommendations

Diversifying the content of the training for the secondary school students by introducing the game of football in the physical education classes;

The most diverse use of the technical elements and procedures of the football game in the football terminal classes;

Using as many teaching materials and diversifying means in order to attract physical education classes in sports classes but also in training.

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Conclusions (French)

Ce volume spécial, *UE et ses Voisins*, constitue une contribution significative au domaine académique des études européennes en abordant un large éventail de sujets interconnectés qui soulignent la complexité, la pertinence et le dynamisme de l'Union européenne ainsi que ses relations avec les régions voisines. Édité par **Mihaela Natea, PhD**, et **Simion Costea, PhD**, ce volume fait preuve d'une cohérence exceptionnelle et d'une vision unificatrice qui reflète l'engagement durable de l'UE envers le multiculturalisme, l'intégration et la résilience.

La valeur académique de cet ouvrage réside dans son approche critique et multidisciplinaire, englobant l'histoire, la religion, les guerres hybrides, la migration, l'élargissement de l'UE et la résilience humaine. Des chercheurs issus de divers horizons et affiliations explorent ces thématiques, offrant des perspectives novatrices et des analyses originales qui renforcent le rôle de l'UE en tant qu'acteur global et défenseur de l'unité, de la stabilité et de la diversité.

Dans la **Section 1: Histoire, Religion et Sociétés Multiculturelles**, **Prof. Dr. HDR Hedi Saidi** (*Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur et Chevalier des Palmes Académiques, Université Catholique de Lille, France*) examine les récits de victimisation et de souffrance, apportant des éclairages critiques sur la construction du discours victimaire. **Mohsen Neffati, PhD** (*Université de Sfax, Tunisie*) explore la laïcité en tant que valeur occidentale ayant un potentiel universel, contribuant à une compréhension nuancée de la religion et du sécularisme dans les contextes multiculturels. **Saoudi Bilel, PhD** (*Université de Tunis, Tunisie*) offre une étude historique des communautés européennes en Tunisie pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale, établissant un pont entre les récits européens et nord-africains. **Maria Costea, PhD** (*Académie Roumaine*) et **Simion Costea, PhD** (*GGI Bruxelles*) se penchent sur les négociations de Lambeth de 1930 et leur pertinence pour les efforts d'unité apostolique, soulignant l'importance durable du dialogue religieux dans le cadre multiculturel européen.

La **Section 2: Élargissement de l'UE** met l'accent sur les défis géopolitiques contemporains. **Mykola Kapitonenko, PhD** (*Université nationale Taras Shevchenko de Kyiv, Ukraine*) analyse de manière critique le chemin vers la victoire de l'Ukraine dans sa guerre contre la Russie, apportant des perspectives précieuses sur le voisinage oriental de l'UE. **Marcu-Andrei Solomon** (*Free Russia Foundation, Bureau de Bruxelles, Belgique*) met en lumière les domaines d'action critiques pour préparer la République de Moldavie à l'intégration dans l'UE, soulignant le rôle de l'UE dans la promotion de la stabilité et des réformes en Europe de l'Est. **Aysegul Zengin, PhD** (*Université de Tallinn, Estonie*) examine les implications des technologies de "deepfake", mettant en évidence les défis et solutions potentielles dans le contexte de l'environnement post-vérité de l'UE.

Dans la **Section 3: Renforcer la Résilience: Politiques et Dimensions Humaines**, les contributeurs abordent la capacité de l'UE à promouvoir la résilience. **Angelika Kleszczewska-Albińska, PhD** (*Université de Lodz, Pologne*) propose un programme préventif pour développer la résilience psychologique dans les régions voisines des conflits, offrant des solutions pratiques pour renforcer la sécurité humaine dans l'UE. **Tacşa Andreea-Maria, PhD** (*UMFST, Roumanie*) explore l'interaction entre le sport et la politique étrangère pendant le régime communiste, approfondissant les aspects historiques et culturels de la résilience européenne. **Mircea Ungur, PhD**, **Edit Laura Ciulea, PhD**, et **Irina Mihaela Trifan, PhD** (*UMFST, Roumanie*) analysent la mondialisation à travers le prisme du football, illustrant la capacité de l'UE à influencer les tendances culturelles mondiales. **Țurcanu Florin, PhD**, **Szabo-Csiffo Barna, PhD**, **Laurențiu Magdaș, PhD**, et **Dana Simona Țurcanu, PhD** (*UMFST, Roumanie*) présentent une étude sur l'optimisation des processus d'entraînement physique pour les athlètes juniors, contribuant aux discussions sur la santé et l'éducation dans le cadre de l'UE.

Ce volume illustre la diversité des disciplines et des sujets qui définissent les études européennes. Les contributions couvrent des domaines tels que l'histoire, la religion, les relations internationales, le sport, la psychologie et la géopolitique, mettant en lumière l'étendue des thématiques essentielles pour comprendre la nature multiforme de l'UE. La répartition géographique des auteurs—représentant l'Estonie, la France, la Belgique, la Tunisie, l'Algérie, l'Ukraine, la Pologne et la Roumanie—met en valeur les connexions globales de l'UE et l'engagement académique partagé pour relever les enjeux pressants.

En favorisant la pensée critique et en embrassant des perspectives diverses, ce volume souligne le rôle de l'UE en tant que force unificatrice dans un monde complexe et en rapide évolution. Il constitue une ressource inestimable pour les chercheurs, les décideurs et les étudiants engagés dans la promotion de l'intégration européenne, le renforcement de la résilience et la célébration de la diversité qui définit le projet européen.

Conclusions (English)

This special volume, *EU and its Neighbors*., provides a significant contribution to the academic field of European Studies by addressing a wide spectrum of interconnected topics that underscore the complexity, relevance, and dynamism of the European Union and its relationships with neighboring regions. Edited by **Mihaela Natea, PhD**, and **Simion Costea, PhD**, this volume demonstrates exceptional coherence and a unifying vision that reflects the EU's enduring commitment to multiculturalism, integration, and resilience.

The academic value of this volume lies in its critical and multidisciplinary approach, encompassing history, religion, hybrid warfare, migration, EU enlargement, and human resilience. Scholars from diverse backgrounds and affiliations explore these themes, providing fresh perspectives and innovative analyses that reinforce the EU's role as a global actor and advocate for unity, stability, and diversity.

In **Section 1: History, Religion, and Multicultural Societies**, **Prof. Dr. HDR Hedi Saidi** (Chevalier de la Légion d'honneur et Chevalier des Palmes Académiques, Université Catholique de Lille, France) examines the narratives of victimization and suffering, offering critical insights into the construction of victimhood discourse. **Mohsen Neffati, PhD** (University of Sfax, Tunisia) explores laïcité as a Western value with universal potential, contributing to a nuanced understanding of religion and secularism in multicultural contexts. **Saoudi Bilel, PhD** (Université de Tunis, Tunisia) provides a historical study of European communities in Tunisia during World War II, bridging European and North African narratives. **Maria Costea, PhD (Romanian Academy)**, and **Simion Costea, PhD** (GGI Brussels), delve into the 1930 Lambeth negotiations and their relevance to apostolic unity efforts, highlighting the enduring significance of religious dialogue in Europe's multicultural framework.

Section 2: EU Enlargement shifts the focus to contemporary geopolitical challenges. **Mykola Kapitonenko, PhD** (Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Ukraine) critically analyzes Ukraine's path to victory in its war against Russia, offering valuable insights into the EU's Eastern neighborhood. **Marcu-Andrei Solomon** (Free Russia Foundation, Brussels Office, Belgium) highlights the critical focus areas for preparing the Republic of Moldova for EU integration, emphasizing the EU's role in promoting stability and reform in Eastern Europe. **Aysegul Zengin, PhD** (Tallinn University, Estonia) examines the implications of deepfake technology, shedding light on its challenges and potential solutions within the EU's post-truth environment.

In **Section 3: Building-Up Resilience: Policies and Human Dimensions**, the contributors address the EU's capacity to foster resilience. **Angelika Kleszczewska-Albińska, PhD** (University of Lodz, Poland) outlines a preventive program for developing psychological resilience in conflict-adjacent regions, offering practical solutions to strengthen the EU's human security. **Tacşa Andreea-Maria, PhD** (UMFST, Romania) investigates the interplay of sport and foreign policy during the communist regime, adding depth to the historical and cultural aspects of EU resilience. **Mircea Ungur, PhD**, **Edit Laura Ciulea, PhD**, and **Irina Mihaela Trifan, PhD** (UMFST, Romania) explore globalization through the lens of football, demonstrating the EU's capacity to influence global cultural trends. **Țurcanu Florin, PhD**, **Szabo-Csiffo Barna, PhD**, **Laurențiu Magdaș, PhD**, and **Dana Simona Țurcanu, PhD** (UMFST, Romania) present a study on optimizing the physical training process for junior athletes, contributing to discussions on health and education within the EU framework.

This volume exemplifies the diversity of disciplines and subjects that define EU studies. Contributions span fields such as history, religion, international relations, sports, psychology, and geopolitics, showcasing the breadth of topics essential for understanding the EU's multifaceted nature. The geographical spread of the authors—representing **Estonia, France, Belgium, Tunisia, Algeria, Ukraine, Poland, and Romania**—further highlights the EU's global connections and the shared academic commitment to addressing pressing issues.

By fostering critical thinking and embracing diverse perspectives, this volume underscores the EU's role as a unifying force in a complex and rapidly changing world. It serves as an invaluable resource for scholars, policymakers, and students dedicated to advancing European integration, promoting resilience, and celebrating the diversity that defines the European project.

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